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2ABSTRACT:
This study examines the ability of protectionist measures to
increase the political power of auto workers by improving
their bargaining power. The study focuses on production
workers in the leading U.S. auto firms and makes reference to
workers in the supplier industry. A connection is made
between the open economy on the one hand, displacement,
earnings loss and weakened bargaining power on the other. By
examining the impact of past protectionist measures, and the
anticipated effects of removing them, the study finds that
protectionism makes an important contribution to the
bargaining power of automobile workers.
Given the conditionality of protectionist measures' ability to
protect workers, the thesis concludes that while relatively
fixed levels of import quotas have positive effects on
workers' political power, the impact of increased
protectionist measures is uncertain and possibly harmful to
the interests of workers' long-term interests as part of a
social class.
The conditions under which protectionism may be successful in
aiding workers are reviewed by examining industrial
restructuring in the auto industry and the character of
international competition. Conclusions are drawn as to how
import penetration would increase dramatically without trade
controls and how protectionist measures are most effective
when used in conjunction with supplementary industrial
policies and labor strategies.
The study examines some of the major progressive and
conservative objections to trade protection which bear on the
ability of trade controls to project the interests of labor.
It finds that objections to protection do not take full
account of the opportunity costs of the open economy.
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7Introduction: Protectionism as an Industrial Policy
As the 1980s draw to a close workers in basic industry are
confronted with what is perhaps their most serious crisis since
the demise of industrial unionism and the collapse of a
movement based on a wave of industrial strikes which shook the
corporate order in World War II. The crisis threatens to
erode the gains made by industrial workers in the post-War
era. Jeremy Brecher, an observer of industrial
restructuring in the U.S., summarizes the problem as follows:
The U.S. economy is going through a transformation that
is fundamentally altering the situation of American
working people. It is removing the majority of workers
from relatively secure job structures and thrusting them
into a semi-casualized labor market. It is destroying
the existing bases of power for both union and non-union
workers (Brecher, 1984).
The victory of industrial unionism in the late 1930s and 1940s
was made possible by the concentration of industry and workers
in large industrial cities such as Detroit. Automobile
workers were among the most militant of the new factory
workers in these years. Workers organized innovations in
conflict such as the sit down strike; later in the early
1970s, auto workers would engage in numerous wild cat strikes
as a way to project political power. The mass production
system, guided by scientific management, led to the
development of highly integrated production systems "so that
striking a key department could stop an entire factory, and
closing a few plants could cripple a giant company." Capital
flight was not a problem for workers because mechanized
8production required large dedicated machinery which was
difficult to move and investments were also relatively fixed
(Ibid.).
One out of six jobs are tied directly or indirectly to
the manufacture, distribution, repair or use of motor
vehicles. In 1979, motor-vehicle related employment was 8.3
percent of the total civilian labor force. The strategic
economic position of the auto industry helped give auto
workers the power to force management to make new concessions
in labor bargaining. For example, in 1948 the United Auto
Workers (U.A.W.) and General Motors (G.M.) signed what was the
first major industrial labor agreement that included a cost-
of-living adjustment escalator as part of a multi-year
contract. In 1955, the industry was the first to implement
supplementary unemployment benefits; paid personal holidays
were introduced in 1976 (Katz, 1985: 2).
In the late 1970s, the strategic position of the auto
industry, together with the concentration of black workers in
auto plants in Detroit and New Jersey, merged with civil
rights activism and ghetto rebellions to produce a major rank-
and-file movement. As late as 1976, the integrated production
system at G.M. still left the company vulnerable to political
disruption. The Hyatt Clark Roller Bearing plant in Clark,
New Jersey, was one of three G.M. bearing manufacturing
plants. The Clark local was perhaps the most militant in the
whole G.M. system. Given production dependence on bearings, a
1976 strike over health and safety issues threatened to shut
9down fully one third of G.M.'s production (Livingston, 1986).
Today, the mobility of capital and displacement linked to
automation, increased import levels and productivity severely
constrain the power of workers to disrupt production at the
local plant level. While recent strikes among truck haulers
of finished automobiles may prove a model for future
industrial conflict, auto workers' options have been limited
by the power of management to close down plants and layoff
U.S. workers. As imports replace domestic production,
unemployment in the auto industry makes low seniority and
lower skilled workers vulnerable to management pressures for
concessions. While it may be impossible to predict what
leverage workers would have in a long drawn out strike in the
auto industry, the mobility of capital and increased pools of
unemployed workers clearly complicate strategies which hinge
on militant rank-and-file actions or even coordinated national
bargaining by the U.A.W.
As a result of auto industry restructuring, progressive
planners and trade unionists have proposed legislation to
regulate plant closings and the movement of capital in the
auto industry. Increased government intervention is proposed
as a means of mediating the impact of management decisions on
workers. The U.A.W. and some progressive planners and
academics have also proposed protectionist legislation such as
increased tariffs on nations with major trade surpluses with
the U.S., domestic content legislation and continuing quota
restraints on Japanese imports. These proposals have met with
10
criticism from free traders on the right, and leftist critics
who argue that government intervention in the form of trade
controls hinges on labor-management cooperation, may encourage
nationalism or provoke divisons between auto workers and other
groups. Critics on the left and right have also argued that
protectionism could provoke retaliation from Japan or raise
car prices considerably. Free traders argue that
protectionism may contribute to management inefficiency and by
slowing competition would encourage waste or the production of
vehicles of lower quality than foreign competitors.
Radical critics argue that labor-management cooperation
needed to insure protectionist measures may obscure workers'
needs to confront management on questions of corporate control
of production or the disposition of technology. Critics
claim that corporatism, or institutional arrangements where
labor and management trade concessions in formal deals
mediated by the State, is increasingly unfeasible as
corporations find the domestic work force more and more
superfluous.
This study attempts to examine whether present or
increased levels of protectionism could increase the political
power of workers. It examines the risks that outsourcing and
increased and present import levels pose to workers and weighs
them against the risks that protectionism might also pose. By
analyzing the nature of foreign competition and industry
restructuring, we also attempt to discover whether workers'
bargaining power could be preserved without increased State
11
intervention or some level of protectionist barriers.
We begin by examining the potential links between protectionism
and workers' power.
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Chapter One: The Theoretical Links Between Protectionism
and the Political Power of Workers
In order to make a case for how protectionism would
advance the bargaining and political power of auto workers it
is necessary to answer two essential questions. First, would
auto workers be worse off without protectionism than with
protectionism? Second, would "confounding variables" or
potential obstacles to improving or preserving the power of
workers seriously limit the usefulness of a protectionist
measure, even if it could provide auto workers with
significant power in the short-run?
The following analysis traces the logic of protectionism
as a trade union strategy. The analysis explains the
potential link between profits, the corporate environment and
strategic choices, the demand for labor and the potential
political power of workers under the protectionist regime.
Briefly, the hypothesis is offered that protectionism could
theoretically improve workers' power in one of two ways:
First, protectionism might prevent or slow a squeeze on
corporate profits, leading to less labor concessions and a
more favorable attitude of business towards domestic
investment. Second, protectionism might increase the demand
for labor (or reduce the rate of increase in unemployment in
the auto industry) by slowing import penetration and
outsourcing. The favorable effects of protectionism on auto
worker employment could contribute to increased power for auto
workers by eroding the power of the "discipline effect"
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(defined below) and improving bargaining power and general
labor solidarity. These potential benefits must also be
weighed against potential disadvantages and these are
discussed in the pages that follow.
The first general question is whether protectionism
preserves or extends the amount of sales made by domestic
producers. We attempt to answer this question by looking at
another: Does protectionism slow the rate at which imports are
able to decrease the market share of the Big Three? We look
to this question to find out how protectionist measures may
preserve jobs or slow displacement given that labor demand is
largely shaped by sales and output. We use market share
rather than sales to examine the impact of imports because
this measure addresses the full cost of import penetration on
job loss (as discussed in Chapter Three). To answer this
question it is necessary to establish a relationship between
contracted domestic sales and import penetration. Did
increased import penetration cut into the sales of the Big
Three auto makers? The answer to this question generally
seems to be accepted as positive. While G.M. suffered least
from increased levels of imports in the 1970s and early 1980s,
Chrysler and Ford clearly lost their market positions. A
group at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government
contends in a 1982 American Economic Review article that
despite increased import penetration in the 1980s, "U.S. car
makers lost only a few percentage points of their share of the
small car market, and they continued to dominate the large and
14
intermediate markets completely" (Gomez-Ibanez, 1982: 319)
However, the authors admit that in 1980 and 1981 "imported
cars accounted for approximately 27 percent of all domestic
automobile sales, up from between 15 and 18 percent in the
1970s" (Ibid.).
Appendix One lists the market shares of domestic
manufacturers and imports since World War II. Industry
observers generally have pointed to the depressed car sales of
U.S. auto makers following oil shocks in 1973 and 1979
(Fischer, 1982). 1980 was a particularly bad year for the
industry. G.M. and Ford suffered record losses while
government loan guarantees were required to save Chrysler from
imminent bankruptcy (Winham and Kabashima, 1982: 73). About
300,000 auto workers were progressively laid off during the
Spring months and "roughly double that number were idled in
auto related industries" (Ibid.).
The first hypothesis then is that the depressed sales of
domestic auto makers, or at least Ford and Chrysler, could
be slowed by protectionist measures. As we shall see in
Chapter Three, arguments against this hypothesis suggest that
recession and dollar appreciation were more important factors
in the depressed sales that caused diminished market share.
Also, it has been suggested that the shift to foreign
automobiles was based primarily on a quality and mileage
advantage which foreign automobiles no longer enjoy, or that
the small car market is less important now to building
domestic market share and this is the source of foreigners'
15
comparative advantage. We must also take note of the
differences between the 1970s and 1980s. For example, a U.S.
Department of Commerce study last year estimated that 36% of
the 1988 market for car sales would be comprised of imports
(Sundstrom, 1985).
The utility of protectionist measures has been challenged
by economists who argue that depressed sales and employment in
the 1970s and early 1980s were more directly linked to a
recession caused by increased interest rates and federal
deficits. It is also argued that protectionist measures will
not erode foreign nations' comparative advantage based on an
over-valued dollar. More significantly, protectionism would
not increase Big Three market share if Japanese and other
foreign firms which relocated to the U.S. significantly
expanded their domestic sales without a compensating growth in
the over all market.
Assuming that protectionist measures increase market
share by blocking foreign imports, we must determine whether
or not this will lead to an increased demand for the labor of
auto workers, will make layoffs less likely or slow the rate
of layoffs. If a protectionist measure is successful in
blocking parts outsourcing (defined below), it may also lead
to less layoffs without affecting statistics on the market
share of fully imported automobiles.
There are a number of ways to interpret the links between
increased imports and the decreased demand for domestic labor.
Reduced purchases from domestic firms could provoke layoffs in
plants producing specific models when demand shifts to
16
comparable imports. Alternatively, increased foreign
competition and import penetration could put a squeeze on
profits which forces across the board cutbacks as firms
attempt to cut variable labor costs and insecurity about the
market slow investment in domestic auto production.
Our question about labor demand branches into two
specific components representing our second and third
hypotheses. The second hypothesis is that protectionism may
slow or prevent a profit squeeze (or contribute to corporate
profits) and thereby increase the demand for domestic labor.
While economic analyses of protectionism have established that
protectionism has led to increased profits for auto companies,
we must again distinguish between whether the lessons from the
past can be applied to proscriptions for the future. A
profit squeeze might not be prevented by protectionism if
demand for imports are relatively inelastic and demand shifts
to higher priced luxury or larger sized imports. A profit
squeeze at a particular firm would not be avoided if inter-
firm rivalry increased substantially under protectionism or
became a significant dilemma in the 1980s. One could also
argue that if workers' political power increased under
protectionism that this too might lead to a squeeze on profits
and layoffs. Recent trends in auto bargaining precisely trade
wage hikes for employment security.
Our third major hypothesis is that protectionism could
create an environment suitable for corporate expectations (and
capacity) for products to clear the market i.e. protectionism
would decrease the likelihood of layoffs induced by foreign
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competition. One would assume that if imports are
significantly blocked, demand for U.S. autos would increase
or be preserved. In public pronouncements, U.A.W. President
Owen Bieber has noted predictions that there would be "750,000
additional Japanese car imports within just 12 months if the
V.R.A. comes off" (News from the UAW , 1985). However, demand
that would have led to foreign purchases could be met by
increased sales of used cars. Also, the cross-elasticity
between purchases of domestic automobiles and imports may be
such that the two goods are not substitutes. The question is
considerably complicated by the role played by foreign owned
production facilities in the U.S. i.e. would imports blocked
by protectionism simply be replaced by increased production
from foreign-owned domestic plants? A significant increase
in the market share of Japanese production based in the U.S.
could lead to displacement among Big Three automakers.
Even under protectionism, jobs might be lost because of
automation, capital flight from region specific plants,
recession or diversification out of the industry. Also, the
"downscaling" of domestic firms (discussed below) could lead
to major unemployment in the supplier industries. The
relevant question is whether protectionism would slow or
accelerate these trends. If protectionism did not aggravate
these problems, it has been argued that protectionism diverts
workers from focusing on these problems or the more general
question of the corporate control of production and location
decisions.
The impact of protectionism on the economic environment
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is also part of this question of how import controls might
affect employment prospects of auto workers. We will discuss
the links between foreign competition and the changing
patterns of industrial relations in the auto industry in
Chapters Two and Four. The main question is how a relatively
isolated U.S. market would affect trends encouraged by foreign
competition which weaken labor's power e.g. increased labor-
management cooperation, automation and diversification.
Whether or not protectionism is a diversion leads us to
our fourth major hypothesis: Protectionism would significantly
contribute to the political power of auto workers. This
argument depends on an analysis of how import penetration and
outsourcing weaken workers by decreasing the demand for their
labor. Also, if protectionism preserves corporate profits
might less concessions be demanded from auto workers?
Protectionism may aid workers by changing the political
and economic relationships between workers and managers at a
micro-economic or plant level and at a macro-economic level by
shaping national labor markets. To briefly summarize the
argument, at the plant level, a depressed demand for
labor leads to plant shutdowns and layoffs. Such events have
encouraged union locals to bid against each other for work
and lead to a "discipline" effect in which laid off workers
and workers remaining on the job are less likely to advance
political demands. On a macro-political level, increasing
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unemployment in the auto industry strengthens the hand of
management against workers by decreasing the likelihood of
strikes, increasing the number of strike breakers and the
ability of management to win concessions from workers. Trade-
linked deindustrialization also pulls workers out of highly
organized sectors and "pushes" a substantial number of them
into unemployment or relatively low paying jobs. While the
political dynamics resulting from unemployment at the plant
and national levels are difficult to separate, the
distinctions made above are offered as a means of explaining
how political reactions to depressed labor demand may affect
auto workers differently as members of a specific plant (with
its own history of shutdowns and layoffs shaped by forces such
as the car model or part it produces) and as members of the
larger groups of auto workers subject to larger social forces.
Let us examine each of the arguments presented above.
Assuming that protectionism increases the demand for
labor or slows the rate of unemployment in the auto industry,
how might protectionism increase the power of workers? The
supply of parts from overseas, foreign outsourcing, has
expanded since the 1960s as a weapon used by management to
discipline labor. Multinationals are able to put constraints
on U.S. workers and regulate their capital investments in
Third World nations by playing auto parts' producing countries
against each other. "Dual sourcing seeks to reduce the risk of
a single bottleneck or broken supply line disrupting worldwide
production" (Shaiken, 1982: 240). By relying on more than one
nation for the supply of parts, transnational auto producers
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are able to avoid any obstacles to the final supply of
vehicles. They can use supplies from one nation while another
country's auto workers go out on strike. Under "parallel
production," the creation of production and assembly
operations overseas which mirror domestic operations can be
used to redirect production to non-union facilities (Bluestone
and Harrison, 1984: 166). Also, even when overseas companies
supplying parts are unionized, the importing firm can increase
its power "by forcing the unionized work force in one country
to compete for jobs with that of another" (Ibid.: 175).
The possibilities of foreign sourcing as a weapon against
domestic labor are highlighted by reference to data on
corporate investments and profits overseas. While much
production overseas is directed towards capturing growing
markets outside the U.S. (as well as foreign subsidies and tax
advantages), facilities based overseas can be used for exports
to the U.S. (Ibid.). Among the incentives to source domestic
markets from foreign operations are cheaper wage costs abroad,
the need to maintain stable supply lines, and lower foreign
costs based on subsidies and tax advantages available from
foreign governments (Cohen, 1982, 1983a, 1983b). Production
is also sourced overseas if foreign manufacturers are believed
to produce higher quality parts than domestic producers. By
the early 1970s, about one third of annual U.S. automobile
company investment was being placed abroad (Bluestone and
Harrison, op. cit.: 113). The growth of the foreign labor
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forces of the Big Three in itself sends a message to auto
workers of their potential vulnerability:
...A 1977 survey by the Department of Commerce
reported that 38 percent of the employees of U.S.
[multinational corporations] which produce motor
vehicles and equipment were employers of their foreign
affiliates...That perhaps 40% of their employers
workforce was already offshore by [the] 1980's could
not fail to effect the bargaining power of U.S. auto
workers (Trachte and Ross, 1983).
Ford has duplicated production plants in Western Europe:
"Their plants are designed normally to operate at half-
capacity precisely so that managers can confront labor with a
stronger hand" (Goldsmith, 1984: 349). The first question
that should come to mind is the capacity of foreign operations
1
to supply both their domestic and U.S. markets. Are
there limitations to foreigners supplying U.S. markets? In
addition to the growing integration of U.S. and Japanese auto
markets, we should take note of studies which indicate that
increased levels of outsourcing is not only possible but
likely.
Several studies have pointed to the dramatic increase in
foreign sourcing of car parts. In the early 1980s, only five
or six percent of the value of components used by U.S.
companies came from foreign components. A 1985 report by
Arthur Anderson & Co. stated "that industry executives expect
foreign-made parts to account for 30% of the average
domestically produced car in 1995--up from 15% now" (Hampton
and Cook, 1985a: 79-80). Frost and Sullivan, a corporate
consulting group, estimated that about 10 percent of the
content of U.S. built cars will come from Mexico and Brazil
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alone by 1985 (Shaiken, 1984: 242). Past forecasts have also
argued that there would be a dramatic increase in the number
of engines sourced from abroad, with one-third to one-half
coming from nations such as Canada and Mexico (Cohen, 1983b:
546-47). The U.A.W. also predicts a dramatic rise in the
number of "captive" imports, or cars imported from abroad and
sold under U.S. firm nameplates. By 1988 more than a third of
the cars sold in the U.S. will be imports i.e. approximately
4.3 million of the 11.2 million cars sold in that year could
be imports. Thirty-six percent of these imports are expected
to be captives, vehicles imported by Ford, G.M. and Chrysler.
In addition, low-content U.S.-assembled vehicles made by
Japanese producers in the U.S. could account for sales of
over 1.4 million cars. If the low-content vehicles and
imports are the first cars sold in 1988, "there will be a
demand for only 5.5 million domestically-produced vehicles,
down from 7.5 million in 1984" (U.A.W., 1985a). We will
discuss the implications of such employment projections at
length in Chapter Three. Table 1-1 shows U.A.W. projections
for the rising number of captive and foreign import sales.
The increase in outsourcing is also expected to become a
major source of job loss in the auto parts supplier industry.
The Big Three are expected to buy more of their parts from
outside suppliers although more of these parts are expected to
come from abroad. As a result, the ranks of domestic
suppliers will thin. Table 1-2 outlines the proposed impact on
the U.S. auto supplier industry.
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Table 1-1: Projected Import Sales
1984 1988
Total Imports 2,439,000 4,275,000
100% 100%
Captives 105,000 1,560,000
4.3% 36.5%
SOURCE: U.A.W. Research Department, Research Bulletin,
July-August, 1985, Detroit, MI.
Table 1-2: Changing Patterns Among U.S. Auto Suppliers
Amount of Parts Bought Imports Share Number of
Outside U.S. Original Of Total Parts Primary
Equipment Manufacturers U.S. Suppliers
1985 47% 18% 2,500
1990 51% 23% 2,250
1995 56% 29% 2,000
Source: Arthur Anderson and Co., AIM Newsletter, December 1985.
Big Three auto companies can still rely on automation,
agglomeration economies and "just in time sourcing" to make
production economical within the U.S. (See: Chapter 4).
However, they can always extend the threat to export jobs. In
the Fall of 1984, during contract negotiations, "G.M.
threatened to step up plans to produce parts and even whole
cars overseas if U.A.W. leaders caved into rank-and-file
demands for a rich contract" (Bensman, 1984). Even when
workers are successful in negotiations, the threat of long-
term foreign sourcing can be used against them. Industry
observers claimed that an October 1985 labor agreement which
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provided $5,650 a year in additional income for Chrysler
workers would lead to increased outsourcing of cars and parts
from low-cost foreign suppliers (Holusha, 1985d).
The ability of car makers to transfer production overseas is
openly described as a management weapon to gain concessions on
labor costs. After the Chrysler settlement, Business Week
reported:
...Chrysler says it has to hold its breakeven point to
about 1.1 million cars and trucks, mostly by loppping
$2,000, or 30%, off the projected-cost of building a car
in 1990. Labor costs constitute 20% of the company's
costs. But if it makes no headway there at all, Chrysler
will move even further into the arms of foreign
suppliers. The company, which imports 87,500 cars a
year from Mitsubishi Motors Corp., plans to triple that
amount (Edid, 1985b).
Similarly, the business press has argued that the United Auto
Workers' leadership is compromised by the open economy; its
options are limited by the threat of outsourcing. Describing
the position of President Owen Bieber, Business Week wrote:
...If he pursues a militant path, Detroit is sure
to expand its foreign network. If he accomodates the
industry too easily, he risks an internal rebellion
without stopping the loss of jobs (Edid, 1985a).
Can increased outsourcing and imports be linked to
closings at specific plants? In the 1980s this question has
been complicated by the shutdown of establishments in
California and other regions and the redirection of production
to the Midwest. On the other hand, import induced layoffs
could also be viewed as a force for consolidation in fewer
plants at times when imports have cut significantly into
domestic car sales. The choice between layoffs overseas and
in the U.S. can be seen in one incident involving a Chrysler
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plant in the U.S.:
...Chrysler...manufactures the same 4-cylinder engine
in Trenton, Michigan, as it does in the new Mexico plant.
Saddled with excess capacity because of a weak market,
the corporation chose to make its layoffs in Michigan
because of lower costs in Mexico (Shaiken, 1984: 240-41).
Whether unemployment is due to shutdowns or layoffs,
displacement has clear effects on the bargaining power and
stance taken by workers. When employment has contracted in the
auto industry, layoffs have been used to divide union locals:
At auto plants throughout the country, management
is pitting local against local in a scramble for the
spots it chooses to refill (Junkerman, 1983).
It would be mechanistic to suggest that unions will always bid
against each other for work in situations of contracted labor
demand. In fact, shutdowns have lead to the mobilization of
workers in places like California where a state-wide coalition
organized to fight plant shutdowns. Some locals have raised
demands that other plants not be closed if their plant remains
open (Mann, 1986). However, as a general trend, increasing
layoffs have made bargaining difficult. If plants close and
then reopen, there is a "discipline" effect on workers. This
effect can be seen in changes in labor and management
relations at the reopened G.M. Framingham, Masssachusetts,
auto plant:
The shutdown seemed to convince both management and
labor that business as usual would not be good enough in
the future. Both sides say labor relations have improved
in the past year (Stein, 1984).
The discipline effect also is generated by layoffs and affects
both re-employed workers and those remaining on the job:
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...Compelling evidence exists that the layoffs created
by plant closings can actually improve the business
climate. The swelling ranks of the unemployed creates a
reserve of malleable workers and even potential strike
breakers. The memory of such drastic dislocation can
have what labor relations experts call a "chilling
effect" on future labor management negotiations
(Bluestone and Harrison, 1982: 79).
The bargaining power of management is increased as the
potential costs to a union of disagreeing with management's
position is raised by the "threat of unemployment,
particularly when it is in the form of a possible plant
shutdown" (Capelli, 1985: 100). As a result, if protectionism
slows displacement, we would expect it to increase workers'
political power.
This discussion leads us to an examination of how job
loss affects the wages of employed and unemployed autoworkers,
as well as the general bargaining climate under which a
potential strike against management would take place. Various
political-economists have argued that generally movements
towards full employment improve workers' power in securing
real wage increases, the likelihood of strikes and increases
in quit rates i.e. a measure of autonomy from work (Boddy and
Crotty, 1975). Such arguments have usually described the
impact of cyclical unemployment or the "political business
cycle." However, the present restructuring of the U.S.
economy suggests that increasing structural unemployment in
the 1970s and 1980s is playing the same role traditionally
left to cyclical forces (Bluestone et. al., 1985).
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The evidence for increasing structural unemployment has
been documented in a series of economic studies:
...Long-term unemployment rates have been shown to
exhibit a rising trend, the ratio of the number of
unemployed job-seekers to the pool of vacancies has grown
significantly since the 1960s, and the average length of a
completed spell of unemployment in the 1970s was substan-
tially longer than in the previous decade (Ibid.).
The relevance of such trends for protectionism can be seen in
arguments which link trade controls to a deceleration or
decrease in such unemployment and tie rising imports and
foreign competition to recessionary or structural
unemployment. The link between decreased structural
unemployment and protectionism has been suggested in an
econometric analysis carried out by Barry Bluestone, Bennett
Harrison and Alan Matthews in 1985. The authors write that
there was "a critical period of structural change for U.S.
manufacturing, occurring (or at least first observable) during
the years 1967-1973." During this period increased
automation, the transfer of production overseas and increased
foreign sourcing were "all structural shifts in business
policy that could conceivably manifest themselves in a new
employment trend line." A 1970-71 recession after more than
ten years of uninterrupted expansion, together with the 1973
Arab oil embargo and the beginning of the U.S. retreat from
Vietnam also suggest that this was a crisis period. The
authors argue that while such trends might indicate the growth
of increasing structural unemployment in the auto industry,
protectionist--and other industrial policies--measures have
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slowed, if not prevented, deindustrialization:
...Employment trends in both the motor vehicle
industry and shipbuilding --often thought to be
deindustrializing-- exhibit positive structural shifts
after controlling for cycle and exchange rate. According
to our analysis, the auto industry actually had 90,000
more jobs in 1984 than it would have if the pre-1973
trend had been maintained. This counterintuitive result,
however, has a rather simple explanation. Part of the
positive shift in autos is no doubt related to the
voluntary export restrictions forced on Japanese auto
manufacturers between 1981 and 1985. It may also be
partly due to the federal loan guarantee that kept
Chrysler in business after its near-bankruptcy in 1979
(Ibid.).
Our final general hypothesis is that protectionism can
improve the relative power position of workers tied to the
auto industry by improving their wage rates or slowing the
decline in wages by making trade union concessions less
likely. One possible link between wage cuts and protectionism
was suggested above: if protectionism can slow or prevent a
squeeze on profits, then concessions might be less likely as
employer ability to pay increases. While wage hikes generally
follow trade union demands, strike threats or actual strikes,
would protectionism make the bargaining position of workers
favorable to such wage hikes? The literature in this area is
suggestive, strikes are less likely when the "cost of job
loss" is high. This measure, as developed in the work of
Juliet Schor and Samuel Bowles, represents "the income loss
times the duration of unemployment expressed as a pre-loss
stnadard of living of the worker" who becomes unemployed.
"Workers are more likely to win strikes when the supply of
available strikebreakers is small" (Schor and Bowles, 1984).
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If protectionism can lower the cost of job loss, it could be
conjectured that wages rates and protectionism are postively
related. Such a proposition may be impossible to prove with
reference to statistical analysis. What could be shown is
that concession bargaining or a drop in the real wage rate are
more likely in import sensitive industries. Or, it might be
shown that increasing import levels cause a drop in wage
rates. Chapter Five discusses the relationship between
concession bargaining, wage levels and import penetration.
The most serious challenges to the protectionist argument
for specific industries targetted with trade controls come
from four sources. First, even if employment levels in the
auto industry were favorably affected by protectionism, the
movement of capital to areas where labor is weak within the
U.S. seriously undermines its usefulness as a strategy for
workers. Second, protectionism may help auto workers but
hurts other workers who must pay more for automobiles as
protectionism raises the price of foreign and or domestic
autos. As a result, workers in the auto industry become
divided from other workers who are consumers. Third,
protectionism in the auto industry would provoke retaliation
from targetted nations and thereby depress employment in
export sensitive industries. Foreign reaction to
protectionism, as well as the nationalistic feelings stirred
up by protection, would contribute to divisions between U.S.
auto workers, workers overseas and U.S. workers in export
sensitive industries. Finally, it can be argued that
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corporate opposition to protectionism makes trade union and
labor efforts to push protectionism forward a wasted effort
i.e. further protectionism is impossible and therefore
policies design to encourage protection are diversionary. The
other side of this argument is that there are other-more
useful-strategies for labor to preserve or extend its share of
corporate income. These arguments are addressed in Chapter
Five and the conclusion to this study.
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1-There are two major regulatory impediments to the
substitution of foreign-built products of U.S. firms overseas
production for domestic use. One obstacle is that vehicles
must be "federalized" to meet the U.S. Government's
requirements in terms of emissions and safety. Such
requirements add 200 pounds and costs which producers are
reluctant to pay for in advance of notification that products
they produce abroad (geared for foreign markets) will also be
directed to the U.S. If producers plan in advance to export a
certain amount to the U.S., for markets which are guaranteed,
this might not prove an obstacle.
Second, U.S. producers must meet Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards which set limits on a producer's fuel
economy average for domestic and import production separately.
There has been the danger that American manufacturers' fuel-
efficient imports would displace their fuel-efficient domestic
products. As a result, their U.S. output would be left with
too high an average fuel consumption meet the government's
fuel-economy regulations (Altshuler et. al., 1984: 172).
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Chapter Two: The Changing Nature of Comparative Advantage
in the Auto Industry
Introduction
Increasing import penetration by foreign producers is
based on two sets of forces: first, conjunctural forces which
favor different sized automobiles because of oil shocks and
consumer desires for cars with better mileage ratings and
quality performance. Second, larger forces which are based on
the labor and production costs of foreign producers as well as
the organization of work. Protectionist measures have been
proposed to protect domestic suppliers from the effects of
both forces. Therefore, it is important to understand the
causes of increased import pentration in order to judge the
economic arguments on which protectionist measures are based.
Today it is generally recognized by observers of the auto
industry that Japanese and European producers are setting the
standards for the design and production of automobiles. If
the organization of work in these nations forms the basis for
comparative advantage, then nations not following the practice
of either Japan or Europe could be viewed as being at a
disadvantage. The advantages of the Japanese system have
already lead to changes in the U.S. automobile industry and
promoted a number of trends such as: new arrangements between
producers and suppliers, the relocation of Japanese producers
to the U.S. and the development of corporate stategies to
"recentralize" production within the Midwest. These
tendencies are described in Chapter Four. Each tendency plays
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an important role in defining the terms of the protectionist
debate. Will the new supplier-producer relations make the
ability of protectionism to preserve jobs less likely? Or,
will these new relations make capital flight to the South and
other labor weak areas less likely, making protectionism less
of a "diversion"? Will the relocation of Japanese producers
and suppliers to the U.S. weaken the ability of protectionism
to preserve the Big Three's markets? Each of these questions
can be answered definitively only in the future. However, by
understanding the Japanese system we may be able to answer
other questions which allow us to come to some tentative
conclusions e.g. how might production economies affect capital
flight? Or, how might the Japanese system further encourage a
profitable relocation of assembly operations to the U.S. from
Japan?
The Small Car Advantage in the 1970s
We now turn to an examination of the conjunctural forces
which lead to a rising market share for Japanese producers in
the early 1970s. Before the recession of 1974-75 and a
fourfold jump in oil prices, domestic auto sales of American
automobile makers increased steadily, from 7.1 million units
in 1970 to 9.67 million units in 1973. However, by 1974
sales dropped by 2.2 million units, a 23 percent decrease. In
1976, domestic sales again rose until 1978 when sales were
9.30 milllion units, slightly below the peak in 1973 of 9.67
million units. But with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran came
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Table 2-1: Japan's Rising Share of Imports
Calendar Japanese Imports Total % Imports % Japanese
Year Imports
1984 1,906,204 23.5 18.3
1983 1,915,621 26.0 20.9
1982 1,801,969 27.9 22.6
1981 1,858,89 27.3 21.8
1980 1,905,968 26.7 21.2
1979 1,769,633 21.9 16.6
1978 1,357,337 17.7 12.0
1977 1,387,856 18.5 12.4
1976 941,665 14.8 9.3
1975 807,931 18.2 9.4
1974 592,113 15.8 6.7
1973 742,621 15.3 6.5
1972 628,898 14.7 5.7
Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United
States, Facts & Figures '85, Washington, D.C., 1985.
a second rapid increase in oil prices and uncertain product
availability. Once again, automobile sales fell dramatically.
By 1982, U.S. new car sales declined to 5.8 million units
which was their lowest point since 1961 (Laffer et. al., 1985:
267). Table 2-1 examines how Japanese imports have taken a
larger share of total import sales from the early 1970s to the
early 1980s. The data reveal both a rising percentage of
Japanese imports and an increase in the absolute sales of
Japanese producers in the U.S.
From the peak sales year of 1973 until 1982, sales of
35
full-sized cars declined, losing more than 15 percent of their
share of the total domestic automobile market. But while
overall domestic automobile sales were declining, the market
share of small cars increased over the 1970s by more than
twenty percent, from 42.7 percent in 1973 to 63.8 percent in
1980. The shift in consumer demand to small cars at this time
was paralleled by an increase in imports: In the past more
than 97 percent of all imports into the U.S. were within the
small-car market. As a result, the change in the past decade
towards small cars sustained the sales of foreign cars. This
occured even though there was a depression in total U.S. auto
sales (Ibid.: 268, 269).
What accounts for the shift to imports? Five general
factors have been offered by auto industry analysts for the
change in the composition of car sales. The first three of
these were generally caused by factors which uniquely combined
in the 1970s to the detriment of U.S. producers. The last two
are more deeply rooted and pose a lasting threat to U.S.
manfacturers. Turning to the first of these factors, increases
in income will increase the demand for transit services. The
demand for transit services may be reflected in an increased
demand for a variety of forms of transit. However, there is
evidence that when economic growth slows and incomes decline,
demand for new automobiles will also fall. A slowdown in
economic growth which began in 1979 contributed significantly
to the slowdown in sales of U.S. autos during the 1979 to 1982
period. Appendix 2 outlines the connection, showing that the
annual percentage change in sales of automobiles is associated
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with changes in real GNP in the U.S. (Ibid.: 272).
A second factor contributing to the shift in auto demand
is the impact of government regulations. There is clear
evidence that federal safety and emissions regulations have
added substantially to the cost of U.S. produced automobiles.
Appendix Three outlines the estimates of a Brookings study of
the cost of automobile regulation. These regulations had an
indirect impact on making imports more attractive. New safety
requirements led manufacturers to incorporate weighty
equipment; exhaust emission control devices used to comply
with environmental regulations reduced engines' over all fuel
efficiency. As a result, "Between 1967 and 1973 there was a
substantial (around 20 percent) decline in the fuel economy of
American cars" (OECD, 1983). U.S. large cars became more
expensive and the cost constraints of regulation depressed
over all demand for car sales (making any rise in import share
more costly to domestic auto manufacturers) (Laffer et. al.:
273). Imports rose as foreign manufacturers could more
readily (and cheaply) supply the smaller fuel efficient cars
which they specialized in producing.
A third factor which has been linked to depressed sales
of automobiles is the dramatic rise in oil prices,
particularly after supply shocks in 1973 and 1979. According
to one account, "The rise in the price of petroleum explains,
in part, the substantial decline in sales of new cars at the
time the oil embargo was imposed in the United States" (Ibid.:
274). Empirical evidence up to the mid-1970s had indicated
that there was a relatively inelastic transportation demand
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for fuel oil used for transportation in Western nations
(Hensher, 1982: 100). Further, some research shows that the
price of fuel oil has a greater impact on car size than car
usage (Ibid.: 100-101). Appendix 4 highlights the strong
relationship between the annual percentage change of small car
sales and the percentage change in the real price of
petroleum. During the last energy crisis, domestic and
Japanese products were both beneficiaries of the shift to
smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles. From 1978 to 1981
purchases of both domestic and Japanese small cars increased,
indicating a secular trend of increased consumer interest in
small cars in general (Hammond, 1983). However, imports
consistently outpaced domestic automobiles share of the
American subcompact market from 1971 to 1982 (Laffer et. al.:
270).
Two other causes have been linked to the rising share of
imports in the 1970s. These factors are more deeply rooted in
the nature of Japanese cost advantages and quality control
(discussed below). One result of the Japanese cost advantage
was the lower prices of Japanese cars. This advantage
diminished in comparable models from 1977 to 1983 as can be
seen in Table 2-2. However, a final factor explaining the
shift to imports has been their superior quality. Table 2-3
shows that by 1976 Japanese cars had much better repair
records than their U.S. counterparts (Crandall, 1984: 10).
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Table 2-2: Prices
A Compar
Car Model
Datsun 8210/Sentra
2 door, delux
Mazda GLC
3 door, hatchback,
custom
Toyota Corolla
2 door sedan, delux
Chevrolet Chevette
2 door hatchback, coupe
Ford Pinto, Escort
2 door, hatchback
Plymoth Horizon
4 door, hatchback
Source: Hammond, 1983.
Year
1970
1976
1981
Source:
rating.
of Japanese and U.S. Cars 1977-1983
of Japanese and U.S. Cars 1977-1983
asion of Comparable Models
Price 1977 Price 1983 % C
$3119 $5701 83
$2930
$3224
$3531
$3583
$5452
$5663
$5784
$5922
$6254
hange
85
76
64
65
Table 2-3: Average Consumer Reports Quality
Table 2-3: Average Consumer Reports Quality
Ratings for U.S. and Japanese Cars
Japanese Imports G.M. Ford Chrysler
2.33 2.81 3.18 3.85
1.13 3.03 2.80 3.91
1.05 4.33 3.17 4.50
Crandall, 1984. 1 indicates high rating, 5 low quality
Price and quality considerations have been documented in
market research which suggests that U.S. consumers regard
Japanese cars as superior to U.S. products. In ranking their
preferences, "vehicle price is central to this, followed by
operating cost and quality" (Hammond, 1983).
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Production Costs, Wages and Automation:
A Comparative Look at the U.S. and Japan
An explanation for why the Japanese have enjoyed price
and quality advantages over U.S. producers leads us to a
discussion of the Japanese production system. U.S. auto
makers have made political use of this system in their
relations with U.S. labor, arguing the U.S. workers must
follow the Japanese practice. Others say that management has
no choice -but to develop a labor relations system on the
Japanese model. In fact, several economists have argued that
the Japanese system has become the basis for comparative
advantage in the auto industry.
Increasing product market competition in the auto
industry has been linked to the impact of Japanese labor
costs, plant organization and management on the price and cost
picture of car sellers in the U.S. market. Several studies
done in the early 1980s showed that Japanese cars have a
significant cost advantage over U.S. firms:
Japanese manufacturing costs are 33.3 percent
(or $2,050 per vehicle) lower than U.S. costs. After
an estimated transportation and tariff cost of $400 per
vehicle, the Japanese still enjoy a landed cost advantage
of 26.8 percent, or $1,650 per vehicle (Gomez-Ibanez
et. al., 1982: 320).
Yet, cost estimates prepared by James Harbour which showed a
widely publicized $2000 cost advantage for the Japanese have
been challenged as an attempt to win concessions from the
U.A.W. Industrial engineering expert Seymour Melman argues
that the Harbour study did not make proper allowance for
capacity utilization and unit costs in estimating the cost
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differential. Also, Harbour did not even discuss the problem
of inventory costs in making his comparisons (Melman, 1986).
Former U.A.W. economist Lee Price suggests that most of the
Japanese cost advantage is based on lower unit labor costs
(Price, 1984). Harvard University researchers William J.
Abernathy, Kim Clark and Alan Kantrow argue that about half of
the Japanese producers' lower unit labor costs are due to
lower compensation rates, and half to fewer hours needed per
car (in their estimates 80 vs. 144) (Gomez-Ibanez et. al.,
op. cit.: 320). Data on compensation rates in 1975 and 1981
indicate that while Japanese and British workers are catching
up to those in the U.S., American workers are paid much more
than foreign auto workers (See: Table 2-4). Price notes that
the Japanese have been able to convert some of the "savings"
received in lower labor costs into improvements in product
quality (Price, 1984).
One study in the early eighties found that the total
annual compensation of production workers was $32,400 in the
U.S. and $20,863 in Japan. Total cost per hour worked was $20
in the U.S. and $11.28 in Japan (Abernathy, et. al. 1983: 60).
Assuming that wage competition from Japan is a reality, one
link between labor relations and increased international
competition can be seen by reference to industrial relations
theory:
...the motivation to alter either existing
collective bargaining outcomes or to avoid unions
altogether is in part a function of the degree to which
the parties have been able to take labor costs out of
competition (Kochan et. al., 1984: 26).
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Table 2-4: Hourly Compensation Costs
Production Workers in Motor-Vehicle and Equipment Industry
1975 1981
US Dollars Index
(U.S.=100)
US Dollars Index
(U.S.=100)
United States
W. Germany
Sweden
France
Italy
U.K.
Japan
Figures include an assessment of the cost of fringe
well as wages, bonuses, and deferred compensation.
Source: Office of Productivity and Technology, U.S.
Labor, B.L.S. as published in Altshuler, 1984: 208.
benefits as
Department of
Table 2-5: Hourly Employees US Big Three Vs.
1982 Data
Base Wages,
bonus, COLA
Housing, meals
commuting
Medical,
dental
Pension
Vacations,
holidays
Unemploy-
ment,
Soc. Sec.
Shipping
to USA
TOTALS
USA
Worker
$12.30
0
$2.00
$1.50
$1.80
$2.00
0
$19.50
Japan Japan
Worker (230yen/$)
1748 yen
230
368
161
230
437
460
3634y
$7.60
$1.00
$1.60
$.70
$1.00
$1.90
$2.00
$15.80
Japan Big Six
Japan
(180yen/$)
$9.71
$1.28
$2.04
$.89
$1.28
$2.43
$2.56
$20.19
Source: UAW Research Dept. as published in Labor Institute, 1984.
9.44
7.68
7.44
5.22
5.10
3.96
3.56
100
81
79
55
54
42
38
17.55
12.89
11.50
9.20
7.86
7.83
7.74
100
73
66
52
45
45
44
42
But the statistics which show a wage jap with Japan have
been challenged by labor activists and economic researchers
who argue that the difference in U.S. and Japanese wages has
been overstated. Table 2-5 provides a different view of the
Japanese wage gap. Differences in exchange rates and the
inclusion of employee benefits narrows the gap considerably.
Thus, to fully understand Japan's cost advantage we must look
beyond any cost differences based on a hypothetical "wage
gap." This is not to suggest that wages are not a source
of competition for domestic labor and producers when it comes
to non-Japanese imports and outsourced parts. We examine this
issue in the final section of this chapter.
Abernaty et. al. trace productivity improvements in Japan
less to higher levels of in-plant automation than to practices
in management and work-place organization. According to one
estimate about one half of the Japanese cost advantage comes
from the "just in time" system (see below) and organization of
auto production:
If a Japanese car costs $1500 less to build, wages are
responsible for at most half the problem. If there were
no wage differences at all, the Japanese car would still
cost at least $750 less, probably $1000 less (Krulwich,
1982).
However, data on productivity levels in the Japanese auto
industry clearly indicate that lower wage rates in Japan do
not fully explain the Japanese advantage:
In the early 1970s the Japanese produced roughly 3
million vehicles per year and their work force consisted
of about 450,000 workers. Today the Japanese produce
well over 9 million vehicles a year with the same 450,000
workers (Westfall, 1982: 9).
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Does Japan's greater use of robots explain the
productivity and general competitive advantage of the
Japanese? Auto industry observers William J. Abernathy, Kim
B. Clark, and Alan M. Kantrow argue that automation levels
in Japan are not the crucial factor in explaining their
production advantage. In Industrial Renaissance,
they write:
The exemplary, productivity, cost, and quality record of
Japanese automobile makers is explicable not in terms of
"new plant" or "new technology" but, instead, in the way
automobile production is managed (Abernathy, et. al,
1983: 69).
Evidence against competitive advantages based on "new plant"
can be seen in data which show that "the Japanese actually use
less capital per vehicle than do their American counterparts"
(Ibid.: 69). Data collected by M. Ito, also shows that robotics
applications in Japan and the U.S. are comparable (See:
Table 2-6). Other data suggests that "robot" density, or the
number of robots per 100,000 manufacturing workers is larger
in other manufacturing countries than in the U.S. (See: Appendix
Five). Whether this has made a critical difference to Japan's
advantage is doubtful since Sweden has the most automated
auto industry and has not been perceived as a major exporter
to the U.S. or comparable to the "threat" posed by Korean auto
makers. In 1982, Sweden had 1 and 1/2 times as many robots
per manufacturing worker as the Japanese and 8 times as many
as the United States (U.A.W. 1985b: 20). More importantly, the
Japanese production advantage should not be attributed to
robotics because some Japanese companies have used large
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Table 2-6: ROBOT APPLICATION FIELDS
Figures in % of total applications.
1980/81
USA JAPAN
Spot Welding 40 30
Arc Welding 6 6
Painting 10 1
Assembly 10 18
Other* 34 45
*-Other includes material handling, maching, press.
Source: Present state and future trends of introducing
robots into the automobile industry in Japan. M. Ito,
Hakone 1982, using figures from Cincinnati Milicron and
JIRA. Table appears is (OECD, 1983: 65).
numbers of robots while others have used almost none at all.
In 1980, Toyota had 420 robots although Honda had only 5
(Shaiken, 1984: 156).
In seeking to explain the Japanese advantage in selling
automobiles, the authors of Industrial Renaissance look to the
Japanese system of manufacturing as producing the higher
quality and lower cost automobiles which have led to an
increased U.S. market share for Japan's auto producers. Data
on labor and capital productivity in the Japanese auto
industry both indicate Japan's advantages over the U.S. in
labor hours per small car and "productivity of capital" in
automobile production (Abernathy, et. al., op. cit.: 62-63).
Other data reveal that Japanese cars are superior in terms of
reliability, workmanship and durability (Ibid: 65-67).
The Japanese manufacturing system contributes to lower
costs and improved quality through several components: the
just-in-time production system (in-plant operations), total-
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quality control, just-in-time purchasing (supplier-producer
relations) and an overall system of labor and machine
flexibility. An overview of the sources of Japanese and
American productivity increases will help explain how Japan's
advantage is rooted in production and labor processes.
The Productivity Difference:
The Japanese and U.S. Manufacturing Systems Compared
In order to understand the Japanese production advantage,
we will refer to an analogy employed by Japanese auto analyst
Takahiro Fugimoto. Production resembles an information
processing system in which workers and machines relate to
workparts to add value and "information" to workparts. There
are three components to the production process: operating
time, up-time and non-operating time (See: Figure 2-1).
Operating time is the time when materials flow on an assembly
line, work is in process, or machines are running which
directly contribute to value through assembly: "the time when
technology element A (machines, workers, etc.) is connected to
element B (work in process, materials, etc.)." Up-time is a
Figure 2-1: Operating Time, Up-Time and Non-Operating Time
up-time (set up, etc.)
A ] J[ ] [ [ ]
B [/]--[/]---------[/]--[/]--[/]---------
non-operating time operating time (inventory)
[ ]-Workers,machines etc. [/]-workparts
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SOURCE: (Fujimoto, March 1983: 7)
subset of operating time; it is when information from machines
or workers is actually transfered to workparts. "This
represents the information processing speed of element A (B
absorbs the information from A)." Finally, "Non-operating
time is the time when element A or B is not connected to
anything" (Fujimoto, March 1983: 7).
Labor productivity can be defined as the number of
labor hours per vehicle. This ratio can be divided into
tw'o components: up-time per vehicle and the up-time ratio.
Takahiro Fujimoto defines these elements as follows:
Labor Hours Up-Time . Up-Time
Vehicle Vehicle Labor Hour
For any given product design and level of automation, up-time
per vehicle is determined by the individual work pace or
information processing speed of each individual worker.
"Up-time ratio, on the other hand, represents the information
processing efficiency of the total work system." According to
Fujimoto, U.S. and Japanese basic product designs, automation
levels and the workpace of an average worker are not
significantly different (Fujimoto, 1983: 8-9). However,
other observers of the Japanese auto industry suggest that
line speed in the Japanese auto industry is very intense and
point to industrial accident levels and the very few work
stoppages which occur in Japan (Halliday and McCormack, 1973).
A report in October 1982 noted that speed-ups were a serious
problem at Nissan:
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...Over the last five years Nissan has increased
its output by 25 percent, but it hasn't hired any
new workers. This increased production was accom-
plished by radically speeding up the assembly line...
workers don't even have time to talk to each other--
if they do, their managers will give them more work.
Another worker said "If you drop a bolt, you don't
even have time to pick it up" (Westfall, 1982b).
Assuming Fujimoto's assumptions are correct, we can trace
the productivity difference between Japan and the U.S. to the
up-time ratio. For example, assuming a total up-time per
vehicle of 3.75 hours, we can see up-time ratios as the
critical factor:
Up-Time/Vehicle / Up-Time Ratio = Labor Hours/Vehicle
U.S. 3.75 / .25 = 15 Hours
JAPAN 3.75 / .75 = 5 Hours
(Fujimoto, March 1983: 9).
Auto technology analyst James Harbour estimates that body shop
up-time is 70 percent in the U.S., but 95 percent in Japan.
Press up-time is 50 percent in the U.S., but 90 percent in
Japan. Harbour also estimates that midsized cars require 189
labor hours per vehicle in the U.S., but 115 in Japan. For
compact cars, the U.S. requires 172 hours per vehicle but only
105 are required in Japan (Harbour, 1986).
There are two ways to enhance the up-time ratio. One way
is to increase the line speed or reduce the cycle of time of
the production process (the amount of movements/time which is
needed to produce an automobile through a given cycle of
man/machine interfaces). Another way to increase up-time is
through job-enlargement. Productivity is improved "by
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increasing the number of job elements each worker does within
a given cycle time." This latter approach only becomes
possible when "workers are multi-skilled and flexible as to
job assignments." American automobile workers have
traditionally emphasized the speed-oriented approach, while
limiting one worker to one job. Japanese manufacturers tend
to emphasize job enlargment rather than the speed-oriented
productivity measures according to Fujimoto. More job
elements are assigned to each worker in a given cycle term:
"the job-enlargement (flexibility-oriented) approach appears
to be more effective than the speed approach" (Fujimoto,
op. cit.: 10).
The advantages to Japanese equipment productivity also
are based on the same principles as labor productivity. The
productivity of equipment is based on equipment costs per
vehicle. This ratio is dependent on up-time per vehicle, up-
time per machine hours and equipment life cycle cost per life
time machine hours. Here, the U.S. auto industry emphasizes
up-time per vehicle by speeding up the pace of each machine.
In Japan, the technology system is oriented towards maximizing
both the up-time ratio and the lifetime of a machine through
machine flexibility to model changes (Ibid.: 10).
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Japanese Economies in Manufacturing Techniques
The Japanese manufacturing advantages described above are
rooted in a number of practices which affect the organization
of technology, capital and labor. The just-in-time system
contributes to productivity by eliminating non-operating time,
inventory build-up and waste. Traditionally, U.S. management
has emphasized the large costs associated with setting up
equipment and paid slight attention to the need for
eliminating carrying costs (which were regarded as relatively
fixed) (Schonberger, 1982: 188 ff.). This emphasis is linked
to a U.S. reliance on large batch as opposed to small batch
production (which is favored by the Japanese).
The U.S. emphasis on large batch production was based on
relatively stable product demand which favored production at a
high volume. Large batch production leads to greater
inventory accumulation as assembled intermediate goods or raw
materials are taken from a storage area in an assembly plant
after having been shipped by suppliers. When a company orders
in large lots they have to pay more to inventory carrying
charges such as "interest costs on capital tied up in
inventory, plus the physical loading costs, such as warehouse
rent and warehouse workers' wages" (Ibid.: 18).
Yet, producers who organize production around small
batches face high set up costs. More frequent ordering leads
to increased set up of equipment after intermediate goods and
or raw materials are received. Costs come when heavy dies
must be moved into place and adjustments must be made for each
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production run. The Japanese producers have been willing to
trade the advantages of small batch production for the
disadvantages associated with these cost pressures. They have
sought to reduce the costs associated with set up and machine
changes. Commercial machine tools have been designed for
quicker set up. "Commercial machines are sometimes retired
and a company's own toolmakers build their own machines"
(Ibid.: 21). In addition to lessening carrying charges,
the Japanese machine set up times are cut so that it becomes
economical to run small batches.
The costs associated with set up are more than balanced
by the just-in-time advantages gained by limited inventories
and a steady flow of production: "The ideal is to make one
piece just in time for the next operation" (Ibid.: 1).
This system contributes to both cost and quality control as
follows. In the U.S. and traditional manufacturing systems,
buffer stocks have been inserted between work stations "to
cushion the shock of irregularities into the parts-feeder
processes." By limiting these buffers, the problems in making
a part are exposed at the source. Each worker becomes more
dependent on his or her fellow worker up the assembly line for
insuring that a product is not defective and will not slow
down the line and thereby prevent their production quota from
being met. Japanese manufacturing expert Richard J.
Schonberger explains the rational for just-in-time as follows:
The Japanese no longer accept the buffer principle.
Instead of adding buffer stocks at the point of
irregularity, Japanese production managers deliberately
expose the work-force to the consequences. The response
is that workers and foremen rally to root out the causes
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of irregularity. To ignore it is to face the
consequences of work stoppages (Ibid.: 32).
The just-in-time process together with a total quality
control system lead to the increased quality of Japanese
goods. First, by relying on small batch production the danger
that a manufacturer or supplier will accumulate batch after
batch of defective parts hidden in inventories is eliminated.
Also, "competitive checks can be maintained because at each
stage of production the costs of the products and services
being traded is fully known" (Altshuler et. al., 1984: 138).
James Harbour estimates that the Japanese are able to produce
first-time quality engines 98 percent of the time, whereas in
the U.S. the figure is 80 percent (Harbour, op. cit.).
The total quality control system also increases product
quality and reliability. It is based on one simple principle:
by making each worker responsible for parts inspection, the
responsibility for quality is no longer specialized into
costly inspectors who are not directly tied to assembly and
production lines. The Japanese also seek to maintain high
quality goods at low cost by developing long-term
relationships with suppliers whose own production is based on
just-in-time and total quality control systems. By finding
suppliers whose goods meet the high standards of Japanese
manufacturers, the need for inventory inspection is eliminated
and the quick and constant flow between supplier and
manufacturers can be maintained as if the two processes were
part of one larger integrated operation. An added advantage
to this approach is that through cooperative networks,
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"innovations in technology and management diffuse more quickly
through a production chain and across the industry" (Ibid.:
139). By establishing closer realtions with workers and
suppliers, management is able to come in direct contact with
both groups' special knowledge about production. Cooperation
helps form the basis for flexible labor which can be arranged
to meet the requirements of new managerial directives or
technological applications (see below).
The traditional U.S. system of quality control is quite
different from that of the Japanese. Japanese auto makers
prefer a "zero-defect" standard for parts production whereas
Americans have often been willing to adopt the "acceptable
quality level" criteria for parts production. While in Japan
long term relationships are established between suppliers and
manufacturers, in the U.S. the traditional practice has been
for manufacturers to choose suppliers which submit the lowest
bid. This practice leads to a sacrifice in product quality as
suppliers which in the past submitted successful bids are
taken off their learning curves. The Japanese manufacturers
seek to find suppliers who do little business with other
downstream industries so as to develop leverage with them in
meeting their specific quality and cost requirements
(Schonberger, op. cit.: 157 ff.).
Rather than emphasizing on the spot inspection, U.S.
manufacturers prefer to "shorten the quality chain" by
integrating technology elements. One example of this is the
use of computer-aided design and manufacturing systems which
"integrate some of the die design steps into a single computer
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data base, making the chain shorter" (Fujimoto, March 1983:
12). This principle of quality control is based on automated
processes which divorce produc.t design from production, the
execution of the design idea. While the Japanese attempt to
build up the skill levels of auto workers through job
rotation, Americans prefer specialized workers who remain
dedicated to specific tasks. As a result, quality and
innovativeness in the U.S. system may suffer. Technology and
auto industry analyst Harley Shaiken explains the limits of
the U.S. strategy:
Success in removing conceptual skills from the shop
floor-in further severing planning from execution-creates
some new problems. The dialogue between the engineer and
the person closest to the cutting and fabricating of
metal is not mediated by the part programmer. Not only
does this restrict the upward flow of design ideas, it
may limit the engineers' awareness of problems involved
in producing a certain design. The result can be the
exploration of fewer design alternatives (Shaiken, 1984:
84-85).
Labor Flexibility: A Key to the Japanese Manufacturing System
Earlier we discussed how the flexibility of Japanese
labor lead to productivity gains as labor handled more parts
per worker than in the American system. Similarly, parts
inspection by Japanese auto workers depends on the flexibility
of labor. In Japanese manufacturing, "When one worker is
having problems and experiencing delays, other workers move in
to help, partly to avoid being idled themselves." Labor
flexibility is also neeeded after management pulls workers off
the assembly line when it is running too smoothly i.e.
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management wants to create tension in the system to gain
maximum productivity. Whole crews are also moved from one
"dedicated" line to another as the model mix changes. Also,
"flexibility is needed to rebalance lines when there is a
changeover from one part to another, which tends to occur
often in a Japanese JIT [just-in-time] factory" (Schonberger,
1982: 135).
The absence of labor flexibility in the U.S. is rooted in
trade union demands and work rules designed to protect workers
from working too many tasks and management attempts to
fragment the labor process (by dividing conception from
execution as described above). The U.S. industry has relied
more on bureaucratization to formalize and stabilize the
production process. The goal is to make the work process less
vulnerable to disruptions caused by reliance on the
"information" stored in a workers. The Japanese, however,
have formal policies or even pay systems that reward or
recognize flexibility (Fugimoto, op. cit.).
The use of labor flexibility in the Japanese system and
its limited use in the U.S. is partially based on the
historical conditions and socio-political relations in both
countries. Labor flexibility has been accepted in Japan in
part because there is less fear among workers that job
rotation will lead to unemployment. Here it is critical to
note the link between labor displacement and quality control.
If production workers are treated more as professionals and
"given the skills and responsibility to diagnose problems,
repair equipment, and spot defects, then the ranks of
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supervisors and machine repairmen can be greatly thinned as
quality is improved" (Altshuler, et. al.: 137).
The development of a permanent employment system in Japan
helped insure greater acceptance for labor flexibility.
Permanent employment in Japan was extended to the majority of
semi-skilled blue-collar workers in large-scale industry after
World War II. At that time workers demanded through
"enterprise" unions a means of preventing massive dislocation
from contracted employment caused by a peace economy (Cole,
1979: 12). Over-population in the countryside also led to the
need for a system to be created which would provide security
for urban workers. Workers were rewarded according to age and
length of job service; workers who left a firm in the middle
of their work cycle were penalized. But workers who remained
in their firm had the security that they would not be forced
to return to the rural areas (Ibid.: 19). Another reason for
flexible labor practices through job redesign has been the
need to make work attractive to workers in industries with
recruitment and turnover problems e.g. the steel and auto
industries in Japan (Ibid.: 129).
However, an underlying political factor behind labor
flexibility in Japan is the political weakness of unions;
their inability to prevent a practice clearly favored by
management. Robert Cole, a student of Japanese labor
practices describes the history behind labor acquiescence to
management design of work roles as follows:
Among Japanese unions there was considerably less
interest in crystallizing the rights, duties, and
boundaries of jobs than in the U.S. In the
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pre-World War II period the unions had trouble simply
establishing their legitimacy. Furthermore, Japan
experienced a labor surplus rather than labor shortage
throughout much of its industrialization. Consequently
control over job opportunities and the job specification
that follows from this, was less feasible as a
union strategy (Ibid.: 103).
Similarly, other commentators have observed that Japanese trade
unions are part of a larger management structure. A 1973 study
of the Japanese economy note6:
Nissan, in which all 118 permanent officials of the union
are members of the supervisory staff, is simply one of
the most advanced examples of a very widely-based trend
in Japanese industry (Halliday and McCormack, 1973: 186).
More recently, Business Week described Toyota's labor-management
relations as follows:
Every Toyota worker belongs to the company union, but
it's almost part of the administrative structure. There
has been no strikes since Toyota fired 25% of its work
force in a dispute in the early 1950s (Helm, 1985b).
But beyond the advantages of the Japanese production
system one must also look to larger financial and political
realities which support Japanese industry. Japanese
automobile companies are part of larger financial trusts which
readily provide finanicial support and management advice when
auto firms develop economic problems (Alstshuler et. al., op.
cit.). Government subsidies may also provide the Japanese
with advantages although economist Paul Krugman has argued
that subsidized competition does not necessarily hurt U.S.
industry: "A protected domestic market that serves as a
spingboard for exports is more characteristic of innovative,
high-technology sectors than of mature sectors like auto and
steel" (Krugman, 19841 83-84). Finally, Japan's advantages
are also based on the role women play in the economy:
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Exporters and their low-margin suppliers use women
to fend off low-cost Third World competitors--and to
maintain big profit margins in U.S. markets. Some
30% of women work in exporting companies...the growth
of the female work force has held down wages across
Japan by creating a labor surplus (Helm and Takahashi,
1985).
This suggests that in one respect "low wages" may be a source
of Japan's advantage in production with the U.S. Yet, the
U.S. auto industry has its own pockets of lower paid workers
in the supplier industry. Such low wages are supported by the
use of migrant labor as we will discuss in Chapter Five.
Flexible Production and Changing Markets
The changes which have taken place in U.S. markets and
the advantages of Japanese techniques in lowering costs and
producing higher quality goods since the 1970s suggests that
comparative advantage in the auto industry now also depends on
the implementation of flexible production systems and
production geared for higher valued added autos e.g. capturing
sales for large and luxury cars. As explained by Nissan Motor
Co. Executive Vice-President Yoshitada Uchigama:
This is the second phase...with small cars, we had
an advantage because of the oil crisis. The real com-
petition will be in mid-sized cars. That will decide
the fate of the Japanese auto industry (Treece and
Hampton, 1985b).
In fact, Toyota and Nissan have made more money on larger cars
than subcompacts. They clear almost $5,800 on each
intermediate car they sell in the U.S., compared with only
$933 for a subcompact. A report at the close of last year
noted that the Japanese auto makers are shifting production
for U.S. markets away from smaller cars. The change comes as
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the market in the U.S. has shifted to more luxurious cars.
The rise of an affluent "baby boom" consumer market, the shift
to two-income households and smaller families have all
increased demand for larger cars. Luxury models have only
accounted for 10 percent of the cars sold in the U.S., but the
figure could could grow to at least 15 percent by 1990
(Hampton, 1985c).
But while the Japanese producers are now building larger
and more luxurious cars than they did in the 1970s, Americans
have sold smaller cars (although they are increasingly
imported) and scaled down the larger models. Traditionally,
U.S. production of large vehicles and the lack of foreign
alternatives blocked foreign entry in key product markets
(Altshuler, et. al., op. cit.). However, the difference
between size categories of cars produced at home and abroad
are rapidly narrowing. As a result, U.S. producers are
increasingly vulnerable in markets which are critical to their
profit posture. Luxury cars by one estimate account for about
one-third of the Big Three's profits each year. Car makers
also admit that they clear about $5,000 on each luxury car
that sells for $17,000 or more, while they barely break even
on small cars (Hampton, op. cit.).
In addition to the growing importance of luxury cars,
some argue that the instability and segmentation of markets
makes it imperative for U.S. producers to adopt a system of
flexible specialization in automobile production. Under this
system firms "specialize in certain types of outputs, but not
in the production of outputs in large quantities...as in mass
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production". Although firms can make use of relatively
sophisticated technologies, they do so "in the form of general
purpose machines rather than large scale integrated machine
systems". As can be seen in the example of Japanese auto
production, the flexibility of the system has two components:
management and labor. With supplier operations divorced from
assembly, the costs of model changes are no longer absorbed by
one integrated operation. Product lines can be switched more
easily when production is not based on integrated machine
systems, which are dedicated to one narrowly defined output
(Christopherson and Strorper, 1985). In the U.S. die mold
transition (or set up) time is eight to twenty four hours, in
Japan five to twenty minutes (Harbour, 1986).
The changing structure of Western markets also has made
dedicated large scale manufacturing systems a distinct
disadvantage. This was particularly clear during the oil
shortage. At that time rapidly fluctuating demands for fuel-
efficient cars made it difficult to use dedicated large scale
equipment geared to a certain product line. The costs of not
using a flexible manufacturing labor/production system were
highlighted by both business uncertainty and contracted
markets i.e. there were no longer large guaranteed markets in
which consumers were certain to purchase a specific kind of
automobile (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 176). The jumbled flow
operation is also more flexible to product and volume changes
(Hayes and Wheelright, 1979: 138). Flexible production allows
Japanese firms to meet rapid change in the form of strategic
moves by competitors. The Japanese producers have begun to
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fragment the market for standard cars into a series of
distinct submarkets. They produce a distinct chasis, engine,
and finishing package for each submarket. Thus, they have a
"production strategy of flexibility" which matches "a
marketing strategy of real product differentiation" (Friedman,
1983: 351).
The need for product flexibility has also become critical
in the auto industry because of the "dematurity" of the auto
industry. This term, coined by the authors of
Industrial Renaissance, suggests an increase in the diversity
of product technology offered in the market in response to
consumer demands for improved quality products and product
improvements associated with process innovations that make the
use of cars easier, cheaper or more attractive. Among the new
innovations in the works are fluorescent dashboards,
computerized gears and raindrop detectors which automatically
activate the windshield wipers (Petre, 1985). As product
markets are increasingly fragmented and based on demand in key
product niches, flexible specialization has become an
important element in capturing markets:
Because the automobile is probably the most complex
consumer good and provides such services for the buyer as
status, recreation, entertainment, and comfort in
addition to basic transportation, a producer always faces
a challenge in successfully combining product designs,
production systems, and market placement in a mix that is
right for all times (Altshuler, 1984: 128).
Will Japanese Technology Systems Reshape the U.S.?
It could be argued that the tremendous productivity
advantages in the Japanese technology/manufacturing system
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will reshape the organization of production in the U.S. auto
industry. Past increases in energy prices and the lower sales
price of Japanese imports are both important forces promoting
technological organization which reduces costs. A review of
technologies which improve gasoline mileage by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
such as diesel engine technology, increased use of ceramics
and plastics, increased compression ratios and the use of
more durable steels all involved heavy outlays for research
and devlopment and high initial production costs. Such
product innovations are rooted in the need to reduce vehicle
fuel consumption (OECD, 1983: 54 ff.).
The innovations which improve mileage are costly, putting
pressure on management in Western nations to lower their costs
in any way possible. In the U.S. and other Western nations,
auto manufacturers have turned to the use of flexible
manufacturing systems (F.M.S.) and robotics. Robotics
replace labor with machines, reducing wage costs. F.M.S.:
consist of a line of machine tools and transfer
machinery which can easily be reprogrammed to
manufacture several types of components, or the same
type of component of different size specification (OECD,
1983: 64).
F.M.S., like Japanese quality control systems, save on labor
costs by improving product quality as the number of quality
inspectors can be reduced. The increased use of robots is
based on simple economics: In 1980, the total cost for an
automaker to buy and operate a robot over two shifts for eight
years was about $6 per hour. As we have seen, total
compensation for U.S. autoworkers runs at about $20 per hour
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(Shaiken, 1984: 162-63). In short, there are two opposing
trends in the U.S. auto industry: product innovations which
add value to autos and make them more expensive and process
innovations which reduce labor and manufacturing costs (OECD,
1983: 66).
The preference for F.M.S. and robotics rather than more
extensive use of Japanese techniques as suggested earlier is
rooted in management's desire for stability and labor control
as well as accumulated traditions. Some have argued that U.S.
management's preference for outsourcing parts is also based on
a strategy of limiting workers' power and moving production to
cheap wage areas overseas. As a result, outsourcing limits
the use of just-in-time economies dependent on the close
proximity between supplier and assembler (Piore and Sable,
1984). The conservatism of Japan's unions and lower wage
rates in Japan have made just-in-time more feasible than in
the U.S. In the past, American trade unions also have
resisted the flexible labor system of Japan.
Yet, there are several forces at work which make the use
of Japanese manufacturing techniques in the U.S. increasingly
likely. The Big Three U.S. automakers are beginning to follow
1
Japanese manufacturing practices. For example, the number of
steel suppliers used by G.M. has been cut back, and G.M. is
also choosing suppliers based on their proximity to G.M.
fabrication plants and their ability to produce high quality
steel products (Schonberger, 1982: 179). A recent report noted
that "The industry's usual one-year, multiple source
contracts...are giving way to exclusive agreements that run
63
for five years or longer" (Hampton, 1985b). The use of Kan
Ban or just-in-time techniques has been applied at General
Motors' Buick Motor Division. A March 1985 report noted that
the inventory on hand and in process at Buick was reduced from
$48 million to $25 million through Kan Ban techniques. Buick
planned to further cut its inventory to $13 million once its
massive "Buick City" program had begun by the end of last year
(Westfall, 1985). The U.S. automakers are also experimenting
with job rotation and flexibile work rules in some of their
plants. Japanese auto and motorcycle plants in the U.S. have
already successfully introduced just-in-time, quality control
and flexible labor arrangements to their plants (Schonberger,
1982). We will return to an examination of these issues in
Chapter Four.
What forces will promote these trends? First, there are
clear limits to the increased use of automation. Harley
Shaiken notes that the expensive automated equipment
increasingly used by the automakers is very vulnerable to
sabotage and has at times been foiled by worker resistance to
automation (Shaiken, 1984). However, it is not clear that a
technology policy which deskills workers or removes them from
the process of quality control will produce the quality
products demanded by consumers (Abernathy et. al., 1983).
This suggests again that automation and F.M.S. can not be
counted on to deliver the quality products increasingly
demanded by auto consumers.
Whether or not labor flexible practices will be
introduced in the U.S. depends in part on U.S. labor and trade
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union response to management initiatives. Some observers of
the labor movement believe that the advantages of the flexible
manufacturing system portend problems for workers who resist
flexible labor arrangements:
Changes in the conditions of international competition
are forcing producers to increase the flexibility of pro-
duction while reducing the costs. These adjustments
entail changes in work tasks, job ladders, and employment
security.. .Where unions are resisting change, they may
pay a ruinous share of their industries' defeat in
international competition. Where they are cooperating,
they may be the the victims of the very successes they
encourage (Katz and Sabel, 1985).
This assessment implicates workers in the process of making
companies competitive. It bears a striking resemblance to
another view in which workers must pay a price if they resist
technology:
If you resist technology, you'll lose jobs because
of uncompetitiveness with competitors that didn't. If
you don't resist technology, you'll lose jobs because
technical progress will raise productivity in excess of
the growth rate of output (Luria, 1982).
Both of these approaches assume a relatively open economy and
the costs that entails for workers unless they are able to
renogiate the terms on which they work with management. Would
protectionism isolate workers from automation which is needed
to compete with foreign producers? We address this question
at length in Chapter Four. At this juncture it should be
noted that the choices are not so clear as laid out above. If
workers' or management resistance to new technology increased
dramatically, then the introduction of automated production
systems would hardly make us more competitive in the world
market. There is evidence that worker sabotage and machine
failure clearly limit the usefullness of some forms of new
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technology (Shaiken, 1984). More importantly, if
protectionism provided companies with increased profits it
would make it easier for workers' to demand and management to
provide a shortened work week to provide full employment in
the face of technology-based productivity increases. In
recent years management at the German Manufacturer IG Metall
claimed that to shorten the work week would be too costly. An
open economy precisely raises such relative costs. On the
other hand, management would not have its backs against the
wall and workers would have confidence that companies could
make greater concessions if corporate profit rates stabilized
or markets were relatively sheltered by protectionism.
Turning to the dilemma rooted in flexible labor, it is
unclear whether or not this is a "dilemma" at all. Flexible
labor systems hinge clearly on labor-management cooperation.
In the American context, such cooperation has usually proven
detrimental to production workers at the Big Three auto
companies. U.A.W. activist Eric Mann, based on his
observations of labor-management relations at the G.M.'s Van
Nuys plant, argues that the "team concept" in which work
groups attack production problems will be used to speed up
production. Such speed-ups will result in labor displacement.
This pattern can be seen in Quality of Work Life (Q.W.L.)
experiments at G.M.'s Tarrytown, N.Y. plant where quality
circles were introduced as a management device to co-opt
workers faced with a speed-up. Mann argues that the team
will be used to get workers involved in discipline if workers
don't show up to work as managers put pressures on workers to
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meet production quotas. Team members, subject to racial or
sexual biases, can work against fellow workers in greivance
proceedings as well (Mann, 1986).
Mann's thesis that labor-management cooperation and
displacement are linked is supported by an internal document
prepared by G.M.'s Vice-President of Industrial Relations
Alfred Warren and leaked by a union activist. The document
detailed G.M.'s plans to reduce man-hours per car by
continuing its assault on local work practices. The Warren
memo suggested that plant management and supervisors "actively
support local changes in work practices and seniority bumping
procedures that increase productivity" (Russo, 1984). There
is also no guarantee that management will use productivity
gains reaped from worker cooperation in a way that will
benefit labor. Knowledge shared by workers with managers can
easily be transported across national boundaries. Flexible
labor schemes can be used to intensify competition among
workers, a problem seen in Q.W.L.:
...the more worker knowledge is articulated, polished
and presented in a formal package to management, as
happens in QWL, the more likely that those techniques
will be used in the "competing " operation (Parker, 1985:
86).
The strategy adopted by the U.A.W. at G.M.'s Saturn
project suggests that labor leaders are willing to cooperate
with mangement to do whatever is necessary to save jobs and
enhance productivity. Last July, the U.A.W. negotiated a
labor agreement which followed the Japanese practice of
supplementing salaried pay with bonuses and involved greater
worker participation'. Labor flexibility was a central
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element:
Workers will not be restricted in their tasks. Job
classifications will be reduced from scores to a maximum
of six--one for all unskilled workers and up to five for
skilled employes. Production will be by "work groups" of
six to 15 people, and groups will interact (Maynard, 1985).
The Saturn deal even includes provisions for job guarantees,
another practice resembling the Japanese auto industry.
It is not clear how far the Saturn model will go towards
reshaping U.S. labor and technology in the image of Japan.
Labor may resist any attempt to use flexible work rules or
manufacturing techniques in ways which bring speed-ups or the
intense fragmentation of work. The history of G.M. at
Lordstown tell us this much.
Outsourcing and Cheap Labor Overseas:
A Divergence from the Japanese Pattern of Competition
Changing patterns in the U.S. automobile markets have
lead Japanese producers to target the large and medium sized
car markets (especially with U.S. production). However, the
small car market is now being threatened by other foreign
producers such as the Koreans. Korean auto workers make
considerably less than their Japanese counterparts. Here,
wages play an important role in driving down costs. As a
result, the Korean "Hyundai Pony" has surpassed Japanese
models as the best-selling car in Canada (Proper, 1986). The
Korean producers have begun to plan a major import drive in
the U.S. The U.A.W. estimates that by 1988 U.S. imports of
Korean produced cars could reach 430,000 or 10 percent of the
total import share (U.A.W., 1985a).
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U.S. parts outsourcing is also supported by the cheaper
wages paid to foreign workers engaged in the motor vehicle
industry. As a large and stable demand for small cars emerged
in the 1970s, U.S. multinationals were able to supply the home
market with parts from Latin America and European subsidiaries
geared to more fuel efficient production. With dedicated
production machinery, the start up costs of new models has
been enormous. In the past this limitation favored the
adoption by car manufacturers of a "world car." Under this
strategy, limiting the number of models produced offered car
producers a means of reaping economies of scale in design and
production. There were a limited number of models with high
production runs. According to Ford executives, the world car
was a vehicle "with a uniform engineering philosophy and
sufficient commonality in component design to permit optimum
use of the productive resources of the company" (Jenkins,
1984).
Common design of cars allowed a tremendous saving in pre-
production costs: "Ford estimates that it saved $150 million
and 15,000 man-years in engineering time through its worldwide
approach to developing the Escort" (Ibid.). Such standardized
design and decentralized production has grown with advances in
computer technology and telecommunications. "Computer
technology enhances the ability to decentralize without the
price of operations becoming disorganized" (Shaiken, 1984:
235). Production of jointly designed cars can also be
decentralized even though manufacturing operations are in
different nations. In the case of the Escort:
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The basic design parameters of the car were determined
at Ford World Headquarters in Dearborn, after which teams
of Ford engineers throughout the world developed the
major components (Ibid.: 238).
The uncertainty associated with changing consumer demand
and oil shocks and the advantages of flexible specialization
have made the dedicated production scheme of the world car
obsolete. The advantages of supplier-producer proximity have
also placed limits on decentralized production. However,
outsourcing and the just-in-time system are not mutually
exclusive (Sabel, 1986). Production located in low-wage areas
such as Mexico can still be considered "close" to the U.S.
More fixed components such as engines can be made there, while
other components subject to changing consumer tastes (e.g. car
bodies) can still be located in the U.S. Also, parts
manufactured under flexible production can always be supplied
from the U.S. although assembled with less skilled workers
abroad.
Despite the demise of the world car, coordinated design
has lead to coordinated supply of parts to the U.S. from Latin
America, Asia, Europe and Japan. The demand for small cars
and increased competition from Japan has expanded the number
of joint production agreements between U.S. and Japanese auto
makers (See: Chapter Three). Under such agreements the Big
Three have imported more parts and entire vehicles from
Japanese auto makers. U.S. auto makers have sought such
agreements because even as U.S. cars have improved in gas
mileage, they have not matched Japanese autos' quality. U.S.
firms can also make more money by selling cars with Japanese
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parts (or entire vehicles) because of Japan's cost advantage
in producing smaller cars.
U.S. sourcing from Third World nations has also
increased. Third World nations seeking to protect their
native auto industries have placed local content limits on
U.S. multinationals. Nations such as Brazil and Mexico have
also encouraged the expansion of engine plants in
multinational subsidiaries through export subsidies and tax
concessions. Such inducements have at times made overseas
production more profitable than U.S.-based operations (Cohen,
1983b: 547). The cheaper costs of parts production (as
opposed to fully aseembled autos) in the Third World has also
encouraged multinationals to expand overseas operations
(Kronish, 1984: 83-84).
U.S. workers also face competition from exports based in
the "maquiladoras" or assembly plants in border regions in
Mexico. In the mid-1960s Mexico instituted a Border
Industrialization program. The Goverment allowed duty-free
imports of machinery, equipment, and components for processing
or assembly within a 12-mile strip on the border. Under the
plan all imported products were to be re-exported.
$2.5 billion was exported from the maquiladoras in 1980, with
$2.3 billion going to the U.S. About half of the exports was
value added (including material) in Mexico, the balance was
primarily U.S. components. European and Japanese firms are
starting to set up operations in the assembly plants
(Grunwald, 1983).
U.S. auto companies have set up many operations in such
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regions in Mexico. G.M. has three Packard-Electric division
plants located in Juarez, Mexico, employing 1,077 workers.
The plants produce 20,000 wiring harnesses per day which are
shipped across the border to the U.S. where they are installed
in G.M. trucks and auto dashboards. Fisher body, also in
Juarez, makes seat covers and trim. There is also a Delco-
Remy plant where workers assemble fuel management devices for
computer-controlled auto systems.
The importance of Juarez production for U.S. markets can
be seen in the scale of production and labor cost advantages.
There are 150 plants in Juarez, where the average wage per day
is $3.54. The work week runs 48 hours and plants have no
unions. A September 1983 report noted that 80 to 90 percent
of engines produced at a new plant in Chihuahua were destined
for use in the U.S. in Ford-Tempo and Mercury-Topaz compacts.
While 10.3 million cars were sold in the U.S. in 1984, a 1983
estimate suggested that "G.M.'s enormous, modern engine plant
near Mexico City will have a maximum delivery capacity of two
and one half million V-6 engines per year by 1986" (Westfall,
1983).
Domestic Implications of Foreign Competition
The cost advantages of foreign production and the
superiority of Japanese manufacturing techniques to those in
the U.S., as well as the politically constrained conditions of
labor overseas, help explain the advantages of foreign
producers in U.S. markets. This pattern is not uniform, as
Brazilian industry has expanded in spite of a wave of militant
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strike activity in the 1970s and could conceivably become a
major exporter to the U.S. Korean auto workers in 1985 have
struck successfully for higher pay although they are still
paid considerably less than their U.S. counterparts (Proper,
1986). Others argue that low wages do not explain all of the
cost advantages of outsourcing and see subsidies and foreign
government incentives as more important (Cohen, 1982; Jenkins,
1985). Land costs are also a factor in the relocation of
supplier firms from Los Angeles to Mexico (Morales, 1983).
Nevertheless, the relatively constrained labor and lower wages
paid overseas, as well as foreign subsidies, and production
advantages combine to provide foreign producers with
advantages in the U.S. market. Such advantages suggest that
"free trade" would be detrimental to U.S. producers.
The advantages of the Japanese system also raise
questions about how labor and production relations will be
reshaped within the U.S. One question that emerges is whether
the Japanese system will change the relationship between labor
and management by producing more flexible labor in the U.S.
This could weaken the power of U.S. workers considerably as
suggested above. It is not clear whether protectionism could
slow the process of management demands for flexible labor.
However, by removing cost pressure from other nations which
adopt flexible labor there may be limited space provided for
U.S. workers. Given that the Saturn plant is already in
place, it seems likely that U.S. producers are committed to
highly automated systems which require interchangeable labor.
Another question raised by the Japanese system and the
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rise of flexible production systems is their role in shaping
the location of U.S. production i.e. the movement of Japanese
producers to the U.S. and the building of new plants by the
Big Three in the U.S. As we will see in Chapter Three the
advantages of Japanese producers can be transferred to the
U.S. to reap cost economies within the U.S. market. Automation
and flexible production may also make outsourcing less
feasible. As a result, protectionism could be irrelevant as
more and more production moved back to the United States.
Or, protectionism would have to redefined to address how the
domestic cost advantages of domestic Japanese producers affect
the Big Three. We discuss this issue in Chapter Three.
Also, as Japanese production systems reshape the
relationship between U.S. suppliers and assembly operations,
cost competition increases parts outsourcing and the number of
captive imports from Japan. We have shown through our
description of foreign auto production suggests that
protectionism might limit outsourcing and captives by removing
foreign companies' cost advantages i.e. taking such costs out
of competition with domestic market production.
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1-It should be noted that some "Japanese practices," such
as low inventory accumulation, "zero defects," and quality-of-
work life programs had their origins in U.S. management
practice. The successful Japanese perfection of these
techniques has created a dynamic situation in which the search
for higher market share (through lower costs/prices and higher
quality products) has lead the U.S. to re-examine ideas and
practices now favored in Japan. However, it seems unlikely
that the U.S. would have been forced to implement these
techniques by the market without the competition from Japanese
producers.
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Chapter Three: Changing Market Share, The Demand for Labor
and the Protectionist Regime
Imports, Job Loss and Recession
We have already indicated that the changing nature of
comparative advantage in the auto industry presents a serious
challenge to domestic auto makers and threatens to dramatically
increase market share of foreign producers within the U.S.
Having reviewed the nature of the Japanese trade advantage, we
can better evaluate the ability of protectionist measures to
increase labor demand and market share of domestic producers.
We now return to the analytical framework described in Chapter
One.
Our first hypothesis argues that rising import levels
were responsible for depressed U.S. sales of automobiles and
resulting unemployment among workers in domestic industry.
The link between unemployment and the growth of trade can be
seen by examining trade statistics describing imports and
exports in the motor vehicle industry. The U.S. trade deficit
for autos, trucks and buses, and bodies and chasis increased
from $10.9 billion in 1979 to $23.8 billion in 1983. Table 3-
1 shows the trade deficit for these products in millions of
dollars. The data indicate that trade patterns in the motor
vehicle industry were not conducive to employment growth. In
fact, one study of the motor vehicles industry from 1970 to
1980 revealed that the decline in employment due to trade was
larger than the increase due to domestic use i.e. consumption,
government purchases and investment (Lawrence, 1983: 137).
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Table 3-1: The Trade Deficit in Autos, Trucks, and Buses
(Bodies and Chassis): 1979-1983 in Millions of Dollars
Year Imports Exports Trade Deficit
1979 18,466 7,563 10,903
1980 21,039 6,550 14,489
1981 22,588 6,697 15,891
1982 25,539 5,029 20,330
1983 29,906 6,108 23,798
Source: "Summary of Trade and Tariff Information: Automobiles,
Trucks, Buses and Bodies and Chassis of the foregoing Motor
Vehicles," USITC Publication 841, June 1984, United States
International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.
We have already seen that increased imports of small
cars increased throughout the 1970s. How much did the shift
to small cars come at the expense of domestic auto makers? On
the intuitive level it may be possible to separate the effects
of rising import penetration and recession by reference to
Appendix One. Of all the Big Three car makers General Motors
had the largest share of larger cars as a percentage of total
sales. Ford and Chrysler, having a larger percentage of
smaller cars, were more sensitive to imports throughout the
1970s. As can be seen in Appendix One, G.M.'s market share
increased throughout the 1970s, while Ford and Chrysler's
fell. Yet, one could argue that G.M. was more "recession
proof" than Chrysler and Ford as those who buy larger cars
have higher incomes and are affected less by a recession.
Several studies have argued that G.M. has unique advantages
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because of its size and market power, as compared with its
smaller rivals, Ford, Chrysler and American Motors Corporation
(Kwoka, 1984).
Critics of protectectionist policies argue that the
number of jobs lost from recessionary effects in the auto
industry outweigh the jobs lost from increased import share
(MacEwan, 1986). Robert Z. Lawrence, an economist at the
Brookings Institute also argued that changes in domestic use
of motor vehicles, rather than imports, contributed most to
declining employment levels throughout the 1970s (Lawrence,
op. cit.). He found that radical changes in the world
economy after 1973, with increased stagflation, volatile
exchange rates and increasing government intervention in trade
produced different findings for the auto industry than when
1970 is used as a base year to measure employment and output
changes up to 1980. In a trade study employing input-output
techniques, Lawerence found that:
...of the 24.1 percent decline in the output of the
U.S. automobile industry from 1973 to 1980, 18.6 percent
could be attributed to a decline in domestic use and
5.5 percent to changes in net trade balance. Even if
Japanese imports had remained constant during this period,
the problems faced by the U.S. automobile industry would
have been severe (Ibid.: 138).
Table 3-2 describes Lawrence's findings on the impact of
changes in domestic use and trade on employment and value
added in the Motor Vehicle and Equipment industry. Lawrence
found that imports reduced employment in auto assembly and
parts by .91 percent per year between 1973 and 1980, leading
to a total loss of 6.6 percent of the jobs in the auto
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Table 3-2: Percent Change in Employment and Value Added
Resulting From Foreign Trade and Domestic Use, U.S. Motor
Vehicles and Equipment Industry, 1970-80, 1973-80
1970-1980
Total Change Due Change Due
To Foreign To Domestic
Trade Use
Value 21.6 -15.4 37.0
Added
Employ- -1.3 -11.1 9.9
ment
1973-1980
Total Change Due Change Due
To Foreign To Domestic
Trade Use
Value -24.1 -5.5 -18.6
Added
Employ- -19.2 -6.4 -12.8
ment
Source: Lawrence, 1983.
industry i.e. approximately 61,700 jobs (Scott, 1985: 7).
Lawrence's findings have been challenged by other
economists who question his use of the input-output technique
to model trade-induced job loss. Robert Scott, in a study for
the Office of Technology Assessment, found that:
Lawrence's technique seriously underestimates the
number of auto workers who were actually or potentially
displaced by vehicle imports because it focuses on
changes in the number of imports rather than the market
share of imports (Ibid.: 9).
Rising market shares of imports represent an opportunity cost
for domestic production. By this line of reasoning, if
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imports in 1980 had held their 1973 market share, domestic
auto sales would have been approximately 1,015,000 units
higher, "rather than the 635,000 suggested by the Lawrence-
type analysis" (Ibid.: 10).
To separate out the cyclical from the trade impacts on
employment, the fall in domestic production from the 1973 peak
year must be adjusted by the percent total motor vehicles fell
i.e. assuming domestic motor vehicles held their peak 1973
market share, how much would they produce in a depressed 1980
market? Using this technique Scott found that employment fell
by 204,000 workers between 1973 and 1980 for purely cyclical
reasons. In contrast to Lawrence's findings that there were
819,000 units in direct sales losses from trade, Scott found
that the increase in market share by foreign producers
represented 1.238 million units (at 1980 levels of total
sales) i.e. an opportunity cost of 1.238 million in sales to
U.S. production. Changes in inventories linked to increased
imports accounted for the loss of another 50,500 workers in
the 1973-80 period (Ibid.).
Our analysis of Japan's competitive edge through lower
costs and flexible specialization in Chapter Two suggests that
Scott's method has clear advantage's over Lawrence's. For
example, Scott linked job loss from increased outsourcing and
automation to job loss, modeling the indirect loss of jobs
from rising import penetration. Lawerence's method is not
able to account for such indirect import-induced job loss.
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Even if rising import levels are associated with job
loss and depressed market share, critics of protectionism
contend that it is not the open economy which is primarily
responsible for the penetration of U.S. markets by imports.
Rather, recession, high federal deficits, inflated interest
rates and the appreciation of the dollar are blamed for
contracted domestic sales and the attractiveness of imports
(Dollars and Sense Collective, 1986; MacEwan, 1986). Trade
problems are primarily linked to "Reaganomics," rather than
the open economy. Job loss is traced primarily to recession
and the appreciated dollar rather than manufacturing or labor
cost advantages of the Japanese. However, while the
appreciated dollar has created trading problems for the U.S.,
protectionist critics have not fully accounted for the limits
of dollar devaluation in changing import levels; they also
seriously underestimate import-induced job loss.
An article in Dollars & Sense expressed the view of many
progressive critics of protectionism, linking import
penetration and reduced domestic sales to the problems
descibed above. The real value of the dollar rose
approximately 60 percent between 1980 and March 1985. This
rise in the dollar prompted domestic demand to shift to less
expensive imports. Exports fell because foreigners found U.S.
goods more expensive to purchase. High budget deficits have
lead to an increased demand for credit but exacerbated lenders'
fears that inflation would increase in the future.
Resulting tight credit policies (through high interest rates)
81
have attracted foreign investment capital into the U.S.
However, as U.S. goods increase in price, they are less
attractive to foreign nations as imports. The rise in the
dollar increases the price of goods priced in dollars and
purchased overseas. This "exports inflation" to other
countries who react with deflationary policies which serve to
contract overall world demand and trade. As a result, there
may be less purchases of U.S. goods by foreigners (Dollars and
Sense Collective, 1986).
It is certainly true that recessionary policies and
dollar appreciation complicate the ability of domestic
manufacturers to sell their products at home and abroad.
However, the argument that the open economy bears no
responsibility for job loss is clearly open to question. We
have already seen that rising import levels in the 1970s were
linked to serious job loss in the auto industry. There is a
problem with extending the above analysis to the auto industry
as well. Exports have not played a significant role in U.S.
automotive sales. While it could be argued that this has
something to do with an over-valued dollar (e.g. prior to
1985), the more significant factor is that local content
agreements abroad do not encourage the servicing of foreign
markets for autos with production based in the U.S. The rise
in export platforms in numerous industries, where products are
assembled overseas from U.S. components, has created a long-
term problem for the U.S. trade balance as has the rise of
multinational enterprise (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Block,
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1977a). Recent changes in trade policy, such as Reagan
Administration efforts to lower the value of the dollar in
1986, indicate that devaluation and Reaganomics are not at
odds i.e. recessionary fiscal and monetary policies can be
complemented with dollar depreciation. Progressive critics of
protectionism also fail to address how changes in the value of
the dollar have occured without new macroeconomic policies.
There is a link between federal budget deficits and trade
deficits-as increased federal deficit spending has lead to
increased purchases abroad (Lawrence and Litan, 1985: 6).
However, there is also clear evidence that the effects of
recession and the effects of trade on employment can not be
neatly divided. For example, Data Resources Incorporated,
a Boston based consulting group, found that imports of
Japanese cars could increase to three million by 1987,
boosting the current trade deficit with Japan by $6 billion
(Hampton, 1985a). As noted earlier, optimistic projections
for U.S. car sales in 1988 suggested a market for 11.2 million
cars.
The links between recession and import penetration run
deeper than the direct and indirect loss from trade in just
the auto sector. Sector specific trade deficits contribute to
structural reactions by the government to set in motion a
deflation in response to trade imbalances. While the U.S. has
followed the course of "exceptionalism," letting foreign debts
accumulate and making foreign nations take the loss from our
devaluations, there are clear limits to this policy in the
long run. The structural constraint on defi-cits, as described
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by British economist John Eatwell, is worth describing at
length:
But if there is a systematic tendency for a country to
be in deficit--to be a borrower from the rest of the world--
something has to be done. Reserves will eventually run out,
and debt cannot be accumulated indefinitely. Ultimately,
creditors will not be willing to lend any more to a
delinquent borrower, and the borrowing country will not be
able to buy more on international markets than it can pay
for directly with its exports. It will be forced to cut
imports, both by limiting the purchases of foreign goods by
consumers and by slowing down the output of import-using
industries--perhaps precipitating a major cut in living
standards. Since this dire outcome must be avoided, the
need to preserve, on average, balanced international
payments is a fundamental constraint on any government's
freedom of manoeuvre in economic affairs (Eatwell, 1982:
92).
The usefullness of protectionist measures as a means to
reflation has been discussed at lenght by British economists
associated with the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG) and
the Alternative Economic Strategy. While the British model is
not directly applicable to the U.S., it does indicate how
protectionism can support a reflation. The U.S. may also find
itself having to pay off trade deficits if foreign nations
shift to non-dollar currencies. The rise of Japanese multi-
national capital suggests the yen as one replacement for the
dollar and the power of Japanese banks is growing.
A dramatic rise in the values of Britain's oil imports
after the OPEC price rise in 1973 and Britain's entry into the
European Economic Community (EEC) that same year helped
accelerate worsening trade deficits linked to growing import
shares (CSE Working Group, 1982: 40-41). The government's
response to the worsening balance of trade led the British
government in the 1970s to adopt restrictive fiscal and
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monetary policies. The objective of the deflation was to
avoid large balance of payments deficits by depressing import
purchases. However, the deflation only served to reinforce
the depressing effect of a weak trade performance (Ward, 1981:
94).
Both the Cambridge Economomic Policy Group and
Alternative Economic Strategy models were developed as
alternatives to this kind of government sponsored deflation.
These proposals were developed as a way to bring economic
growth that would not aggravate the balance of payments
problem and as vehicles for limiting the spread of import-
linked unemployment. Both the U.S. and Britain have faced the
problem that rising income or growth levels lead to increased
import purchases. An October 1980 Department of Labor report
stated that there was strong empirical evidence that: "The
U.S. propensity to spend extra income on imports [was] higher
than that of our major trading partners" (Bureau of Interna-
tional Labor Affairs, 1980: 10). In the U.K., a similar
pattern emerges:
...as home demand expands, imports (particularly of
manufactured goods) have risen by a far greater pro-
portion--roughly a 1% increase in demand has brought
a 4% in the volume of manufactured imports (CSE Working
Group, 1982: 92).
The AES and CEPG model both begin the case for import
controls by arguing that deflation will not bring long term
economic health to Britain; deflation will not create the
economic expansion required to make the U.K. competitive in
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the world market. Deflations used to control imports (and
import purchases themselves) both lead to an underutilization
of productive capacity and foster unemployment and stagnation.
Devaluations can lead to a viscious cycle of underdevelopment,
trade cycle deflation. This form of deflation arises because
if output is growing slowly or declining and there is little
prospect of sales growth, investment in new plant and
technology will be hampered. This restrained investment
weakens trade performance by making industry less competitive;
decreased competition causes loss in market share, further
recession and completes the trade cycle (Ward, 1981: 96).
AES strategists also believe that devaluations are
generally unsuccessful in limiting imports. They cite data
which shows that a 2% depreciation leads to only a 1% fall in
the volume of exported manufactures: "In other words a massive
devaluation of some 15-20% would be necessary to offset the
stimulus to imports of a 4% expansion of home demand."
Devaluations are of limited use since "import prices tend to
get built fairly quickly into wage claims." Consumers as
workers demand higher wages to compensate for the increased
price of imported goods (CSE Working Group, 1982: 94).
By blocking limiting import penetration, protection holds open
the possibility of reduced deficits without a wage-price
spiral especially if used in conjunction with price controls
(See: Chapter Five).
Given the problems associated with the established
trade control mechanisms of deflation and devaluation, both
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the CEPG and AES groups go on to propose alternative methods
of controlling balance of payments problems. Under the CEPG
model, economists Francis Cripps and Wynne Godley suggest,
"the use of uniform tariffs on imports of services and
manufactures, or alternatively some form of auction of quotas
to make a predetermined amount of foreign currency available
for...imports." Imports of food and raw materials would not
be affected under this plan and controls would be applied "so
as to maintain the shares of different foreign countries in
imports and manufactures and services the same as they would
have been." Selective controls could be applied to preserve
strategic industries such as steel, "infant" industries at the
early stages of their development, or "transitional"
industries which would require protection until they are able
to adjust to import competition through technological
development and restructuring (Cripps and Godley, 1978: 329).
The "infant industry" notion has also been applied to the
U.S. auto industry. Harvard's William J. Abernathy has argued
that the impact of foreign competition on the ability of Ford
and Chrysler to develop competitive vehicles warranted
protected markets. While some believe that import penetration
restrains competition, others argue that a serious depression
in auto makers domestic market share would block technological
development. As described in Chapter Two, part of auto makers
problems hinge on management inefficiency. Protectionism
would not eliminate competitiveness if the U.S. used existing
technology more efficiently. The incentive for such efficient
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practices could be found in Japanese producers located in the
U.S. or through competition in European markets.
One formulation of the AES indicates that import controls
could include "action by government such as negotiation of
voluntary export restraints, imposition of quotas and the use
of public purchasing agreements" (CSE Working Group, 1982:
97). Another left formulation of import controls is that the
specific form of protection--tariffs or quotas--makes little
difference, provided that the balance of payments constraint
on economic expansion is removed (Ward, 1981: 102). A
fundamental principle is that a ceiling be placed on imports
such that they can be paid for with exports in a full
employment economy (Rowthorn and Currie, 1981).
If a successful import control strategy was able to break
trade cycle deflation, then protection could lead to economic
expansion. Protectionist advocates suggest that learning
economies would arise with expanded output and that
productivity would also increase with a reflation. Profit
margins would rise not from price hikes (inflation) but from
lower costs reaped through scale and learning economies.
Industrial policies could provide financial assistance for
firms whose development was hindered by trade cycle deflation
and non-competitive technology (Rowthorn and Currie, 1981;
Cripps and Godley, 1978; Ward, 1981).
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Appreciation, Devaluation and Limit Pricing
While recessionary policies administered in Washington,
D.C. have certainly contracted auto sales, we must ask who
would be the primary beneficiary of economic expansion. The
Japanese quality advantage and the trajectory of rising import
sales suggests that imports would benefit substantially from
reflation. As income rises and demand shifts to more
luxurious goods, the Japanese ability to supply such high
quality automobiles in greater numbers would become a pressing
trade problem. If recessionary policies can be linked to a
government and corporate reaction to growing successes by
workers in raising wage and workplace demands (Bowles, et.
al., 1983), then the problem of achieving a reflation becomes
in part strategic i.e. how can real income levels and economic
expansion be maintained in the face of recessionary pressures?
MacEwan (1986) argues that protectionist measures are too
divisive to build the political alliance required to increase
workers' bargaining power and income levels. Thus, whether
recessionary (policies) or lowered income levels can be
resisted under the protectionist regime hinges in part on
questions of power discussed in Chapters Four and Five.
Will devaluation improve trade balances with Japan? In
1983 and 1984, the trade deficit rose dramatically. Japan
contributed 31 percent of the total trade deficit of $170
billion. Yet, "the dollar rose only 7 percent against the yen
in those two years, and increased by just 3.8 percent between
the end of 1979 and the middle of 1985" (Karczmar, 1985).
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Would a strengthened yen or depreciated dollar make Japanese
goods less competitive? An examination of Japan's currency
reserves provides evidence that it would not:
...many items needed in Japanese production (including
process energy to run the factory , practically all the
new materials in the vehicle, and a number of components
manufactured by Toyota affiliates in East Asia) can be
purchased by Toyota with non-yen currencies earned in
profitable export sales. These transactions would largely
mitigate the effects of a strengthened yen (Altshuler, et.
al., 1984: 158).
The view expressed above is supported by estimates made by
Japanese researchers who concluded earlier this year that even
a 30 to 40 percent rise in the yen's value would cut Japan's
total export volume only four to five percent (Wysocki, 1986).
However, we must assume here that the currencies of "Toyota
affiliates in East Asia" e.g. Korea, are not tied to the Yen.
The rapid appreciation of other currencies against the
dollar during the course of 1985 has tested the views of those
who claim that America's lack of competitiveness hinges most
strongly on the value of the dollar against other currencies.
The price of Japanese subcompacts such as the Honda Civic rose
9.6 percent from 1985 to 1986, as prices were raised to
compensate for the falling value of the dollar. Comparable
U.S. models such as the Ford Escort L rose only 3.3 percent
and cost $1,700 less (See: Appendix Six). But despite such
price hikes, it is not clear that U.S. market share will
increase. In the past, domestic producers followed a strategy
of dynamic limit pricing against foreign small car
competition. According to the theory of limit pricing, if a
90
cooperating core of firms have little or no cost advantage
over a rival fringe, their "long-run profit-maximizing
strategy is to raise price and thereby permit the growth of
the fringe" (Kwoka, 1984: 512-13). We have already seen
clear evidence of the Japanese cost advantage. Evidence in
the late 1970s shows that after Japanese firms raise their
prices in response to dollar depreciation, U.S. firms will
follow a limit pricing strategy by raising prices and
conceding market share (Ibid.). An article in the March 28,
1986 New York Times noted a planned 2.9 percent increase in
car prices by G.M., following a pattern of Japanese price
hikes carried out in response to the falling value of the
dollar (Holusha, 1986b). Devaluation and dollar depreciation
have proven relatively ineffectual in creating price
competition as domestic producers raise prices in response to
the pricing policy of import firms.
Even if U.S. auto firms were to reject limit pricing as
competition between domestic auto makers may have increased in
response to increased import penetration, other factors
indicate that devaluation will prove of limited use.
Consumers have shown that their demand for Japanese cars is
relatively inelastic, as quality considerations remain high in
spite of price hikes. In the recent past, while domestic auto
makers were offering rebates and having trouble selling their
cars, distributors of Japanese imports were charging premiums
and facing problems meeting demand for their products
(Hammond, 1986). The rapid depreciation of the dollar against
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the yen may change this pattern, although the distributors of
imports can still remove high priced accessories to make their
vehicles competitive (Nag, 1986). Producers also want higher
quality Japanese supplied parts. Demand for Japanese parts is
also relatively immune to currency fluctuations because "in
auto parts, many U.S. plants have meshed imports into their
production system so thoroughly that they are now
indispensible" (Wysocki, 1986).
Nevertheless, the appreciated dollar has played an
important role in declining U.S. competitiveness. Part of the
Japanese cost advantage has certainly been based on the past
high-value of the dollar. For example, U.S. unit labor costs
rose steeply in 1981 and 1982 largely because of dollar
appreciation (Alvarez and Cooper, 1984). However, the
problems associated with dollar depreciation to do not prove
that trade problems will be resolved under an open economy
regime or with relatively uncompetitive (e.g. lower quality)
U.S. goods.
The Relocation of Japanese Producers to the U.S.
The movement of Japanese auto producers to the U.S.
provides the most serious challenge to arguments that
protecting U.S. markets will preserve the market share of
domestic producers. The rise of Japanese auto producers in
the U.S. has been linked to a variety of factors. First among
them have been protectionist pressures within the U.S.
Several Japanese auto officials have described how their
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decisions to relocate within the U.S. have followed
protectionist pressure applied in Congress. On November 1,
1979, former U.A.W. President Douglas Fraser "declared that UAW
members would boycott Japanese cars unless Toyota and Nissan
build assembly plants in the United States" (Winham and
Kabashima, 1982: 83). Early pressures by Japanese unions had
placed limits on the relocation of production to the U.S.
For example, Toyota union leader Shiro Umemura argued that if
Toyota began to produce 200,000 cars in the United States,
approximately 40,000 Toyota workers would become jobless
(Ibid.: 84).
By setting up operations in the U.S., the Japanese are
able to avoid both tariffs and the quotas imposed under the
Voluntary Restraint Agreement. A pattern can already be
detected whereby protectionist pressures against Japanese
producers have encouraged the movement of assembly divisions
to the U.S. e.g. the creation of Japanese-owned assembly
operations for VCRs in the U.S. has followed a pattern already
established in the auto industry (Gabor, 1985). Table 3-3
lists foreign cars built in the U.S.
Several trends indicate that increasing foreign
investment in the U.S. will be a growing phenomena, indicating
the seriousness of the problem of increased Japanese
investment in the U.S. for the protectionist argument. First,
despite the "wage gap" between the U.S. and foreign
nations, wage costs are not a major deterent for some forms
of foreign investment in the U.S. In 1974, the share of
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Table 3-3: Foreign Cars Built in the U.S.
Manufa.cturer Plant Site
Toyota-General Motors Freemont, California
American Honda Motor Co. Marysville, Ohio
Nissan Smryna, Tennessee
Mitsubishi-Chrysler Illinois
Mazda-Ford Flatrock, Michigan
Volkswagen of America New Stanton, Pennsylvania
Renault-American Motors Corp. Kenosha, Wisconsin
Source: New York Times April 21, 1985, March 19, 1986.
direct labor costs in total costs was only 12.1 percent for
all foreign manufacturers (Schoenberger, 1985: 253). The
low value of the dollar in the 1970s also encouraged
manufacturing investment in the U.S. Japanese investment in
the U.S. rose from $0.7 billion in 1979 to $2.7 billion in
1981 (Armstrong et. al., 1984: 376). Japanese investment in
the U.S. was $1.7 billion dollars in 1983. Whether financial
or physical capital, such investment has been associated with
an increase in manufacturing purchases. Between 1980 and
1983, Japanese investment in the U.S. manufacturing facilities
rose 63 percent (Sease, 1985).
The fluctuation of currency values together with the
growing convergence of U.S. wages with those of foreign
nations help explain why Volkswagen opened production
facilities in 1979 at a plant in New Stanton, Pennsyvlania.
V.W. was able to open operations in the U.S. because the
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difference in wage costs between the U.S. and Germany was no
longer a deterent to locating closer to its U.S. market:
As of January 1976, U.S. auto workers received hourly
compensation (including benefits) of $10.75 as compared
to $8.38 for VW's employees, but the latter also get
six weeks vacation a year at 150 percent pay (Dollars and
Sense Collective, 1976).
Table 3-4 below examines the costs of labor for foreign
nations when compared with the United States in the early
1970s.
Table 3-4: Unit Labor Costs and Their International Meaning
1970-1975
Exchange Rate Vs.
U.S. Dollar
0%
21%
W. Germany 48%
% Rise in Hourly
Compensation
Local Money US$
48% 48%
148%
86%
199%
176%
% Rise in Unit
Labor Costs
Local Money US$
34%
99%
44%
34%
141%
114%
Source: Dollars and Sense, October 1976.
U.S.
Japan
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Table 3-5: Labor Costs as a Percentage of Sales
Percentage
30.0
29.6
31.4
31.3
30.1
Source: Standard and Poors' Industry Surveys, Nov. 11, 1982.
"Labor Costs," as published in Slaughter, 1983: 53.
Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
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By locating in the U.S. Volkswagen was also developing a means
of dealing with increasing exchange rate fluctuations.
Investments were made in the.U.S. for middle line products,
upper to middle lines were kept in Germany. By keeping higher
priced production in Germany, Volkswagen was able to "pass
through" the impact of exchange rate movements to both foreign
and domestic consumers who are less sensitive to price
increases because of relatively inelastic demand for higher
quality cars:
On the other hand, placing plants in Mexico, Brazil,
and the United States for primarily local sales reflected
the greater restraint on a complete pass through in the
case of the lower line of cars (Kogut, 1985: 31).
As can be seen in Table 3-4, Japanese labor costs rose
during the 1970s, making the opportunity costs of shifting to
the U.S. that much less. An appreciated yen narrows the wage
gap between U.S. and Japanese auto workers considerably.
Table 3-5 also shows that labor costs as a percentage of sales
in the auto industry has remained relatively constant.
Among the other trends making foreign auto production the
U.S. more feasible are the successes the Japanese have had in
transferring their industrial system to the U.S. A study of
Japanese manufacturing plants in the U.S. by Martin K. Starr,
a professor at Columbia University, found that "just in time"
inventory reduction practices, "lifetime employment" for
workers and consensus-decision-making were not major factors
explaining Japanese competitiveness in the U.S. Other factors,
transferred from the Japanese industrial system were
considerations. These included cutting back the number of
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defective parts, the rate of absenteeism and labor turnover.
Also, Japanese managers attempted to pay closer attention to
workers and consumers than is usual in U.S. (Sease, 1985).
Other advantages are based on labor costs. The Japanse "can
hire mostly young, healthy workers and not be saddled with
hefty pension and health benefit costs borne by older
companies" (Holusha, 1985b). Another related factor,
discussed in Chapter Four, is that some of the Japanese firms
have been able to avoid union representation.
Evidence of Japanese production successes in the U.S. can
be seen in production and quality ratings for Japanese cars
produced here. While G.M. production ratings run from a low
of 75 to a high of 145, with an average of 110, cars co-
produced with Toyota, consistently have received ratings of
145. The cars are manufactured at a Freemont, California,
plant entirely under Japanese management. Honda's Sayama,
Japan, auto factory requires 2.6 man days per car to
manufacture Accords (including welding, assembly, checking-out
and associated tasks). The Marysville, Ohio, Honda plant has
recently achieved the ability to produce Accords at the
superior rate of 2.1 man days per car. Test drives could not
tell the two models, Japanese and U.S. made, apart. Thus,
quality autos can be manufactured in the U.S. indicating that
relocation of production does not remove a central basis of
Japanese comparative advantage (Womack, 1986).
Some observers of the auto industry have argued that the
Japanese are able to achieve high quality and production
ratings precisely because their plants are new. However, the
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Freemont plant was the same basic facility used previously by
G.M. and industry analysts suggest that improvements under
Japanese control came from superior management and
manufacturing techniques. However, it is also true that the
Japanese have the financial resources to make new plant
investments. U.S. competitors claim that the Japanese are
able to beat U.S. firms in domestic competition because with
their export revenues "only they can afford state of the art
plants" (Sease, 1985).
A report by the Auto In Michigan (AIM) project at the
University of Michigan this year said that "If all automakers
stick to announced plans, North America will host 1.3 million
more low-North American locally-assembled light vehicles than
the 540,000 made here in 1985." The AIM forecast suggested
that the market share of low-content vehicles could rise from
3 percent in 1985 to 10 to 15 percent in 1992. Imports are
projected to rise from 22 percent of the market in 1985 to 25
to 35 percent by 1992. The combined result of rising import
shares and increased transplants will be a glut of cars on the
market (Andrea et. al, 1986: 6).
Auto industry observers predict that U.S. plants which
ran at more than 90 percent of their capacity during the past
two years could drop to capacity levels of 62 percent by 1990.
According to John Hammond, auto analyst for Data Resources
Inc., six to ten plants may be closed in the next few years,
although 10 new plants are expected to open. Employment will
shift to new plants, particularly those owned by the Japanese.
Over the next five years Japanese producers will have lower
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cost levels than U.S. producers. As a result they will be
able to lower prices to clear demand, U.S. producers
constrained by older plants will not be able to lower costs
and will concede market share. While G.M.'s Saturn plant will
reduce costs to comparable Japanese plant levels, it will only
be on line by 1990 and represents a small percentage of G.M.'s
future production (Hammond, 1986). The Philadelphia
Autofacts, Inc. group projects that ten plants of domestic
producers will close, leading to a loss of 40,000 jobs
(Hammond, 1986; Ingrassia and Levin, 1986).
The rise in assembly transplants means that protectionist
efforts in the form of quotas and tariffs will be limited in
preserving the employment of production workers in the Big
Three. However, protectionist measures would be able to block
some of the imports which take market share. There would be a
friction in transferring the market share taken by imports to
transplants. As a result, protectionist measures would be
able to block some measure of share lost to imports. Also,
other jobs will be created as Japanese producers turn to
Japanese suppliers relocating to the U.S.:
...made-in-Ohio Hondas will have made-in-Ohio
steering wheels from Niho Plast Co., and U.S.-built
Nissan vehicles will soon get dashboards and radiator
grilles from a Lewisburg, Tenn., plant set up by
Kanto Seiko Co. (Sease, 1985).
This relocation is based on political and economic ties
between suppliers and assemblers, the desire of Japanese
suppliers to get "high quality" parts and protectionist
pressures discussed earlier.
Despite the relocation of suppliers to the U.S., most of
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the higher value added products involved in the Japanese
assembly operations are imported from Japan. The Japanese
auto firms tend to buy energy-intensive components like glass,
tires and steel in the U.S., but labor-intensive elements of
production tend to remain in Japan (Holusha, 1985b). Dan
Luria, a researcher with AIM, estimated last year that 95
percent of the jobs involved in supplying components to
American-owned plants are domestic, for Japanese plants in the
U.S. the figure is 30 percent (Holusha, Ibid.).
The rise in assembly transplants suggests that
protectionist efforts may be limited in preserving employment
in the Big Three, especially for production workers whose jobs
are taken by "imports" made in the U.S. It is possible that
some employment will be retained among suppliers who are able
to link up with the Japanese assembly plants. As the AIM
project points out, if suppliers do not build bridges with the
transplants or form alliances with Japan-based suppliers,
"these suppliers will use the transplant business to get a
toe-hold here, and then move to take Big Three business as
well" (Andrea et. al, 1986: 7). Some auto industry analysts
believe that Japanese-based suppliers relocating to the U.S.
are planning to co-opt U.S. suppliers with their superior
technology, management and organization through licensing
agreements. The plan is to split the U.S. market with them so
as to build a political alliance against a protectionist
backlash directed against their U.S. operations (Womack,
1986). The rise of both assembly and supplier operations
indicates that the usefulness of protectionism in preserving
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market share depends on how the protectionist measure is
implemented and defined. While quotas and tariffs as
currently proposed would fail to block transplant penetration,
other forms of protectionism such as local content could limit
such domestic "imports". But the ability of content measures
to do this would depend on a friction to the relocation of
suppliers from Japan to the U.S. Content proposals would
create jobs in non-Big Three assembly plants. Also, as
implied earlier, this proposal would form a base for extending
employment by bringing supplier jobs which might have been
left in Japan to the U.S.
Local content proposals in the early 1980s by the U.A.W.
would have required companies selling more than 100,000
vehicles in the U.S. to achieve a "minimum domestic content
ratio." This ratio compares U.S. auto-related costs with a
company's U.S. sales. As defined by the U.A.W. in the Fair
Practices Automotive Products Act (S. 707):
...the content requirement is based on a vehicle
manufacturer's trade balance in automotive products.
For example, a 90 percent content requirement would
permit a company to have net automotive imports (imports
minus exports) worth up to 10 percent of its wholesale
auto sales here. Thus, a company gets credit for all
its U.S. costs, including such items as shipping, adver-
tising, taxes, etc. (Bieber, 1984a: 14).
One version of the local content (or "domestic content") bill
passed the U.S. House of Representatives on November 3, 1983.
Beyond local content, protectionism can be redefined so as to
extend tariffs and quotas to domestic products. This pattern
is beginning to take form in Europe:
...But overseas investment, and even cooperation with
domestic producers, may only push the problem one
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stage back. There has been pressure inside the EEC to
redefine 'domestic products' so as to extend tariffs and
quotas to Japanese cars produced by joint
ventures with
European producers..(such as that between Honda and BL)
(Armstrong, et. al., 198 : 377).
Profits and Labor Demand Under Protectionism
Our second hypothesis examines the ability of
protectionist measures to slow or prevent a profit squeeze and
thereby reduce labor displacement. One means of examining the
links between protectionism and profits is to examine how
increased import penetration has affected company
profitability. On the intuitive level one might argue that
since high market share is associated with high rates of
return (Gale, 1972), increasing import penetration which cut
into share will depress profits. The market share connection
to profitability has been linked to both monopoly power and
efficiency gains reaped by scale economies. With the advent
of flexible manufacturing systems profit per unit is less
likely to be associated with scale economies. This conclusion
is implied by Michael Storper who notes that some studies
"indicate that medium-sized firms have systematically higher
profit rates than larger corporations" (Storper, 1985: 265).
Market share dependent on monopoly power is still
conceivably an issue in tracing profit rates to firm'size.
However, the link between company profit rates and domestic
market share is complicated by the international economy.
Protected firms can still maintain a high market share even
with economic losses by redirecting profits from "winner" to
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"loser" regions i.e. Protected firms can gain market share but
still lose money. For example, G.M.'s market share of motor
vehicle production in Europe jumped from 8.3 percent in 1981
to 11.4% in 1985, making it the fifth largest producer in
Europe. However, "the company's European auto and truck
operations lost more than $1 billion during that period"
(Miller et. al., 1986). This story indicates another lesson
for protectionism: Protected companies can still shift their
profits gained domestically into foreign operations. In this
case, record G.M. profits from domestic U.S. operations in
1983 and 1984 were exported to Europe. A report prepared in
the early 1980s noted that G.M. planned to increase foreign
investments from $4.5 billion in the 1975-79 period, to $8
billion in the 1980-84 period (a 78 percent increase).
Domestic investments were expected to have increased from
$26.5 billion to $32 billion from the two time periods (a 21
percent increase) (Assembler, 1981-82). Other data reveal
that protectionism under the V.R.A. did not affect Big Three
decisions to invest in the United States. G.M.'s capital
spending in the U.S. was $5.552 billion in 1981, $4.534
billion in 1982, and $3.125 billion in 1983 (Labor Institute,
1984). Therefore, the preservation of Big Three profits may
be weakly associated with protectionist measures' provision of
employment in the long run. During these three years the
company's net income rose dramatically (See: Table 3-6).
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
SourcE Company Annual Reports
Table 3-7: After Tax Return on Sales: Ford and
Ford US Ford Europe GM US
G.M. Operations
GM Europe
1973 4.6 3.2 6.8 4.0
1974 2.0 * 3.3 *
1975 0.4 1.4 3.7 0.4
1976 2.1 5.1 6.0 5.8
1977 3.4 7.0 6.3 4.3
1978 2.6 7.5 5.7 4.8
1979 * 9.8 4.2
1980 * 2.8 *
*-Indicates a negative return.
Source: Bhakskar, 1980: 76 (for 1973-78 data), subsequent data
from company annual reports as published in Jones, 1982: 157.
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Table 3-6: Net Income (Loss) in Big Three Auto Firms
(Millions of Dollars)
General Motors Ford Chrysler
950.1 327.1 (52)
1,253.1 227.5 (260)
2,902.8 983.1 423
3,337.5 1,672.8 163
3,508.0 1,588.9 (205)
2,892.7 1,169.3 (1,097)
762.5 (1,543.3) (1,710)
333.4 (1,060.1) (476)
962.7 (657.8) 170
3,730.2 1,866.9 701
4,516.5 2,906.8 2,380
3,999.0 2,515.4 1,635
:
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The other side of the picture can be seen when domestic
companies use profits from European operations domestically.
Ford Motor Co., more dependent on foreign operations than G.M.
received 94 percent of its profits from overseas operations in
1979 (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982, p. 42). In this case,
profits reaped abroad could be used to finance domestic
operations even as U.S. market share fell. The relationship
between the two sources of profit can be seen in Table 3-7.
Despite the complications discussed above depressed
domestic profit rates can be linked to rising import
penetration. In a 1971 paper on "Foreign Competition and
Domestic Industry Profitability," Louis Esposito and Frances
Ferguson Esposito conclude that foreign competition "as
represented by the level of imports, appears to exert a
significant negative effect on industry profit rates"
(Esposito and Esposito, 1971: 343). Several political
economists have linked Japanese import penetration to a profit
squeeze on domestic companies. In examining a list of
industries suffering depressed profits, Barry Bluestone and
Bennett Harrison argued that, "Those sectors that have
suffered most from the Japanese 'invasion' the most--radio and
television equipment (consumer electronics) and motor
vehicles--show the greatest lost" (Bluestone and Harrison,
1982: 148). The net pre-tax profit rate for the motor
vehicles and parts industry during the period from 1963 to
1968 was 16.3 percent. This profit rate dropped two-thirds to
6.7 percent for the period 1969 to 1975 (Ibid.). Ann
Markusen, in Profit Cycles, Oligopoly and Regional Development
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links import penetration to depressed profit rates in the auto
industry's "profit cycle." Here, import penetration is
responsible for denying the role market power plays in linking
increased market share to profit rates:
...From a highly innovative and competitive sector
at the turn of the century, an effective oligopoly has
emerged that has lasted to the present and whose profits
were to become squeezed only by the competitive pressure
from imports (Markusen, 1985: 171-74).
One could also look to the role increased foreign competition
between Japan and the U.S. in third markets plays in
depressing the potential profits reaped by U.S. automakers
e.g. Ford's market share in Scandanavian nations has dropped
precipitously since the end of 1979, while Japanese share grew
rapidly (Cohen, 1983b: 544).
The argument that imports played a major role in damaging
the U.S. auto industry's sales levels, has been challenged by
the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). The ITC
commissioners, in a split decision, found that "the maximum
potential loss to U.S. producers resulting from declining
consumption was greater in the period January 1979-June 1980
than that resulting from increasing import penetration"
(Cohen, 1983b: 531). However, the ITC assumed that
consumption levels and the ratio of imports to consumption
change independently; critics of the ITC finding argue that
"because U.S. car lines differed substantially from Japanese,
this would not be true" (Ibid.). We have already described
how changes in the 1970s promoted a shift to smaller imported
vehicles. As noted earlier, blaming falling demand for Big
Three autos on recession fails to address independent problems
107
raised by an open economy.
The link between depressed profits and import penetration
can be seen most clearly after evaluating how increased import
penetration and recession lead to lower sales. Operating
together the two forces would be expected to raise firm costs.
Productivity in the auto industry is pro-cyclical, "because
firms hold on to more workers than they need during downturns
to avoid loosing their highly trained people to other jobs"
(Scott, 1985: 8). Labor productivity tends to rise as
output rises (and vice versa) over the course of the business
cycle (Ibid.). As output surplus decreases, fixed costs and
workers kept on payroll are spread over a depressed level of
output (revenues), putting a squeeze on profits. The costs
associated with laying off workers are "transaction costs."
They help explain "the firm's frequently observed failure to
adjust factor imputs to their equilibrium levels
instantaneously." Such costs include search, hiring,
training, layoff and morale problems associated with
displacing workers (Nadiri and Rosen, 1969).
The link between imports and domestic industry profit
rates is underscored when we examine how protectionist
measures have lead to increased profits for U.S. automakers.
Again, it is difficult to separate the independent effects of
business cycles, import penetration and other factors.
However, it is possible to establish a link between the
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Table 3-8: Effects of the VRA on the U.S.
Trade Balance With Japan
Actual Estimated
Quantity Value Quantity
Year 1,000 Units Billion $ 1,000 Units
1981 1,911 9.5 2,018
1982 1,801 9.6 1,999
1983 1,871 10.8 2,447
1984 1,970 12.5 2,978
Source: United States International Trade Commission,
Value
Billion $
9.8
10.2
12.7
16.4
1985
establishment of the Voluntary Restraint Agreement (V.R.A.) or
Voluntary Export Restraint (V.E.R.) and increased corporate
profits.
On May 1st, 1981, the Japanese Ministry of Industry and
Trade announced the V.R.A. which would reduce the number of auto
exports to the U.S. by seven percent, from 1980 levels. The
agreement was continued for two more years at a constant level
and extended a fourth year which allowed for a 10 percent
increase in Japanese exports. According to a report by the
International Trade Commission (ITC), the V.R.A. had a
substantial effect in blocking imports and preserving the
sales of domestic autos (See: Table 3-8). The V.R.A. also
helped decrease the U.S. trade deficit. With no restrictions
on imports, the ITC estimated that the U.S. trade deficit in
autos would have been nearly $2 billion greater in 1983 and
almost $4 billion higher in 1984. Industry profits under the
VRA rose to $10.4 billion in 1984 from a $4.7 billion loss in
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1980 (USITC, 1985). Data gathered on the rise of Japanese
imports after quotas were lifted support the ITC's findings.
For example, after auto quotas expired on March 31, 1985,
Toyota's exports to the U.S. increased to 79,000 vehicles in
April 1985, a 18.5 percent increase over levels in April 1984.
Honda's imports rose to 45,000 units, for a 20.6 percent
increase (Treece et. al., 1985a). In February 1986, Japan
announced that it would limit exports to the U.S. to 2.3
million units. This continued the 2.3 million ceiling agreed
upon last year. The original agreement in 1981 limited U.S.
imports of Japanese cars to 1.68 million units for three
years. A second agreement in 1984, raised the level to 1.85
million units (Boston Globe, 1986).
According to the ITC, increases in production, and a
substantial reduction in both fixed and variable costs during
1980 to 1984 contributed along with the V.R.A. to increased
auto industry profits. Others note that significant price
hikes of domestic models under the V.R.A. also contributed to
increased profits of the Big Three (Scott, 1985: 36). Looking
beyond the V.R.A., it is certainly possible that a quota which
further limited the level of auto imports than under the
V.R.A., a punitive tariff, or administrative obstalces to
imports (as in France where individual imported VCR's are
registered by one single office with limited staff) could well
have produced even greater profits for domestic producers as
import penetration was further limited.
Despite the apparent link between industry protection and
auto company profits, the connection between preserved profit
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and preserved employment is not entirely clear. The evidence
suggests that the V.R.A. preserved market share for the
domestic producers in the short run (see below). As a
result, profits increased as domestic sales expanded and labor
and production costs per unit decreased. The decrease in unit
costs can be traced to scale economies associated with
expanded output (from 6.98 million vehicles produced in 1982
to 10.9 million in 1984) (Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures,
1985). In short, protectionist measures do support forces
leading to labor retention via their effect on profits.
However, there are opposing forces which tend to separate the
preservation of profit from employment. U.S. car makers are
not able to maximize both profit and employment gains under
trade restraints. Maximizing employment requires car makers
"to increase volume but not prices, while maximizing profit
requires the opposite strategy" (Gomez-Ibanez et. al., 1983:
201). As noted earlier, by following a limit pricing policy,
car makers have chosen to concede market share and raise
profits rather than expand volume and lower prices. Scott
argued that the domestic producers apparently gave up the
share of the market they lost in the 1970s, at least in the
short-run. Domestic capacity was reduced by 11.8 percent from
1979 to 1984 as production dropped from 10.145 million to
8.951 units (Scott, 1985: 22).
Other trends have allowed a constant level of profits
given increasingly lower levels of production of cars. The
Big Three each substantially lowered their break even point
from 1979 to 1984. One study noted that G.M.'s break even
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level, based on world wide car sales, fell from 8.4 million
units in 1979-80 to about 6.7 million units in 1983. The
break even level for Ford's vehicle operations in North
America declined from 3.6 million units in 1979-80 to 2.5
million units in 1983. Chrysler reduced its break even level
for North American operations from 2.3 million units to 1.1
million units during 1979-80. This reduction in break even
points came as costs were dramatically reduced. One example
is Ford's $4 billion cost reduction between 1979 and early
1984 based on seven plant closings and payroll cuts of 60,000
salaried and hourly employees. Increased quality control,
reduced inventory costs, increased productivity and improved
management practices all helped reduce costs (United States
International Trade Commission, 1985).
Sales Preservation and Layoffs
Our third hypothesis examines the links between increased
or preserved sales and the decreased likelihood of layoffs.
How have protectionist measures worked to preserve markets
which in turn lead to the preservation of employment? Turing
to the V.R.A., economists have offered different estimates of
the impact of this protectionist measure on domestic
producers' markets. Robert Crandall argues that "It is
difficult to see how the VERs could have shifted more than 8
percentage points of the market from Japanese imports to U.S.
cars by 1983" (Scott, 1985: 28). The United States
International Trade Commission estimate for 1984 was that
Japanese producers would have captured 28.4 percent of the
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U.S. market if the V.R.A. had not been in place (Ibid.: 29).
Robert Scott argues that these two projections underestimate
the rapid accleration of Japanese import penetration which
occured between 1979 and 1980. At that time, the Japanese
share of total auto sales jumped about five percent, from 16.5
percent in 1979 to 21.3 percent in 1980 (Ibid.: 29).
Scott argues that without the V.R.A.'s, the Japanese
would have captured all of the subcompact market, could
capture at least fifty percent of the compact market and have
already captured an increasing share of the luxury and sports
car market. Combining these estimates Scott concluded that
the V.R.A. could have saved 133,300 auto workers' jobs (Ibid.:
33). The Scott estimates appear to be more realistic than the
alternative ones offered by Crandall and the ITC. The
production and cost advantages outlined in Chapter Two suggest
that Japanese import penetration can be expected to increase
dramatically. As noted earlier, future markets can best be
met by the more flexible production system of the Japanese.
Summary
The evidence presented here suggests that import-
penetration leads to serious job loss and contributed to a
squeeze on profits at the turn of the decade. However, the
link between protectionism and job preservation is complicated
by corporate efforts to restructure production. Protectionist
measures' ability to guarantee profits may take such pressure
off management efforts to displace workers and cut wages.
But, profitability is maintained by squeezing suppliers, plant
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closings and increased automation. Wage concessions are also
used to increase profits e.g. 1980 savings from wage
concessions amounted to about $600 per car in Chrysler (ITC,
op. cit.). Thus, industry restructuring puts pressure on
wages and employment despite protectionism. Quotas on
Japanese vehicles will not prevent outsourcing (although local
content and tariff measures may limit this practice directly).
On the other hand, the evidence is clear that
preservation of market share, or the slowing of share erosion,
by the V.R.A. did preserve a significant number of jobs. Many
jobs would clearly be lost if protectionist measures were
eliminated. The ability of protectionism to preserve
corporate profits also holds some opportunities for increased
bargaining power as well. We discuss these issues in greater
detail in Chapters Four and Five.
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Chapter Four: Obstacles to Labor Retention
Under the Protectionist Regime
Introduction
There are a number of factors which may lead to increased
unemployment in the auto industry in spite of protectionist
measures. Increases in productivity, capital flight,
diversification and the related problem of industry scaling
down production may all contribute to increased unemployment
whether or not U.S. markets are protected. While one could
simply argue that policy makers should address these problems
in addition to protectionist measures, they are relevant for
the protectionist argument for three reasons. First,
protectionist policy may aggravate such problems. Second,
protectionist measures may prove beneficial in dealing with
such problems. Finally, protectionist measures could be
considered as a diversion from such problems. A possible link
between protectionism and these three separate issues has
already been alluded to earlier. Labor cost pressures,
increased foreign competition and increased corporate profit
hurdle rates all created pressures in basic industry (through
pressures to get a higher rate of return in the face of a
squeeze on profits) leading to automation, conglomeration and
migration of firms to the Third World or less politically
organized regions of the United States (Bluestone and
Harrison, 1982). To the extent that protectionism may
preserve sales and profits for U.S. industry, there may be
less pressure to accelerate these trends as markets become
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relatively isolated. Or, one could argue that without the
protectionism which is already in place these trends would
accelerate. On the other hand, a process may have already
been set in motion whereby such trends will continue in spite
of protectionism.
Productivity Increases and Protectionism
Increased competition from Japan, which placed cost and
market pressures on domestic producers, was a major cause for
accelerated automation in the auto industry (Jenkins, 1984).
One economist wrote that "trade pressures indirectly resulted
in the elimination of 15,800 jobs because of technological
change" (Scott, 1985). Several studies have indicated that
technological change will lead to massive displacement in the
auto industry. Harley Shaiken, a technology specialist and
longtime observer of the auto industry estimated that G.M. by
itself would eliminate 40,000 jobs in the next ten years with
robotics alone (Shaiken, 1984). Table 4-1 provides U.A.W.
estimates on the number of production workers expected to be
displaced by robots. But beyond robotics, other technologies
will contribute to productivity-linked unemployment. Flexible
automation systems combine numerically controlled machine
tools and robots with automatic storage and retreival systems:
"Each of these increases productivity by itself, but the
effect is magnified when these systems are interconnected, as
is increasingly the trend" (U.A.W., 1985).
While import-induced automation has accelerated the pace
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Table 4-1: Production Worker Displacement in the
Auto Industry Due to Robots
1990 1995
Low High Low High
Number
of
Robots 27,400 32,600 48,300 58,800
Displaced
Workers 101,900 121,300 185,500 225,800
Displaced
Workers
as % of
1984
Workforce 7.2% 8.6% 13.1% 16.0%
Source: "New Technology in Context Socio-Economic Problems and
Alternatives," U.A.W., August 6, 1985.
of technological change, competition in European markets and
from domestic Japanese producers would put pressure on the Big
Three to have the most efficient technology systems even
without direct import penetration. Ford and G.M. have already
purchased robotics firms as well. Thus, it could be argued
that although open markets have accelerated automation,
further technological displacement will occur anyway.
Therefore, we could argue that protectionism won't acclerate
automation. Dan Luria makes this argument as follows. There
are three times as many robots per worker in Japan as in the
U.S. Therefore, even in a region where workers make less
money than in the U.S., automation still goes on extensively
(assuming that Japan's workers make about $12 an hour and U.S.
workers make about $20 an hour). If protection were to
increase workers' wages, this would not accelerate a trend
that would occur anyway. A robot can work $3 an hour. As a
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result, it will always pay a manufacturer to automate if labor
costs pass over this "tipping point" of $3 an hour. Once you
get over the $3 an hour mark in wages it makes no difference
whether or not labor is paid the amount workers get in Japan
or the U.S. A rise in the cost of labor above the tipping
point would not affect automation that would be going on
anyway (Luria, 1985). Other data suggest that it will be
increasingly cheaper to automate than to hire production
workers directly. At General Motors while wages rose 240
percent between 1970 and 1980, the cost of purchasing robots
increased by only 40 percent. As discussed in Chapter Two, in
1980 the total cost to an auto maker of buying and operating a
robot on a two shift basis for eight years was about $6 an
hour. The total compensation costs for automobile workers, as
noted, was $20 an hour. Also, "G.M. predicts that the annual
cost of robots will rise three percent a year compared to nine
percent for labor in this decade" (Shaiken, 1984: 162-63).
A complication arises when comparing the cost of a robot
to wages on a hourly basis. Given a recession, workers can be
laid off and robots can't. Thus, a robot may be more costly
to "hire" than a worker in a recession, if a robot is
considered as a fixed cost and a worker as part of variable
costs. If protection guaranteed markets for producers, then
it might be less costly to have robots on hand. On the other
hand, workers are also costly to layoff as the average
duration of service of auto workers in the typical Big Three
company is 17 years; at Ford, the average worker is 44 years
old (Gordus, 1986). Because the length a worker receives
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supplemental unemployment benefits is determined by seniority,
the cost to displacing workers may be substantial. We could
1
also include transaction costs here.
But if protected markets make manufacturers more
dependent on domestic labor, wouldn't employers want to
accelerate the pace of automation to remove such a dependency?
Worker sabotage and increased capital investments per worker
may make management more vulnerable if they cannot outsource
or threaten to outsource production. Some labor activists
have argued that the present industrial restructuring in the
auto industry makes management more vulnerable to disruptions
in supply of production (see below). On the other hand,
others believe that labor disruption is not a major factor in
industry planning decisions as G.M. recently made a multi-
million dollar investment in Canada where labor has
traditionally been more militant than in the U.S. in recent
years (Sabel, 1986). The relationship between the rate of
automation, import penetration and protectionism is not clear.
The Big Three have made the increased application of robotics
a major priority; they have found plant closings facilitated
by productivity increases, relatively costless. Protection
might stabilize markets and by increasing labor bargaining
power would make automation more feasible or likely. However,
specific policies designed to regulate technological
implementation would make protectionism more effective in
helping.workers. The two policies are not in conflict, unless
one considers protectionism "diversionary."
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Diversification and Downsizing
How have import competition and protectionist measures
affected movements towards conglomeration in the auto
industry? Diversification was not an option seriously persued
by the major auto companies in the years before intensified
international competition. In the mid-1960s, General Motors
moved into different product lines such as airplane engines,
diesel locomotives, navigation systems for guided missiles,
and appliances. However, "sales of these items never became a
significant focus." In 1979, the company sold off its
Frigidaire unit in what could be veiwed as an abandonment of
the diversification strategy (Morales, 1984: 66).
Presently forces are encouraging automotive companies to
both sell off operations related to supplier divisions and
some backward-linked aspects of production, and to purchase
technology, forward-linked, non-automotive or Japanese based
companies. Turning first to the issue of diversification, we
have the example of Europe where: "Both Fiat and Renault have
annouced plans to reduce their dependence on car production
while Volkswagen has acquired an office equipment and small
computer industry" (Jenkins, 1984). In the U.S., all the Big
Three auto companies have purchased financial or credit
companies in recent years. G.M. has credit operations through
the General Motors Acceptance Co., Northwest Mortgage and
Colonial Mortgage service. The Chrysler Financial Company is
a joint venture with G.E. credit. But such operations are
minor compared to the auto companies investments in the motor
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vehicle industry. Ford Motor Company's recent purchase of
Nationwide Financial Corporation for $493 million is hardly
significant compared with a $2.9 billion investment in the
Ford Taurus and Mercury Sable production lines (Edid, 1985b).
Other recent company purchases, however, indicate that
diversification may be a growing trend in the auto industry.
G.M.'s purchase of Electronic Data Systems (E.D.S.), a
computer services company, in 1984 for $2.55 billion and
Hughes Aircraft, a defense-oriented electronics firm, in 1985
for more than $5 billion are highly significant developments.
It is not clear whether these purchases are pure
diversification or attempts to supplement exisiting company
operations. G.M.'s Chairman Roger Smith argues that these
purchases a part of a plan for "both growth and diversity,"
others suggest that "The Hughes deal is diversification pure
and simple. It has absolutely nothing to do with the vehicle
industry" (Greenwald, 1985). Dan Luria agrees noting that
G.M. could have purchased Motorola, a firm more directly tied
to auto-related activities (Luria, 1986).
G.M. certainly remains committed to the auto industry.
As a January 1986 report noted, the company plans to spend
"between $8 billion and $9 billion a year in the next few
years on new products and facilities in order to make more
modern and efficient cars at lower cost" (Holusha, 1986: F23).
Similarly, Harley Shaiken says that by the year 2000,
approximately 20 percent of the Big Three's sales will be in
non-automobile related activities (Shaiken, 1985). The
purchase of companies such as EDS and Hughes are conceivably
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related to trends in automobile production which are leading
to an increased use of electronic components. Some
projections indicate that electronic content in vehicles will
reach $1,200 to $1,500 per car by the end of the decade (Zoia,
1985). The increased use of robotics and computer-linked
equipment discussed earlier also indicate that purchases of
high-technology companies are not pure diversification.
Nevertheless, a large measure of these purchases can be seen
as attempts to diversify. The movement towards such company
purchases have been linked to companies' desires to buy into
faster growing and less cyclical industries that complement
the automotive industry (Edid, op. cit.).
The links between increased conglomeration and import
penetration in the auto industry can not be directly
specified. Clearly, increased import penetration has put
pressure on corporate profits which makes companies look to
other businesses as a means of improving stock ratings and
overall corporate performance. Extended protectionism might
limit such pressures if trade controls slowed the degree of
domestic competition from foreign producers and contributed to
auto industry growth. However, even before foreign
competition placed constraints on domestic markets, the U.S.
auto industry was already approaching a replacement market
i.e. market saturation by volume. Car density, defined as
cars per 1000 population, increased from 344 in 1960, to 434
in 1970, and 545 in 1980 (Jones, 1982). The automotive
companies have attempted to respond to such constraints by
adding value to cars by increasing the use of electronic
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components (Womack, 1986). Such market constraints also
pressure auto companies to develop technology systems. Thus,
there are definite pressures for conglomeration (via the need
for access to advanced technologies) without respect to
foreign competition. Although, as foreign competition is
limited revenues can be received by increased car sales rather
than by adding value (unless technological gadgetry sets the
standards for what sells).
Industry maturation provides long-run pressures for
diversification. In Japan especially, the trend is for
companies to move towards increasingly knowledge-intensive
industries. But while the Big Three remain committed to the
auto business, their purchases of Japanese companies indicates
they can sell an increased proportion of cars without domestic
workers. G.M. owns 5.3 percent of Suzuki Motors and 35
percent of Isuzu in Japan, 50 percent of Daewoo in South
Korea. Ford owns 25% of Mazda (Edid, op. cit.; Labor
Institute, 1984; Greenwald, op. cit.). This form of
conglomeration would be limited by protectionism because a
major reason for these purchases is to gain access to captive
imports. In the short-run, judging by the degree of company
purchases, conglomeration is not such a serious problem that
efforts to limit import induced layoffs could be considered
diversionary. However, the problems associated with the long-
run acceleration of diversification might be prevented by
protectionist measures which prevented increased Big Three
purchases of captive imports.
The auto industry traditionally has been organized on the
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principle of dualism i.e. "subcontractors absorb uncertainty
or instability from mass production firms" (Storper, 1985).
Some have argued that this has been a primary vehicle for auto
industry accumulation:
... unequal exchange between monopoly sector auto
producers and competitive sector parts suppliers meant
that auto firms were appropriating a portion of the
surplus extracted by the competitive sectors (Trachte and
Ross, 1983).
Increased international competition has encouraged this
process by which risk is extended to suppliers and value is
appropriated from them. Japan's superior quality performance
is also encouraging the use of just-in-time sourcing and total
quality control as a means to improve sales based on lower
inventory and defect costs and improved product quality.
The original equipment manufacturers, the auto assemblers
in the Big Three, seek to export risk and drive down costs by
"down sizing," selling off supplier operations. More parts
are bought outside internal operations, forward-linked
activities such as marketing are emphasized. The process of
exporting risk to suppliers has been linked to what Michael
Storper and Susan Christopherson, geographers at U.C.L.A.,
call "vertical disintegration." Under this process, firms
reduce their overhead costs in an unstable market by limiting
the scope of their activities, purchases are made on the
market as risk is passed on to suppliers (Storper, 1985b).
High costs are associated with extensive vertical integration
if the higher salaries paid workers and managers in assembly
divisions are applied to supplier industries (Altshuler, et.
al., 1984: 147-148). Such costs can be averted as a new
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complex of Japanese supplier companies extends the range of
non-union employment in the auto industry. Within the auto
industry, large establishments are more likely to be be
unionized than smaller ones. Although the majority of workers
in Michigan auto-related industry are unionized, over three
quarters of the establishments are not according to a recent
University of Michigan survey (AIM Newsletter, March 1986).
The problem of extending employment in non-union areas in
response to cost pressures from foreign suppliers has already
afflicted workers in the tire industry where new plants were
built in non-union strongholds in the South (Capelli, 1985).
The process of "down sizing" may also be encouraged by trends
for asssembly operations to specialize in what they do best.
They also are able to shop for the most modern and efficient
technolgy as competition among suppliers increases.
Capital Flight and Regional Relocation in the Auto Industry
The pressure for firms to relocate products in low cost
areas in the United States has been part of a long-term
strategy of manufacturers to secure lower-wage rates and a
more pliable labor force. As a result of workers' political
power in strongholds in the Midwest, auto makers have felt
pressured to disperse production:
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The auto industry's labor situation has serious loca-
tional implications: it is a general principle of loca-
tional theory that a less costly center of labor diverts
the industrial process from its cheapest transportation
point at that moment when labor savings at a new site
exceed the additional transportation costs...
The result is a tendency to seek plant sites in areas
where labor is cheaper, less troublesome and free from a
tradition of hostile labor-management relations. Although
industry-wide bargaining insures equality of payment
throughout the nation, definite advantages nevertheless
accrue to, say, a Southern location rather than one in the
mid-West. Workers there will be much more satisfied with
wage rates than those in a city with a high living standard.
Secondly, no tradition of labor strife exists. Thirdly,
management can install labor-saving machinery and automatic
equipment more readily in such a branch plant than in an
established one.. .there has been a real decentralization
at work in the industry (Hurley, 1959 as quoted in Morales,
1984: 65).
Ford Chairman Philip Caldwell has noted the past efforts of
auto executives to "spread their plants around the country to
keep their newly unionized workers as dispersed as possible."
The development of the two-car suburban market lead industry
to open dispersed regional factory branches, and company
controlled dealerships to increase sales. New plants were
built in cities such as San Jose, Atlanta, and Arlington,
Texas; Los Angeles became an anchor for West-Coast sales
(Morales, Ibid.). Government policy also encouraged the
dispersal of assembly operations. President Truman's National
Industrial Dispersion Program, launched in 1951, provided
accelerated tax write-offs and defense contracts as a way to
decentralize U.S. manufacturing (Markusen, 1985: 170).
A final reason for industry dispersion can be seen in
General Motors' "Southern Strategy," begun shortly after World
War II. This plan was part of a concerted effort to
circumvent the U.A.W.'s strength. Plants were located
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primarily in right-to-work states and this practice continued
throughout the 1970s:
...between 1970 and 1980, GM open.ed a total of fourteen
new plants, with eight located in the deep South and one in
Mexico. Nine of the U.S. plants were located in right-to-
work states. This-permitted GM to effectively use the
threat of shifting production to its non-union shops as
a bargaining lever in its northern plant negotiations
(Bluestone and Harrison, 1982: 167).
Although inter-regional shifts in the supplier and assembly
industry prior to the 1970s were not considered important,
there have been major intra-regional shifts in the auto
industry across the nation. Here, auto companies set up
assembly divisions in rural parts of Michigan (Twinsburg) and
Ohio (Avon Lake and Lordstown). A 1979 study noted that of
the fifteen completely new plants built by the Big Three since
1970, "only one-third were in metropolitan areas, and in the
smaller and intermediate sized ones at that" (Mutlu, 1979:
168). Nevertheless, population trends in the transportation
equipment industry are suggestive of the decline of population
growth in labor strongholds in the Midwest and Northeast (See:
Tables 4-2 and 4-3). The data show consistent losses in the
assembly operations in Nortern tier states, almost all other
states have been consistent gainers in employment. Similarly,
in reviewing data from the Census of Manufactures, Ann
Markusen noted that "employment has dispersed from its
previous agglomerative core in Michigan." While the state
employed 57 percent of all auto workers in 1947, this
percentage dropped to 38 percent in 1977. Although Michigan's
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Table 4-2: Change in Total Manufacturing Employment
in the Transportation Equipment Industry
in Selected States: 1973-80 (Percentage)
Massachusetts 7.8
New York -12.7
Michigan -22.8
Ohio -18.6
Georgia 3.8
North Carolina 101.2
Texas 23.4
California 5.8
United States 11.0
Source: Bluestone, 1984.
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Table 4-3: Geographical Distribution of Employment in the
Motor Vehicle Industry
SIC 3711:
Motor Vehicles
and Car Bodies
First Quarter Last Quarter 1984
1975 1979
New York 4,402 6,043 3,312
New Jersey 6,115 9,891 6,969
Pennsylvania 6,125 12,617 9,865
Wisconsin 18,143 20,158 17,339
Illinois 6,150 8,296 7,519
Michigan 182,461 226,599 194,128
Indiana 10,607 8,029 3,401
Ohio 37,920 34,660 37,783
North Carolina 59 381 3,209
Tennessee 256 930 3,331
Georgia 7,428 10,985 9,978
Missouri 17,586 24,399 24,756
Kansas 3,650 5,537 7,253
Oklahoma 216 4,958 6,561
Texas 5,174 6,640 6,941
California 16,363 23,598 9,272
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Table 4-3: Geographical Distribution of Employment in the
Motor Vehicle Industry
SIC 3714:
Motor Vehicle
Parts and
Accessories
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Illinois
Michigan
Indiana
Ohio
North Carolina
Tennessee
Georgia
Missouri
Kansas
Oklahoma
Texas
California
First
1975
24,780
1,418
10,835
10,670
13,970
120,648
35,999
61,812
4,776
7,676
1,330
6,569
942
2,296
2,969
9,725
Quarter Last Quarter
1979
32,245
2,280
11,901
11,682
14,745
141,019
37,955
69,477
7,707
11,724
3,651
7,535
1,897
4,101
3 , 567
15,152
Source: Cohen 1982a, BLS Data.
1984
28,164
2,813
10,963
9,106
14,859
122,515
33,483
55,671
11,216
11,419
4,381
6,349
2,296
3,889
3,968
16,713
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loss in employment slowed in the 1960s and 1970s, other states
in the manufacturing belt lost jobs as well. The major
beneficiary of these trends were states in the Sunbelt
(Markusen, op. cit.: 171).
But despite the shift of capital to the South and labor
weak areas generally, even plants in the South have been
threatened with plant closings unless they made concessions to
meet global competition. In November 1981, Ford threatened to
close its Sheffield, Alabama plant, unless workers agreed to a
50 percent cut in wages and benefits (Goldsmith, 1984: 349).
The plant was latter "mothballed." Although most recent major
plant closings have been in the Midwest, California or East,
and not in the South, this region has also felt the effects of
corporate restructuring (Bieber, 1984b). A study of plant
closings with 100 or more employees found that the probability
of a shutdown by 1976, given being in operation in 1969, was
actually higher in the South than in any other region
(Harrison and Bluestone, 1984: 375). Still, only 12.5 percent
of all production and related workers in the motor vehicle
industry were employed in the South in 1983 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1985b).
Like the problem of Big Three dispersal to labor weak
areas in the South and rural regions, the rise of Japanese
manufacturing operations in the U.S. threatens workers'
bargaining power. The extension of capital to non-union
strongholds has occurred as Japanese producers have opened
assembly operations in rural Ohio and Tennessee. They have
also engaged in practices which attempt to insure a more
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obedient work force.
Honda and Nissan have used interviews to select mostly
anti-union workers and scare off many potential pro-union
applicants. In March of 1986, the U.A.W. announced that they
were halting a six-year drive to organize workers at a Honda
Motors plant in Ohio. Because workers from rural areas at the
plant are unaccustomed to the higher wages paid by Honda, they
are willing to accept wages which are lower than national
U.A.W. standards and flexible work rules. The U.A.W. also
accused Honda of illegally interogating workers, allowing
anti-union material to be distributed on company time and
increasing benefits in the midst of the organizing drive
Nissan has said that it would oppose U.A.W. efforts to
organize workers in its Smyrna, Tennessee plant (Noble, 1986:
A18). New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI) in
Fremont, California (the joint venture with G.M.) put job
applicants through interviews and tests in an attempt to
insure a cooperative work force (Buss, 1983; Levin, 1985).
An examination of the NUMMI system underlines the limits
of protectionism to provide jobs by relocating Japanese
assembly divisions to the U.S. Jobs from the orignal G.M.
staff have been eliminated by automated equipment and by
producing 70 percent of the car's content in Japan. At full
production, NUMMI is expected to employ 2,500 workers of the
former G.M. work force of 6,000 (McPherson, 1985).
The rise of. the Japanese producers in the U.S. can also
lead to a national disruption in workers' bargaining power by
setting dangerous precedents in work practices. NUMMI was
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able to eliminate 81 job classifications which existed when
the plant was run by G.M., replacing them with three. Plant
production is organized around the team concept (described in
Chapter Two).
The U.A.W. "International has consistently sought to
demonstrate to NUMMI that it can accept Toyota's production
methods and work in a cooperative rather than adversarial
manner" (Ibid.). Even at Mazda's U.S. plant, where the
U.A.W. has been recognized at the Michigan facility, workers
are hired at 85 percent of the going wage at Ford Motor
Company. Flexible work rule are planned for the plant as well
(Edid, 1985c).
It could be argued that the disruption of national
bargaining created by the extension of work practices employed
in Japanese auto plants to the U.S. is a serious challenge
which protectionist measures fail to address. While the
Saturn project provides guarantees for lifetime employment,
the disruption in work rules at the plant sets a dangerous
precendent. Some labor relations academics have argued that
the guaranteed income stream and job bank provisions in recent
U.A.W. contracts points to a new system of labor relations
beneficial to labor (Katz, 1985). Yet, others point to
serious weaknesses in the contracts' ability to provide decent
income levels or slow displacement (Gardner et. al., 1982a,
1982b; Slaughter, 1983).
The danger of NUMMI practices for setting a precedent
come as union critics fear that G.M. may use Freemont as a
model for its Saturn.project and Ford and Chrysler could
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extend the NUMMI system to their joint ventures with Mazda and
Mitsubishi (McPherson, op. cit.). However, protectionist
measures which raised the domestic content of vehicles in the
U.S. could conceivably increase the bargaining power of
workers at Japanese plants in the U.S. as these producers
became more labor dependent. The extension of the Japanese
production system to the U.S. can also increase workers'
potential power: "Even a short work stoppage at any point in
the process, from supplier to final assembly line, tends to
halt operations both upstream and downstream very quickly"
(Parker, 1985: 87).
Centrifugal Forces in Auto
While radical economists have studied the impact of
capital flight to the South during the post-War era, recent
studies have begun to address the possibility that other
forces will lead to production being "recentralized" within
the Midwest. In particular, the shift to the just-in-time
system is believed to require geographical proximity between
suppliers and producers (Estall, 1985; Altshuler et. al.,
1984; Business Week, October 14, 1985). However, geographers
Susan Christopherson and Micahel Storper has questioned
whether the adoption of just-in-time economies will lead to a
centralized production system within the U.S.:
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It is difficult...to infer general principles about
spatial behavior of flexibly specialized industries from
the Japanese cases, because Japan is a small and crowded
country with few opportunities for the kind of decentrali-
zation which has occurred in the U.S. and Western Europe
in the past two decades. Moreover, the U.S. auto industry
is at too early a stage in reorganization to provide ample
time series evidence of changes in spatial linkage patterns
(Christopherson and Storper, 1985).
The automobile industry traditionally had been centralized in
the Midwest as firms were able to take advantage of both
integration and agglomeration in one location. For example,
as a concentrated oligopily, Ford Motor Co. was faced with
very limited price competition in which there were signigifant
barriers to entry from competitors: "Ford decentralized when
the automobile industry became slightly more competitive in
two respects: prices and product differentiation" (Ibid.).
Whether or not price competition exists, we have tried to show
that cost competition is a certainty in the domestic industry.
Product differentiation, as noted in Chapter Two, has made
mass production more costly. Flexible machine technologies
allow small scale production in more remote areas.
Christopherson and Storper suggest that such technologies and
accompanying trends do favor "recentralization":
...the vertical disintegration that lies behind
flexible specialization creates powerful agglomeration
tendencies at the regional level. Flexible
specialization itself leads to the recomposition of
the industrial complex, which itself strengthens the
forces of agglomeration (Ibid.).
The history of the supplier industry is marked by centrifugal
forces. Traditionally, parts and accessories producers have
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been less decentralized than the assembly producers. For
example, in 1972, only 2.99 percent of employment in parts
and accessories was located in the South Atlantic region, this
was merely one-third of its share in employment in motor
vehicles production. While some assembly-operations
decentralized, supplier operations chose to stay close to the
center of gravity of the auto industry in the Midwest. Such
centrifugal tendencies arose to take advantage of economies of
scale by building a large plant instead of many small ones
(which increases overhead), to maintain contacts with
principal customers in a market which is highly cyclical.
Despite higher labor costs in the East-North Central region,
where three-fourths of the industry is located, the industry
remained just as concentrated there in 1972 as 1967 (Mutlu,
1979).
Wage disparaties among regions have been narrowed by
national bargaining contracts. In 1983, the year after
dramatic concession bargaining, production and related workers
in Michigan made $12.18 an hour. In the South the compable
figure was $12.08 and in the Northeast such workers made
$12.33 an hour. But annual wages per employee showed greater
disparity. In 1984, Michigan workers made $39,612 but in
Florida workers made $17,490, in Georgia workers in SIC 3711
made $34,400, in Tennessee they made $27,850. Wage
disparities among workers in the motor vehicle parts
industries were greater. In 1983, average hourly earnings of
production workers in motor vehicle parts ranged from $6.58 in
the South to $9.01 in the North Central region. In 1984, in
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SIC 3714, annual wages per employee ranged from $34,720
in Michigan and $32,732 in Ohio to $19,941 in Tennessee and
$19,191 in North Carolina (Bureau of Labor Statistics, May
1983; BLS data).
Additional reasons may continue to keep a large number of
supplier factories in the North-Central region. Less funds
may be available for spatial adjustments as pressure to
modernize domestic plants to meet competition raise research
and development costs and funds needed for more flexible
production. Another reason keeping Ford in the Detroit area
is based on real estate investments:
...The company is still dominated by the Ford family
and both the family and the company have extensive real
estate interests in and around Detroit. Any extensive
decentralization by Ford, which is the city's principal
employer, would devalue these properties (Mutlu, op. cit.
171).
The growth of a robotics industry in Michigan also
contributes to centrifugal tendencies. More importantly,
extensive automation may promote the return of some production
from overseas to the U.S. One example of this trend can be
seen in G.M.'s Delco Electronics Division. Because of rising
labor costs, Delco began making car radios in Singapore and
Mexico about 12 years ago. In 1983, the company announced
that it was bringing its radio facilities back to the U.S.
Because car radios are electronic, they require little
assembly work; production has been highly automated (White,
1984). Yet, automated production can be extended to export
facilities as well. However, the relative bulkiness and
weight of auto production has added to transport costs which
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make home assembly (centered in the Midwest) more efficient
(Mutlu, 1979). Increased use of plastics and synthetic
materials could change this however (Markusen, 1985: 171).
A central factor which permits recentralization of
production and places limits on corporations' calculations
which send components of the global assembly line overseas is
management's ability to hire complacent workers domestically.
In the U.S. auto industry, new plants are sent to regions
where labor conflict and wage rates are more restrained
(Cohen, 1983a). In the auto industry, migrant labor in and out
of the underground economy can be used to secure cheap wage
rates at home. Recent pronouncements in a proposal to punish
employers of illegal aliens by President Reagan's Council on
Economic Advisers suggests that migration policy is part of
trade policy. The report notes that "restrictions on
immigration, like restrictions on trade, are costly" to both
employers and the economy as a whole (Pear, 1986: 1).
In short, we have a balance between two opposing forces.
First, as firms vertically disintegrate, they seek suppliers
in closer proximity to maintain quality control and
informational networks described earlier. On the other hand,
more of the work sourced outside can be supplied overseas. An
industrial complex is already arising within Mexico and
Tenessee suggesting that just-in-time and decentralization may
not be mutually exclusive. As a result, capital flight to
regions where labor is weak within the U.S. and overseas is
still a pressing problem. Trends towards "recentralization"
may make the jobs of assembly or high skilled production
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workers more secure. However, the same could not be said for
workers in the supplier industries.
Despite the closing of plants in areas such as
California, and the redirection of production in the Midwest,
other patterns suggest that decentralized production in the
U.S. is still an issue. Both G.M.'s Saturn plant and new
Japanese plants are located in union-weak areas in the South
such as Tennessee. Does the growth of such plants in union-
weak regions mean that protectionism is diversionary and does
not lead to increased power for workers?
While protectionism might not limit the growth of non-
union employment in labor-weak areas, it could limit
outsourcing of cars and parts (through local content) and
import-induced displacement. As a result, it could decrease
threats against workers which contribute to the break up of
pattern bargaining (See: Chapter Five). Therefore, it might
reaffirm national wage settlements and make changes in work
rules or regional disparities in wages less likely. Such
national wage settlements would make it more likely that wage
rates paid in the Midwest could be extended to new U.S. plants
which could move to Southern or union-weak states. Also, many
workers in Japanese and new U.S. plants in areas such as
Tennessee are making higher wages than they would otherwise
make. By extending development to such low-wage areas, U.S.
and foreign producers are--to a certain extent--limiting the
pattern of uneven development in the U.S. that makes capital
flight a weapon to begin with.
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1- Scott (1985) found that "labor hoarding" in the auto
industry was substantial in the late 1970s. He noted
significant labor retention in the face of depressed sales,
pointing to decreased average productivity levels in the auto
industry. Average productivity in stampings, assembly and
parts fell from 14.1 units per employee to 10.8 units per
employee in 1980. It is not clear how much of the depressed
productivity is caused by lower utilization rates.
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Chapter Five: The Contribution of Protectionism
to Workers' Bargaining and Political Power
Introduction
In Chapter Three, we discussed at length how import
penetration led to significant displacement in the auto industry
and how protectionism, given the constraints explained in Chapter
Four, helps slow such displacement. Chapter Three noted that
increased import penetration contributed to a squeeze on
corporate profits by cutting into the market share of domestic
producers. We now examine how import penetration and
protectionism affect workers' power through concession
bargaining and depressed wage rates.
Protectionism, Imports and Bargaining
Given recent trends in the auto industry towards the
break-up of pattern bargaining (Katz, 1985), we would expect
that an increase in concession bargaining would increase the
likelihood of wages to be set in plant level rather than
nationally administered labor agreeements. This link between
between workers' power and import penetration represents our
fourth hypothesis. We expect that if import penetration
contributes to the break up of pattern bargaining, it would
accelerate trends which have led to union locals bidding
against each other for work. The first link between import
penetration and workers' power is the role the former plays in
undermining union solidarity.
The connection between concession bargaining and workers'
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power through labor solidarity can also be seen in wage
bargaining patterns. Concession bargaining has already led
to a divergence between wages paid among Big Three auto
makers. An important aspect of wage determination in the
industry in the post-War period was the standardization of
hourly wages across the Big Three. This pattern of wage
standardization began to break down with the advent of
concession-bargaining at Chrysler in 1979 (Katz, 1985: 29).
In December 1982, the U.A.W. released its locals to negotiate
separately, to reduce wages in plants pressed by low profit
levels (Goldsmith, 1984: 349). While a different union policy
may reduce labor concessions, low levels of imports helped
maintain industry-wide wage standards. Throughout the 1950s
and 1960s, the level of auto imports was rather small (See:
Appendix One). As a result, "any sales lost by a failing
independent company were most likely picked up by another
domestic company" (Katz, op. cit.: 35-36). Management
willingness to maintain wage standardization was supported by
both low levels of import penetration and the steady upward
growth in auto sales (Ibid.: 38).
Under the "social contract" between workers and
management in the post-War period, auto companies faced rising
labor costs which were accomodated by increases in sales or
productivity. A 1985 study gives some indication of labor's
ability to capture monopoly profits in the industry:
In the Transportation Equipment and Primary Metal
Industries, where both concentration and unionization
are very high, virtually all of the monopoly profits were
captured by unions in 1972 (Karrier, 1985: 40).
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A review of earnings patterns in the auto industry also
reveals a steady rise in real wages of automobile workers (in
1967 dollars) from 1950 when they were $2.45 per hour to 1973
when they were $4.10 per hour. Since 1973, real wages have
declined from peaks in 1974 and 1979 (years during or
following gas shortages and periods of increased import
penetration) and 1982 which was the first year of dramatic
concession bargaining across the Big Three (See: Appendix
Seven).
We have already noted in earlier Chapters that wage costs
have remained relatively constant in the auto industry. We
must now examine what trends have made management more likely
and able to gain such concessions. The break-up of the
"growth coalition" in the 1960s and 1970s explains part of the
reason for concession bargaining and depressed wage rates
in the auto industry. Under the coalition, management was
both willing and able to grant wage increases as productivity
and profits increased. High wages were also paid to workers
in the auto industry as a means of securing a stable and
secure work force. This pattern, generally described in the
economics literature under the notion of an "efficiency wage,"
has been alluded to earlier in our discussion of "transaction
costs." Monopolies pay higher wages than competitive firms to
reduce transaction costs associated with worker turnover and
to retain skilled labor. The auto companies have been able to
pay high wages for three principal reasons. First, the auto
industry has employed more capital per worker than other
industries, higher productivity has allowed for higher wages.
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Unionization has also brought high wages as did oligopoly
power which made the cost of losing production high (Luria,
1986). Guaranteed markets allowed for both high wages and
profits; management had little incentive to lose production
through strikes. Increased import penetration has helped
weaken the last of these two condition's impact on wages.
The demise of the post-War capital-labor accord has been
linked to many factors, among them depressed worker
productivity in the face of rising wage rates (Bowles et. al.,
1983: 91). But rising import penetration levels also helped
encourge concession-bargaining and depressed wage rates. The
process occurred in four basic ways: First, the rise in
imports increased the likelihood that management would want
labor concessions as market share and profits were depressed
and management sought to cut costs by pressuring labor. This
process occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s when
recession combined with rising import levels to hold back
profits. However, as domestic auto makers increasingly
outsource and add value to cars, the danger of such a squeeze
on profits is diminished. Together these processes may
guarantee profit in the face of competition for the next
thirty years (Luria, 1986). But as protectionism provides
some guarantee of domestic market share, fewer concessions may
be demanded from workers because as domestic markets are
protected it may become more feasible to source domestic
production with domestic labor. The reason for this brings us
to our second argument.
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Protectionism may increase workers' bargaining power
because increased import penetration has created a strong
incentive for employers to resist workers' demands. Non-union
wages from low content domestic production and imports has
come into competition with domestic union wages. In the
supplier industry, union coverage moved from 50 to 30 percent
coverage of workers (Luria, Ibid.). Such trends are
aggravated by the relocation of Japanese auto suppliers to the
U.S. and cost pressures from imports. By limiting competition
from such non-union wages, protectionism helps slow the
erosion of workers' bargaining power.
A third reason why protectionism may aid workers'
bargaining power is linked to the role increased import
penetration plays in making domestic workers superfluous to
the production process. Rising import levels contributed to
growing unemployment levels which increased workers' fears of
losing jobs if work rules and wage rates were not modified.
By slowing labor displacement, protectionism makes workers
more secure in their jobs (especially if it is combined with
other policies which would slow technological displacement or
regulate capital flight). Finally, import-induced job loss
accelerated a process of "deindustrialization" in which
workers were displaced from the relatively high-paying jobs in
the auto industry into lower paid jobs in the service sector
and non-blue collar jobs.
How have rising import levels encouraged management's
desires for concessions? The links between the open economy
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and management policy are not direct. To a certain extent
management always seeks to gain "concessions" from workers.
However, management's increased incentive to seek concessions
in the late 1970s and early 1980s can be linked to the squeeze
on profits discussed in Chapter Three.
The profitability of domestic firms can be viewed as a
major constraint on a union's ability to successfully bargain
for higher wages. This constraint is "tightened" if higher
import levels lower domestic industry profitability: "Union
wage gains are likely to be smaller in industries with import
penetration" (Heywood, 1985). Support for this hypothesis
comes from statistical research which suggests that union wage
gains are "lower where an industry's import penetration rate
(the percentage of domestic consumption that is imported) is
high" (Mishel, 1982). This argument follows from the logic that
union wages should be higher in more concentrated industries
(Heywood, 1985). This association has been supported by
empirical work which shows that high levels of industry
concentration are associated with high wages (Heywood, Ibid.;
Mishel, op. cit.). Firms with substantial market power are
more likely to earn above average rates of return, and such
revenues become the "target" of union negotiations (Clark,
1984: 901). Mishel (1985) found that when union coverage is
measured as the sole dimension of union structure, high price-
cost margins are associated with lower union compensation.
Clark (1984) found that profits were sharply reduced by unions
when companies had a market share of less than ten percent and
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there was no impact when firms had a market share or more than
35 percent. On the other hand, high profits reduce one
organizing cost to unions, "the profitability of job loss with
the firm's demise subsequent to unionization" (Voos and
Mishel, 1986).
The incentive for management to recoup depressed profits
from unionized workers is linked to the effect unions and
workers have on profits. Certainly wages are not a major
factor in increasing corporate costs in the auto industry as
discussed in Chapter Two. However, as corporate profits are
depressed, the opportunity cost of not hiring cheaper foreign
or domestic labor is increased. The discrepancy between the
wages paid in union and non-union plants becomes a management
concern when profits are squeezed. First, "unionized firms
earn substantially lower returns than non-union firms in
comparable technological and competitive environments" (Clark,
op. cit.: 918). Second, and more important for our discussion
of the auto industry, "unionization appears to bear most
heavily on those firms whose profitability is already at a
relatively low level" (Ibid.: 971). But profitable firms also
seek consessions. Nineteen percent of 400 executives in
leading U.S. companies in a 1982 poll in Business Week
admitted that although they didn't need worker concessions,
they were taking advantage of the bargaining climate to ask
for them (Slaughter, 1983: 11). In fact, although G.M. made a
third of a billion dollars in profits during 1982, it still
sought and was granted concessions in April of that same year
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(Ibid.) However, we have already noted that Ford and Chrysler
were more affected than G.M. by import competition. G.M. may
have taken advantage of the precedent set by Chrysler in 1979
in gaining concessions, but this does not mean that a squeeze
on profits did not motivate earlier concession bargaining.
Also, it is clear that G.M.'s receipt of $2.5 billion in
concessions in 1982 contributed to company profits i.e.
concessions are demanded also to increase profits.
The link between stemming a profit squeeze and increased
bargaining power provided by protectionism has been weakened
by industry restructuring through accelerated automation and
outsourcing. But rising import penetration still threatens
workers' security. As rising import levels contribute to
unemployment, the cost to labor of resisting management
demands for concessions is increased. At the very least,
rising unemployment levels increase the perception that it
is more costly to resist management demands.
Researchers have attempted to establish a link between
concession bargaining and unemployment by arguing that
"concession bargaining is a response to changing and uncertain
labor demand functions" (Capelli, 1982: 362). In a 1982 study
of 210 cases of concession bargaining, based on negotiations
reported by the Bureau of National Affairs, Peter Capelli
found a direct link between displacement and concessions. In
ninety-six percent of the cases, employment security was
involved, including threats of layoffs or plant closings.
But, the concessions are not merely based on perceptions of
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possible displacement. In ninety percent of the cases,
workers had actually experienced layoffs or temporary closings
just prior to negotiations.
The likelihood of unions' granting concessions is also
directly shaped by displacement. According to Capelli, 'the
unions granted concessions only where employment was
threatened (that is, there were no rollbacks in the 4 percent
ofthe cases where layoffs or plant closings were not
threatened)". On the management side, concessions are
demanded because employers want to employ substantially fewer
workers under the terms of the current contract, "as evidenced
by the threats of (or actual) layoffs" (Capelli, 1982: 364).
In examining what forces help explain the incidence of
concession negotiations, Capelli suggested that changes in the
security of union employment across industries could
conceivably increase the likelihood of concessions. As union
coverage of an industry falls, "the ability to substitute away
from a union workforce increases, and the elasticity of labor
rises." In a study of more than thirty industries, Capelli
found that changes in import penetration (defined as a
percentage of domestic consumption), as a measure of changes
in union coverage of an industry, was significant in
explaining the likelihood of concession bargaining. Capelli
argues a point raised earlier, that management's ability to
turn to non-union employment raises the costliness to union's
of wage increases: "the burden of union wage rates increases
for unionized employers as the proportion of competition not
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covered by unions--usually with lower labor costs--rises"
(Ibid.).
Recent research at the University of Michigan by John
Heywood, demonstrates the link between depressed wages and
rising import levels. Specific industries which have
witnessed greater new import penetration have experienced a
larger decrease in wages: "A large rise in imports seems to
bring with it a large decrease in wages." Heywood's study was
b'ased on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, in which
respondents were surveyed in 1982 about events in 1981. Using
this data, Heywood found that "a ten point increase in import
penetration will decrease earnings by 1279 dollars per year
for otherwise full-time workers" (Heywood, 1985). Research by
labor economist Lawrence Mishel found that import penetration,
but not its recent growth, is associated with lower pay for
union production workers. In Mishel's study, movement from no
import competiton to high import competiton implied a loss of
compensation of 10 to 17.5 percent (Mishel, 1985). Lower
import levels might raise wages indirectly by increasing
workers' bargaining power by lowering the cost of job loss.
But the empirical evidence implies that futher import
penetration which would occur under the removal of import
controls leads to lower wages.
Other measures indicate that for auto workers not rehired
by the Big Three, the cost of job loss has increased.
Directly, import-induced job loss puts workers in relatively
lower paid jobs. Indirectly, such wage losses accelerated by
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import-penetration raise the cost to workers of loosing their
jobs and makes workers on the job more likely to give
concessions. Appendix Four suggests that auto workers' wages
have consistently been higher than average manufacturing
wages. On the other hand, changing employment patterns have
narrowed the opportunities for displaced workers i.e. there
are less and less high paid jobs for displaced auto workers to
move into.
Several studies have shown that there have been decreased
opportunities for displaced workers. Overall employment in
the class of industries which possess mean wages in the
"middle" (between 80 and 119 percent of the grand mean of 136
industry mean wages in 1980) is growing slower than employment
in low wage industries, but faster than employment in high
wage industries (Gorham, 1984). Other data show a dramatic
rise in income inequality after the late 1970s (Harrison et.
al., 1986). In 1969, low wage industries accounted for 45.2
percent of tatal employment. However, by 1995 their share is
expected to rise to over 52 percent (Gorham, op. cit.).
Studies of displaced auto workers also indicate the
costliness to auto workers of displacement. A Cornell
University study of the shutdown of a Ford assembly plant in
Mawah, New Jersey found that the median income of the 5,000
workers fell more than 50 percent (from $21,6000 to $10,400)
in the two years after the shutdown (Bieber, 1984). In a
study of 320 Michigan auto workers laid off after 1978, Boston
College's Social Welfare Research Institute found that 25
percent of those re-employed at new positions found jobs in
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the service sector. Those laid off and employed at new jobs
made on average 70 percent of their original wages; those re-
called made wages 116 percent higher than before. Despite
substantial supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) and
unemployment insurance, laid off workers losses were
substantial (See: Appendix Eight). Those re-employed under a
new employer made weekly earnings which on average were 81
percent of their original salary levels in the auto industry
(Gordon et. al., 1984).
A larger study of displaced workers carried out by the
Department of Labor also indicated high levels of unemployment
and wage loss among workers in the auto industry. In
examining the employment status of displaced workers in the
auto industry in January 1984, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(B.L.S.) found that 224,000 employees with a tenure of three
years or more lost or left a job between January 1979 and
January 1984 because of plant closings or moves, slack work,
or the abandonment of their positions of shifts. In January
1984, 62.9 percent of these workers were employed, 24.0
percent were unemployed and 13.1 percent were not in the labor
force (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1985a). An estimate by AIM
researcher Dan Luria suggest that about 100,000 auto workers
lost their jobs because of import penetration from 1978 to
1985. Luria's estimate assumes productivity increases of
about 15 percent a year (Luria, 1986). Therefore, about half
of the displacement described above can be traced to import-
induced unemployment. The B.L.S. Displaced Worker study found
that the median weekly earnings of autoworkers on their lost
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job was $391. Of the 141,000 workers who lost jobs in 1979-83
but were employed in January 1984, their median weekly
earnings on their lost job was $406. The median weekly
earnings on the jobs such workers held in January 1984 was
$337 (BLS, op. cit.).
Last summer, reports noted that increased competitive
pressures and the existence of what AFL-CIO President Lane
Kirkland called "an army of long-term unemployed" had lead to
the increased use by companies of strike breakers. By
increasing structural unemployment in the auto industry,
import penetration has contributed to the pool of potential
strikebreakers. Recent legal developments have also increased
the dangers such strikebreaders pose to workers by allowing
union members to quit their union and return to work during a
strike (Hoerr, 1985).
It is not clear what role more limited forms of
protectionism play in directly stabilizing wage rates. Under
the V.R.A.'s, there is evidence that workers exercised wage
restraint. From 1975 to 1980, U.S. motor vehicle compensation
grew at an annual rate of 11.5 percent, while all
manufacturing compensation was growing at a rate of only 9.2
percent. Between 1980 and 1983, motor vehicle compensation
rose at the rate of 5.3 percent per year, while all
manufacturing grew at a rate of 7.6 percent per year (Scott,
1985). Some measures indicate that protectionism contributed
to higher wages in latter years. An April 1985 report noted
that:
The car companies, protected from Japanese imports
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until recently, accounted for one-third of the total
rise in manufacturing earnings since 1982 (Nasar, 1985a).
The removal of protectionist measures could easily increase
the number of workers displaced into lower paid jobs given
the Japanese cost and technological advantage. Increased
protectionist measures would take more non-union waged labor
out of competition, but at the risk of retaliation (discussed
below).
Political and Economic Divisions Under Protectionism
While the evidence is supportive of protectionism
aiding workers in the auto industry, subject to its use with
supplementary policies, critics claim that protectionist
measures would be divisive. They argue that protectionist
measures divide workers who are consumbers from other workers
in the auto industry, fail to overcome divisions between
primary labor market auto workers and secondary labor market
workers inside and outside the auto industry, increase
divisions between workers in the U.S. and the Third World.
Conservatives critics of protectionism claim that
protectionism would place an unfair burden on consumers and is
not justified economically. Progressives prefer to look at
the political divsions which are thought to grow out of such
costs. According to the Institute for International Economics
(I.I.E.), protectionist measures in the auto industry cost
consumers $5.8 billion in 1984. I.I.E. claims that the cost
per job saved was $105,000. These estimates were made by
adding the direct cost of import restrictions (in the shape of
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higher foreign prices) to the higher cost of domestic goods
that resulted from controls on imports. However, it is not
clear from such studies whether their estimate for jobs saved
fully account for multiplier effects in the supplier industry
i.e. more jobs may have been saved than I.I.E. claims
(Business Week, April 7, 1986). A study by Temple, Barker and
Sloane, Inc. (T.B.S.)., a Boston-based consulting group, of
the costs of domestic content legislation did attempt to model
potential employment gains in the supplier industry. However,
the study only projected employment increases based on the
growth or preservation of 1.2 million domestic vehicles in
domestic production. Using this figure as a base, T.B.S.
estimated a gain of 44,296 manufacturing jobs in American auto
factories, and another 28,925 jobs in supplier industries.
The study also projected a gain of 12,742 jobs in dealerships.
Domestic employment loss was projected to be 48,770 from the
measure (Temple, Barker and Sloane, 1984). However, this
estimate fails to address the full opportunity costs of import
penetration. Rather than focusing on a potential gain of 1.2
million domestic vehicles under local content, we could point
to a loss to domestic producers from 2.4 million imports in
1984. In 1988, this figure was expected to grow futher as
noted above. A Federal Trade Commission Report (F.T.C.)
claimed that import quotas would cost consumers more than one
billion dollars annually. Although measuring the discounted
loss of displaced workers' earnings, the F.T.C. underestimated
155
jobs saved by the V.R.A. (4,598) (Tarr and Morke, 1984).
Under the V.R.A.'s, the average selling price of a
Japanese auto in the U.S. increased 39 percent between 1980
and 1984. Crandall (1984) found that increases of $368 per
car for domestic cars (or 3.5 percent of the average domestic
car price) were probably attributable to the V.R.A.'s in 1983.
A 1983 Wharton Econometrics study estimated that the prices of
Japanese cars increased an average of $920 to $960 per car in
1981-82 as a result of the quotas (Crandall, 1984). However,
such price hikes do not lead directly to a critique of
protectionism. In a 1984 study, Robert C. Feenstra, an
economist at Columbia University, found that most of the price
hikes in Japanese vehicles were due to increases in product
quality:
Our major conclusion is that two-thirds of the
increase in Japanese import prices following the
[Voluntary Export Restraint] was due to quality
improvement, with the remaining one-third a de facto
price rise for which the consumer is not compensated
by a change in quality (Feenstra, 1984: 56).
A study by the U.A.W. found that as measured by C.P.I., auto
price hikes have trailed inflation:
When rebates and quality changes are taken into
account and when considering a constant mix, price
hikes for both domestic and imported cars have been
extremely moderate, consistently below overall
inflation. This has been particularly true in the
case of small cars: the restraints have been
accompanied by increased small car competition among
domestic producers (Bieber, 1984a, Appendix I).
Another problem with linking price hikes in domestic autos
to protectionism is that while dollar devaluation may not
eliminate the Japanese cost gap or slow sales of imports, it
does play a significant role in raising Japanese car prices
156
i.e. not all of recent price hikes on Japanese autos is cause
by import controls. It would be hard to see how protectionist
critics could label dollar devaluation "divisive" if it raised
Japanese car prices. Also, some of the low prices on foreign
autos are based on the fact that workers in overseas auto
plants are even more politically constrained than U.S.
workers. If price hikes among domestic and foreign producers
follow from administered prices or limit pricing, then price
controls which supplemented protectionist measures could help
keep the prices of both imports and domestic vehicles low. In
Japan, auto producers are price competitive. Some observers
believe that they have used higher prices in the U.S. to
subsidize Japanese consumers in the home market (Womack,
1986).
Economists also note that not only are consumers also
workers, but that as workers they can also suffer from
increased import penetration:
...Suppose that import competition lowers the
average cost of living to consumers by two percent.
But suppose further that we respond to it by forcing
or tolerating a decline in the average worker's
earnings by two percent. The average worker is no
better off than before.
In fact, from 1979 to 1984, while imports helped reduce
prices, private nonfarm nonsupervisory employees, who comprise
five sixths of all U.S. private nonfarm employees, faced a
2.7 percent decline in the purchasing power of their
earnings (Gordon, 1986: 108).
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Politically, there may still be a cost to protectionist
measures as workers who pay more for imported cars direct
anger against auto workers. However, such anger could also be
directed against legislators in Washington or domestic auto
companies which support protectionist measures or higher
prices. Political alliances between auto workers and consumer
groups would not necessarily be threatened by protectionism
because both groups could lobby for price controls on foreign
and domestic products. Also, the impact on any given consumer
from increased prices ($370 or $960) is relatively minor
compared to the impact of displacement on auto workers.
Numerous studies have described the psychological costs of job
loss (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). We have already implied
that the discounted value of lost lifetime earnings would be
high. Public opinion polls have consistently favored
increased protectionism i.e. the costs of such protectionism
are not perceived to be high. This could change if
retaliation became a serious danger. By a margin of 56
percent to 38 percent, those surveyed by a Business
Week/Harris Poll believed that President Reagan's decision to
lift auto import quotas was a "bad idea" (Jackson, 1985).
Such surveys indicate that auto workers are not alone in their
desire for protectionism. They may also indicate political
nationalism, a danger we describe below.
Another criticism of protectionism is that it would fail
to remove barriers between primary labor market employees in
auto production and other workers. John Willoughby, a
progressive protectionist critic, writes:
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Trade union agitation to preserve the "middle class"
(that is, high paying union jobs in heavy industry)
are of course laudable, but they often implicitly
suggest a permanent barrier exists between the
primary and secondary labor markets (Willoughby,
1984: 6).
Others have argued that strategies designed to preserve income
levels through job creation fail to unite secondary and
primary labor market workers around a common program. The
argument could conceivably be extended to job preservation as
well. Barbara Ehrenreich, a critic of strategies which
solely link income-preservation to jobs, argues:
When jobs no longer work to meet people's needs for
economic security, we have to look to alternatives.
The alternative is the direct redistribution of wealth
through a program of steeply progressive taxes combined
with generous public social welfare measures...
(Progressive Agenda, February 1986).
Yet, others have argued that job creation and income support
are not mutually exclusive and could be considered mutually
supporting (Ibid.). The notion that job preservation
strategies (through protectionism) would fail to support the
interests of black workers is difficult to accept. From the
end of 1979, to the end of 1981, blue-collar employment of
black workers at Chrysler fell 33.5 percent, from 20,376 to
13,545 (Slaughter, 1983). By slowing job loss, protectionism
might limit such displacement. Data from the previously
mentioned BLS study found an unemployment rate of 41.8 in 1984
among displaced black workers 20 years and over, for whites
the figure was 23.9 percent. Assuming that protectionist
measures slowed the displacement of black workers, it is
significant to note that past struggles by such workers united
community and labor groups (Geschwender, 1977). Import
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induced displacement has complicated the basis for such
political movements. Also, as plants may close because of
import-penetration, primary labor struggles (or class-fraction
battles by primary labor market workers) may easily become
community ones because of the economic links between any plant
and surrounding areas.
It could be argued that controls on capital flight might
be more effective in preserving the jobs of black auto
workers. The population of such workers is centered in the
Detroit metropolitan region. At least 12 Chrysler plants in
the region were closed or slated to close from 1980 to March
1983. However, only three plants were closed outside the
Detroit area (Slaughter, op. cit.).
What impact would protectionist measures have in stirring
up feelings of economic and political nationalism? Much of
the national resentment against import penetration has been
directed against Asians and or Asian-Americans. Studies have
shown rising numbers of racist incidents directed against this
group in the U.S. A number of incidents indicate that
resentment over rising import levels manifests itself in
racism. A member of Congress from Michigan referred to
Japanese workers as "little yellow people" during a closed-
door hearing. Bennett E. Bidwell, President of the Hertz
Corporation, stated that the best way to slow car imports
would be to charter the Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped the
first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Bidwell later joined the
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Chrysler Corporation as an executive vice-president (Motz and
Nakawatase, 1983). On June 19, 1982, Vincent Chin, a Chinese-
American, was beaten to death by two men, both auto workers,
who had mistaken him for a Japanese. The murder took place
after a confrontation in which the assailants made racial
slurs and comments about Japanese cars costing American
workers their jobs (Knopp, 1983).
While racism against Asian-Americans is rooted in factors
deeper than resentment against lost jobs, critics of
protectionism claim that the U.A.W. has exploited racism to
promote protectionism and sentiment against Japanese products.
A report in January of 1984 stated that the U.A.W.
International has urged locals to publicize the "interlocking
empire of law firms, lobbyists, PR people, and consultants
whose aim is to help Japanese companies get a lock on the
American market" (Urquhart and Parker, 1984).
The Detroit Americans for Justice, formed after Vincent
Chin's death, has argued that the incident was "linked to the
anti-Japanese imports campaign" being waged throughout the
country, but particularly in Detroit around the automobile
(Wong, 1983). Racist bumper stickers, linking Japanese car
makers to Pearl Harbor and a U.A.W. PACMAN figure chasing a
racist caricature of a Japanese have circulated among union
members. Critics of the union's protectionist campaign charge
that mobilization against Japanese auto makers and the union's
"exploitation" of racism are part of a larger process of trade
union cooptation:
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Such swipes at Japan are no accident. Since the
UAW's central strategy is to cooperate with the auto
makers--as demonstrated by concessions, the touted
"non-adversarial relationship," and quality-of-worklife
programs--the membership cannot be mobilized against
the corporations. Who is left to be the enemy?
The Japanese. For union locals that have adopted
a cooperative relationship with management, the rank
and file can be roused only by bashing cars made in
Japan, picketing auto import dealers, and
attempting boycotts of all Japanese products
(Urquhart and Parker, 1984).
But despite the links between protectionist sentiment and
racism, lower import levels might stem a "backlash" or
misguided anger against Asian people. While there is hardly
anything admirable about American isolationism, as it has
often been associated with racism, there are other dangers
which could link an open economy to ractionary politics. As
noted earlier, displacement leads to "skidding" in which auto
workers are pushed into lower paid jobs. Continued dramatic
increases in income inequality could lead to alliances across
racial or class lines on the one hand, but could also lead to
fascism (Harrison, 1985b). Some writers have linked racism to
resentment over imports which predates the U.A.W.'s
protectionist domestic content campaign (Price, 1984). It is
also true that racism and protectionism would be less likely
to occur if trade unions made more sustained efforts not to
cultivate anger at the Japanese. Trade unions could also
engage in more cooperate efforts with progressive trade
unionists overseas e.g. tours with Japanese trade unionists or
support work for Korean trade unionists. Such efforts would
help mitigate whatever racist links existed to protectionism.
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The implications of protectionism for the divisions
between migrants and natives in the auto industry are
difficult to disentangle. Pressure on costs led many
manufacturers to turn to migrant labor in the 1970s. In basic
industry, undocumented workers were hired as a "controllable"
labor force that could easily be displaced. The workers were
used until longer term solutions to cost pressures were tried
such as automating or relocating to Mexico.- Observers of such
transitional workers have argued that they form a latent
reserve function in the economy. Immigrants in the secondary
labor market tend to exercise "downward pressure on working-
class wages and the security and job conditions of domestic
workers" (Morales, 1984: 281). However, primary sector
migrants "supplement the domestic labor force, rather
than...discipline it" (Ibid.: 282-283). Migrant labor is
increasingly hired out in domestic jobs which are unlikely to
filled by native workers. But as immigrants begin to hold
jobs within the U.S., they can become vulnerable to
outsourcing and import penetration:
As undocumented workers were being absorbed into
good paying and often unionized jobs in basic manu-
tacturing in the U.S., U.S. manufacturers were, in
turn, moving production to Mexico, and when possible,
automating as well (Ibid.: 181).
Given the "transitional" and perhaps temporary use of such
migrants in the auto industry, protectionist measures fail
to address the vulerability of these secondary labor market
workers to displacement. Many Mexican-Americans work at
G.M.'s Van Nuys plant, which is more vulnerable to
plant closure from a movement to recentralize production in
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the Midwest than from import penetration. The situation of
migrant workers shows that protectionist measures must be
implemented in conjunction with other policies.
The changing nature of auto industry employment also
raises the question of what jobs protectionist measures are
likely to preserve. A study of the auto industry in the
United Kingdom may point the way for the U.S. market. There,
the impact of technical change was linked to a sharp increase
in the employment share of technicians between 1978 and 1984,
up from 4.5 percent to 5.8 percent. Major reductions have
occurred in employment share for asssembly workers, laborers,
and clerical and secretarial staff. On the other hand, the
development of "internal labor markets," offers to promote
retraining for displaced workers for some of the higher
skilled jobs created (Marsden et. al., 1985). In the U.S.,
the ratio of production workers declined in the post-War era
from its previous high of 85 percent in 1940 to 77 percent
in 1972 (Markusen, 1985: 166). Trends in the use of automated
manufacturing systems will encourage the displacement of
production workers and the growth of more highly trained
personnel in the U.S. auto industry (Shaiken, 1984).
Protectionism will increasingly preserve jobs of more affluent
workers. As a result, the ability of protectionist measures
to protect production workers is limited by whether unions and
workers gain control or influence in the implementation of
technology in the workplace. Critics of the U.A.W. argue
precisely that it has failed to challenge management control
of the use of in plant technology.
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Retailiation and the Risk of International Divisions
Another criticism of protectionism is that it could
create divisions between U.S. and international workers.
This does not appear to be an immediate problem for U.S.
workers' relations with the semi-industrialized nations. A
review of United Nations' data for recent years shows that
even increased protectionism in the auto industry will not be
a major threat to semi-industrialized countries. A 1982
report found that the bulk of Brazilian motor vehicle exports
go to Latin America and Africa, those of Argentina to
Latin America, and those of India to Asia. In 1979, the semi-
industrialized countries accounted for 3.7 percent of the car
imports and 3.4 percent of imports of parts and accessories of
OECD countries. While increasing from 0.2 percent and 0.8
percent in 1970, these proportions are hardly a significant
share of the total OECD market. In judgint the impact of
semi-industrialized countries on the international division of
labor in the motor vehicle industry, Rhys Jenkins concluded:
Despite their growing share of world output, their
importance in terms of world trade in vehicles and
parts is limited and their significance as exporters
to the major developed country markets is negligible.
The major changes in the international division of labor
in recent years have taken place within the advanced
capitalist countries only peripherally (Jenkins,
1985: 68).
As noted earlier, most imports to the U.S. have come from
Japan. Thus, arguments about how protectionism could lead to
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retaliation focus on Japanese auto producers. This problem is
a complex one and cannot be addressed fully here. However, a
cursory discussion will show that the dangers of protectionism
do not necessarily compromise the protectionist arguments
already developed.
As a general consideration, almost all nations engage in
some form of trade controls to protect their auto industries.
In arguing that the risks of retaliation from Japan are low,
the U.A.W. points out that Japan has never retaliated against
the dozens of countries whose auto restrictions are much
tighter than the local content restrictions proposed for
the U.S. Japan has invested in many of the countries which
have implemented content requirements or otherwise regulate
Japanese car imports. In Germany and the United Kingdom,
Voluntary Export Restraints have held Japanese imports to
about ten percent of the domestic market. Spain, Mexico,
Brazil and Australia are all major auto-producing countries
with local content requirements for foreign producers. The
U.A.W. also argues that Japan could not impose trade
sanctions against the U.S. without first going through the
GATT procedures. Its ability to win its case through GATT is
complicated by the ability of the U.S. to file countercharges
against the auto policies of many other GATT members which
regulate Japan's trade through content agreements with which
Japan has cooperated. Most of the products which Japan buys
from the U.S. are raw materials or technological products it
does not have. The U.A.W. argues that Japan would have little
reason to retaliate against the U.S. by buying goods from
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alternative producers who have more restrictive restraints on
auto imports than does the U.S. (U.A.W., 1982).
However, there are many reasons why protectionist
measures which put severe constraints on Japanese import
penetration could provoke retaliation from Japan. In the
Japanese home market, price competition is severe and
overcapacity limits profits. Most of Japan's profits are made
in the U.S. market. Thus, while other nations' economies have
been more closed off to Japanese autos than the U.S., Japanese
producers are now structurally dependent on U.S. markets.
Table 5-1 shows how the Japanese automakers rely on the U.S.
market.
Observers of the effects of a reduction in the bilateral
trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan argue that it
involves "a sharp trade-off between U.S. and Japanese gains"
(Petri, 1984: 157). On the other hand, the value of
protection to the U.S. economy has grown over time. The
greater openness of the U.S. economy and the declising
elasticity of U.S. exports and imports helps account for this
trend. Brandeis economist Peter A. Petri simulated the
effects of the U.S. removing tariffs and quotas unilaterally.
His findings are illustrated in Table 5-2. While the U.S.
increasingly has benefitted from protectionism, his results
also show that the effect of U.S. multilateral protection on
the Japanese economy has diminished over time.
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Table 5-1: U.S. Retail Sales as Percent of 1984 Production
Toyota 23%
Nissan 26%
Honda 35%
Mazda 22%
Mitsubishi 24%*
Fuji 31%
Suzuki 7%*
Isuzu 24%*
*-Includes imports sold by U.S. auto makers.
Source: Ward's Autmotive Reports, Bussiness Week,
February 18, 1985.
Table 5-2: Effects of Eliminating Protection, 1960-1980
Percentage Changes After United States
Removes Tariffs, Quotas Unilaterally
(Simulated Changes)
United States Japan
Exchange Real Exchange Real
Year Rate Income Rate Income
1960 -5.6 -0.08 1.2 0.62
1970 -9.1 -0.28 -0.7 0.24
1980 -5.1 -0.32 -0.7 0.06
Source: Petri, 1984.
The reason for this trend is that "the direct effect of
reduced access to U.S. markets is increasingly offset by the
appreciation of the yen induced by dollar appreciation"
(Ibid.: 147). Some observers of protectionism in the auto
industry have also argued that Japanese auto producers have
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benefitted from U.S. protectionism. Scott (1986) argues that
the V.R.A. quotas created an effective cartel for Japanese
producers, increasing their market power by helping them to
divide up their share of the U.S. market and raise prices
dramatically. M.I.T. economist Paul Samuelson argues that
when the U.S. took increased protectionist measures to trim
the trade deficit in 1971, by allowing the dollar to
depreciate and adding a 20 percent import surcharge, foreign
nations did not take serious retaliatory measures against the
U.S. (Mervosh, 1985).
The removal of existing measures of would hurt the U.S.
more than it would benefit Japan. Increased protectionism
might provoke retaliation and this would create divisions
between workers in export sensitive industries and workers in
basic industry. This cursory discussion implies that
continuing current levels of protection would not risk
retaliation, but measures designed to severely restrict import
penetration might provoke retaliation. Such retaliation is
contingent upon whether the Japanese would lose a significant
level of profit by relocating lost production to the U.S. The
low-content levels of U.S. vehicles and the ability to
successfully replicate assembly operations in the U.S. could
allow for high profit levels in the face of increased
protectionist measures. But, if protectionist measures
regulated the level of Japanese production in the U.S., we
would be left with the same problem of retaliation.
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Corporate Opposition to Protectionism
As Japanese and European products set the standards for
product design and quality in the auto industry, car makers
may be increasingly dependent on protectionist measures.
Joint ventures allow access to this technology and may make
reliance on protectionism less important. A question remains
whether corporate interests will line up behind a significant
expansion of protectionist legislation or set a precedent for
accelerated expansion by passing a large number of the 180
trade protection bills in the House and 300 in the Senate. As
it stands, Ford and Chrysler have supported protectionist
measures in Congress; G.M. has opposed such measures. In
part, Ford and Chrysler's support for protectionism stems from
their greater dependence on small car sales.
Before the rise of coordinated planning by the
Trilateralist Commission, Congress and its constituencies
pressured the Johnson and Nixon Administrations to force
trading partners to limit their exports to the U.S. through a
series of "voluntary" export controls (Spero, 1977: 78-80).
Empirical research on coporate attitudes towards protectionist
legislation and protectionism reveals that a company's trade
policy is more protectionist "as the company faces greater
pressure from import competition, benefits less from access to
foreign markets and it less diversified in the products it
produces and sells..." The last factor is linked to a
company's limited ability to react to import competition
through internal readjustment of production activities. Given
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the greater distribution of risk and increased ability to
shift to new product lines, "the more diversified firm is less
likely to be less protectionist, other things equal"
(Bee Yan Aw and Roberts, 1985). Increased conglomeration in
the auto industry in the 1980s would imply increased corporate
resistance to protectionism.
Another trend, related to conglomeration, which is
leading companies to oppose protectionism is the development
of co-production schemes and patterns of joint ownership with
foreign multinationals. While Ford and Chrysler, more
dependent on small car production than G.M., support
protectionist measures, all Big Three auto makers are
accelerating their imports of cars and parts from overseas.
Such outsourcing has been identified by free trade advocates
as a reason for corporate opposition to protectionism:
"Cutting off imports or jacking up their cost would clobber
American firms that have shifted operations abroad to sell
back to the United States" (Garten, 1985). As noted above
corporations have pursued co-production schemes to gain access
to foreign technology. The development of large regional
markets for advanced products like automobiles also acts as a
force against protectionism:
...a protectionist response might be blocked by
the emerging struggle for markets in newly industri-
alizing nations. The move into such markets...requires
extensive lines of supply between parent firms and their
subsidiaries and between major subsidiaries and new
entities in key markets. Success in these markets
requires that there be no disruption of supply or
substantial increase in the price of intermediate goods
and that there not be any barriers to shipping major
subassemblies to industrial nations (Cohen, 1983b, pp.
558-559).
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As an example of how ties with suppliers overseas work
against protectionism, Ford Motor Co. favors surcharges on
imports from nations that won't reduce their trade surplus
with the U.S. Such a law would affect not only Japan, but
also Korea and Brazil, where Ford is seeking low cost sourcing
to help it compete with the Japanese. In Brazil, Ford makes
engines, electronic components and other parts which it ships
to the U.S. As a result, Ford's vice president for Latin
America concedes that a surcharge "could work against us"
(Buss and Ingrassia, 1985).
As noted previously, the major auto companies have scaled
down production and increased outsourcing as a way to increase
profits. Table 5-3 indicates that the value of labor costs
assumed by in house production is greater in G.M. than in Ford
or Chrysler, contributing to increased labor costs per vehicle
in G.M. Table 5-4 notes that G.M. has lower productivity
levels than Ford or Chrysler. As a result, G.M. has more to
gain in the interim from opposing protectinist measures which
remove the low cost option. Parts may still be supplied by
domestic operations as discussed in Chapters Two and Four.
Again, trends towards increased outsourcing from overseas
would increase corporate opposition to protection until the
industry fully restructures. Exporters and distributors of
foreign products within the U.S. also line up against
protectionism.
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Table 5-3: Sourcing Labor Costs (In Value Terms)
Percent of Labor Cost Assumed by In-House Production and
Sourced from Outside the Big Three by Company
Makes In-House Purchases
General Motors 70% 30%
Ford 45% 55%
Chrysler 30% 70%
Source: Harbour, 1986.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Table 5-4: Productivity, Unit Costs and Profits Per Vehicle
Vehicle Output Per Employee
1984 1985
General Motors 11.0 12.6
Ford 14.8 14.6
Chrysler 20.3 20.9
Fixed Costs Per Vehicle
1984 1985
General Motors $1,863 $1,759
Ford $1,406 $1,425
Chrysler $1,176 $1,155
Profits Per Vehicle before
Interest and Tax Expense
1984 1985
General Motors $933 $728
Ford $910 $822
Chrysler $1,441 $1,290
Source: Donaldson Lutkin & Jenrette as published in
Holusha, 1986a.
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There are other economic trends which work towards
promoting protectionism. The forces promoting "recentral-
ization" of capital within the U.S. discussed in Chapter Four
would lead corporations to protect their anchored investments.
As a general trend, recentralization would be contingent upon
the ability of management to control wage costs and labor
conflict. Automation would promote this trend in some
industries: "current efforts to automate the production of
c'omputer chips may ultimately eliminate the need for the Third
World assembly line" (Cavanagh et. al., 1985, p. 20). Some
auto industry analysts suggest that companies which oppose
protection, like G.M., can be expected to support this policy
after work forces are scaled down by import-induced layoffs and
automation. A U.A.W. economist argues that G.M. will adopt a
protectionist position once the highly automated Saturn
production run is ready and after productivity gains are
maximized (Howes, 1985). Other observers ofthe industry also
believe that G.M. will become vulnerable to mid-sized imports
from Japan and come to favor a protectionist policy (Price,
1985b).
Changing patterns in ndustrial restructuring both support
and oppose the likelihood that corporations would block
protectionist efforts. As the economies of Japan and the U.S.
become more integrated and joint partnerships in the auto
industry flourish, the prospects for increased protectionism
dim. However, the development of domestic technology and
automated manufacturing allow U.S. firms to become more
competitve, albeit on terms less favorable to production
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workers. Recent press reports have noted that G.M. has even
begun to rethink its strategy in the Saturn program given the
success of its joint venture with the Japanese producers in
Freemont. But the development of Japanese production methods
in the U.S. (as a force for recentralization which supports
protection) is still contingent on cooperation with the
Japanese.
In summary, domestic producers may continue to support
protectionism, to be joined by G.M. Such support would limit
protectionist barriers to levels which would allow co-
production with the Japanese (and captive imports) until and
unless U.S. technology and manufacturing capacity increases
greatly.
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Conclusion: Labor Strategy and Industrial Restructuring
The present industrial restructuring in the U.S. auto
industry has limited the ability of protectionist measures to
increase the bargaining power of workers by preserving
employment levels and stabilizing wage rates. Increased
automation, the "squeezing" of suppliers, demands for
decreased work rules and flexible labor practices,
diversification and scaling down of production all contribute
to labor displacement and have increased the costs to workers
of resisting company demands. Capital flight within the U.S.
has confronted workers with displacement as well, although
underlying centrifugal tendencies within the auto industry
have placed limits on this threat. Increasing the scope of
protectionism risk U.S. coporate opposition, if such measures
block outsourcing, and retaliation from Japan, if their
profits in the U.S. market are seriously depressed.
The growing market share of Japanese producers within the
U.S. has also led to displacement, creating limited numbers of
jobs as most of production is sourced from suppliers in Japan.
As such suppliers also relocate to the U.S. some jobs are
created for auto workers. However, Japanese managers have
limited the the U.A.W.'s ability to organize auto workers by
locating in rural or labor weak areas in the United States.
Flexible labor practices in such plants also weaken workers'
control over their lives in the plants although labor-
management cooperation superficially provides some measure of
worker "involvement.-"
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Protectionist measures do not remove serious barriers
between auto workers and other groups such as secondary labor
market workers outside the industry. Nationalist tendencies
associated with protection can also aggravate racist
sentiments and divisions between domestic and foreign
auto workers. Such divisions are increasingly costly as
capital is free to move to foreign nations. This dilemma even
confronts Japanese auto workers whose base of employment in
the auto industry is vulnerable to capital movements to third
nations like Brazil or South Korea.
Each limitation to protectionism indicates that this
policy may bring increased risks or could prove ineffectual.
Nevertheless, our discussion shows that import-induced job
loss contributes significantly to wage loss, displacement and
the resulting weakness in workers' bargaining power.
Regardless of the obstacles, rising import levels seriously
weaken auto workers. The problem can not be ignored.
The ability of protectionism to increase workers'
bargaining power depends partly on whether other policies and
labor strategies are in place. A national policy combining
controls on capital flight and prices would help limit
displacement and the increased cost to consumers that
protectionism might bring. Trade unions and labor coalitions
with consumer and other groups at the national, state or
metropolitan region would be needed to pass such legislation.
If trade unions or workers bargained for controls over how
technology is introduced into auto plants, the risks of
technological displacement would decrease. The risks of
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political nationalism and capital flight would be diminished by
the extension of links and coordinated political efforts
between auto workers in the U.S., Japan and other nations.
Such links are beginning to be developed through rank-and-file
networks and have been proposed by past labor leaders such as
Walter Reuther. Efforts by trade unions to organize
unorganized workers and lobby for income support for the
unemployed would also reduce divisions and threats by
strikebreakers (as well as the cost of job loss).
A threatened boycott of G.M. by workers and community groups
centered around an auto assembly plant threatened with closure
in Van Nuys, California, has also proven an innovative
strategy for increasing workers' power.
While supplementary strategies are critical for labor,
such policies are compromised if they are not combined with
protectionist measures. Regulations on capital flight, a
nationalized auto industry and increased employee ownership
could give workers greater control over investment decisions
and corporations' ability to displace workers. Nevertheless,
even anchored firms are subject to import-induced job loss.
By preserving corporate markets and taking more non-union
wages out of competition, protectionism limits the opportunity
cost to domestic producers of hiring non-union labor. The
link between profits and bargaining power may have been
limited to the critical period from about 1979 to 1982 when
all Big Three profits were severely constrained. But even
today, protectionism may increase bargaining power by making
labor less superfluous and removing the ability of
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corporations to organize politically around the idea that they
are weak and need concessions to stay in business.
Protectionism might have to increase substantially to
reduce the impact which non-union wages and labor concessions
made to low content domestic producers have on national
bargaining patterns. Like increased protection to slow job
loss to such low-content producers, this would risk
retaliation. As a result, it is impossible to say whether or
not the political power of workers could be increased by
dramatically increasing the level of protectionism. The
success of such a policy is contingent on a variety of factors
(see below). Nevertheless, existing protectionist measures
provide a measure of bargaining support.
While protectionist measures under the V.R.A. provided a
measure of bargaining support, corporate restructuring
decreases the effectiveness of protectionism if it is not
implemented in conjuction with other measures. Protectionism
in the absence of other policies may aggravate conditions for
workers:
...Even supplementing trade controls with industrial
policy will have negative consequences, if the goverment
does not simultaneously address regional and national
issues of employment determination. This combined
"macro-micro" approach is essential if a jobs campaign is
to develop policies which weaken the anarchic effects of
capitalist competition while promoting the ability of
labor to forge more extensive anticorporate movements
(Willoughby, 1984: 7).
As an example, protectionism, without controls on capital
flight, might aggravate the problem of plant closings in the
Northern tier states as management seeks to keep labor under
control.
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Arguments which attempts to show that protectionist
measures will help workers in the auto industry are
compromised by the limits of the literature describing the
impact of protectionism, rising import levels and the Japanese
industrial system. The relationship between cause and effect
are not as clear as has been specified in this material.
Critics could argue that the literature confuses correlation
of events with causation. We now examine where this problem
directly limits the case for protectionism.
First, it is not clear whether the Japanese manufacturing
system is responsible for a cost advantage over U.S.
producers. Just because the Japanese are engaged in one set
of production, management and labor practices, and the U.S. is
not, and the Japanese are successful in capturing increased
market share, while the U.S. is not, does not mean that
Japanese business success is the result of just-in-time or
total quality control systems. We have not answered several
questions: How much of the Japanese advantage is based on the
use of new plant and quipment rather than the older capital
employed by U.S. automakers? How much of the Japanese cost
advantage is based on increased "up-time" rather than
intensified labor and speed-ups? How long will the cost
advantage last in the face of a rapidly appreciating yen or
changing patterns in the Japanese work force? A recent trade
report noted that if Japanese car makers continue to raise
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prices, in the face of an appreciated yen, "Japan's $2,000-
per-car pricing advantage will shrink to about $300" (Business
Week, 1986a). Similarly, labor costs may rise as Japan's
labor force is aging rapidly and younger workers are less
eager to sacrifice themselves to company demands (Helm et.
al., 1986). These considerations reveal that cost pressures
may not be linked to a specific manufacturing system, although
competition based on quality and more flexible production will
continue to define a Japanese advantage unless U.S. automakers
become more successful competitors.
A second example of where correlation can not be clearly
linked to causation is the relationship between the increased
profits of automakers and the implementation of the V.R.A.'s.
We have not clearly specified how much of these increased
profits were based on "vertical disintegration", labor
concessions, and increased outsourcing as opposed to markets
sheltered from Japanese competition. Each of these policies
reduces pressures on profits despite increased import levels,
although protectionism clearly helps to increase profits.
In addition to such methodological problems, the ability
of protectionism to aid workers is conditional on a number of
factors which might or might not work on terms favorable to
labor. Assuming first that no supplementary policies are in
place, the ability of protectionism to aid workers is partly
conditional on whether diversification, capital flight, or
automation increase rapidly enough to make protectionism
useless or accelerate precisely because of protectionism. The
role labor resistance would play in accelerating such trends
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cannot be safely predicted. None of these complicaitons mean
that import-induced displacement is not a problem. Rather,
the need to introduce supplementary social policies
complicates other aspects of the protectionist argument.
Because protectionism's ability to aid workers is partly
contingent on supplementary policies, the success of
protectionism also becomes contingent upon the degree to which
corporate opposition makes protectionism more or less likely
politically.
The need for coordination and combination of policies
raises the question of whether industrial restructuring and
the open economy make corporatism and liberal State policies
less likely. Is there an electoral solution to the problem of
gaining the State power needed to implement industrial
policies combined with trade controls? John Willoughby argues
that the internationalization of capital has made corporatist
politics more difficult. In France:
After a brief experiment with Keynesian reflation,
the Mitterand government has reversed its policy by
deciding to control foreign exchange imbalances with
austerity rather than direct regulations.
The French Socialists are "systematically dismatlying the
Gaullist apparatus of guided investment and price regulation"
(Willoughby, 1985: 301-303). The French Government even
cooperated with nationalized Renault in breaking a strike las
year lead by the CGT (Cumes, 1985). The basis for corporatist
politics has seriously weakened--if not disappeared--with the
free movement of capital to low wage areas. Labor peace
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becomes less of a concern for corporations with the ability to
invest capital profitably overseas. Also, social divisions in
the working class have limited the need for liberal state
politicians to carry out economic affairs on terms beneficial
to all workers: social democratic Germany has been able to
pursue austere financial and monetary polcies "because the
threat of unemployment, until recently, has affected only the
'guest' workers" (Willoughby, op. cit.: 309).
The Alternative Economic Strategy proposed for the United
Kingdom, precisely links trade controls with industrial
policies in the manner discussed here. Critics argue that the
radical movement would be needed to implement these kinds of
policies would be subjected to economic destabilization
through capital flight or currency speculation (Block, 1978).
This debate is extensive, but structural arguments which
suggest that such policies are "impossible," make impossible a
priori predictions about what movements could and could not
accomplish. If a powerful political movement rallied around
an AES program, it might be able to pressure the State to
adopt the policy. We can't say a priori that State opposition
would be successful in opposing an AES-type program.
Another problem with the analysis employed is that future
developments may lead to an inconsistency in the chain of
logic used to justify protectionism in this study. An
alliance between Third World labor and domestic workers may
become less likely as more auto workers in nations such as
South Korea are hired in jobs dependent on export markets.
Retaliation becomes a greater problem as capital and labor
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are organized around increased export shares to the U.S.
While Jenkins (1985) has noted that the auto industries of
semi-industrialized nations are not highly integrated into the
economies of advanced Western states, this could change in the
future (Womack, 1986). The U.A.W. believes that South Korea's
sales could rise to ten percent of the U.S. market by 1988
(U.A.W., 1985a).
Another element of conditionality occurs when we examine
the overall impact of protectionism on worker bargaining. It
is conceivable that by guaranteeing the markets of U.S.
producers, protectionism makes automakers less fearful that a
prolonged strike will lead to a loss in customers to the
Japanese. Strikes could becomes less costly to the Big Three.
On the other hand, domestic producers would still have to
reckon with the ability of Japanese producers to increase
their market share with production based in the U.S.
The ability of protectionism to aid workers may also be
contingent on the race, age or seniority level of workers.
Plant closures in Van Nuys, California and Detroit may affect
Mexican-Americans and blacks more directly than an overall
contraction in labor demand caused by increased import
penetration. While such workers may have less seniority than
whites, and may be more vulnerable to import-induced layoffs,
they could also profit less from a "downsized" auto industry
which retains only the most skilled laborers. This problem
could raise obstacles to an alliance between workers with
different seniority levels and social groups.
Because the utility of protectionism is dependent on a
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number of conditional factors, two other issues must be
addressed: How long will protectionism remain an effective
policy? How much emphasis should workers place on
protectionism? Turning to the first question, some have
argued that protectionism should be implemented as long as may
be necessary to allow the industry to regain competitiveness.
As G.M. scales down its work force, it may be more willing to
support protectionism. But if the government continues to
allow increased import penetration with more relaxed
restraints, more links with foreign producers will be
extended, perhaps leading to increased opposition from Ford
and Chrysler. The absence of controls on investment in the
U.S. by the Japanese and other foreign producers may also
permit a loss of share to factories producing "low content"
vehicles. As the Big Three workforce grows smaller,
protection may save less jobs, making this policy less useful
to production workers (although workers in backward-linked
supplier firms may still benefit from protectionist measures).
Therefore, the sooner protectionist measures are implemented,
the more successful they will be in aiding workers. However,
there may come a time after which so many workers have been
displaced from the auto industry that organizing efforts
around this issue will prove to be clearly useless.
How much emphasis should workers place on protectionism?
The answer to this question depends partially on the form of
protectionism, i.e. tariffs, quotas or local content.
Generally, local content and even tariffs may reduce
outsourcing as well as Japanese imports, raising the demand
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for labor and slowing direct labr displacement from the Big
Three from imported captive parts and vehicles. While quotas
have led to the supply by Japan of higher valued autos,
tariffs might not block the demand for increased numbers of
higher quality cars. Therefore, quotas seem more useful than
tariffs in extending the retention of labor. Some measure of
temporary investment controls on foreign automakers might also
be feasible.
To fully answer the question of how much emphasis should
be placed on protection would require further research.
U.A.W. activist Eric Mann argues against planning in the
absence of movements i.e. if no constituency is mobilized
around an issue, then specific proposals made in a vacuum may
fail to attract labor support or are diversionary (Mann,
1986). Therefore, interviews with rank-and-file auto workers,
labor activists and a variety of political constituencies
could help determine how organizing around protection might
advance or limit the goals of labor mobilization in the auto
industry. Nevertheless, the changing structure of the auto
industry requires some role for State intervention to
facilitate workers' bargaining position.
While corporatist politics may prove "unlikely," the
problems which the open economy present to workers has made
increased State regulation more necessary. A recent book on the
auto industry in Great Britain notes:
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...Once the reliance on shop-floor politics was no
longer viable, union politics focused rather less on the
car manufacturers themselves and rather more on the
prospects of political intervention to influence
corporate behavior, either directly or through
suspension of those competitive conditions that
allowed 'harder' management styles to succeed
(Marsden, et. al., 1985: 183-84).
There is the danger that labor-management cooperation to
influence State policies regulating trade could be used by the
Big Three to blackmail workers. On the other hand, the
guarantee of a specified share of domestic markets to the
Big Three under quotas may increase labor's hand to demand a
larger share of corporate profits, income and control of
production.
Rising import levels clearly implicate the open economy
as an obstacle to workers' power. Would alternative policies
such as macroeconomic expansion be more useful to the labor
movement by uniting diverse constituencies without the risks
of retaliation or intra-class divisions? Nations such as
Sweden have relied less on protectionist policies and more on
macroeconomic expansion and technological innovation as a
means to guarantee employment and income to workers.
Political economists Radford Boddy and James Crotty wrote in a
1975 essay that "full emplyment leads to a reduction of wage
differentials among different categories of people" (Boddy and
Crotty, 1975: 9). The power of corporations over workers is
increased by divisions or perceived conflicts of interest
among workers: these are especially pronounced in a recession
or in periods when waged and unwaged workers are divided.
Falling unemployment rates can unify various sectors of the
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workforce because economic expansion reduces wage
differentials and leaves the workforce more homogenous
(Ibid.). However, progressive macroeconomic policy may be
less politically feasible or useful to workers in the U.S.
than the protectionist alternative.
In a progressive nation like Sweden, extensive retraining
of displaced workers and migration of workers to different job
categories in different regions may be easier than in the U.S.
Sweden's small size and progressive traditions make
progressive macroeconomic policies more likely as a
transitional or short-term strategy than in the U.S.
The organization of labor markets is decreasing the likelihood
that economic expansion will promote higher paid jobs. One
study found that the business cycle has played a negligible
role in increasing income inequality (Harrison et. al., 1986).
By specifically targetting a high wage industry, protectionism
helps slow wage erosion as most new jobs generated are lower
paid. Nevertheless, organization of workers in new sectors
could extend higher wage rates.
The specific contribution of the auto industry towards
providing higher wage rates leads us to another consideration:
should trade controls be estended to other industries or is
the auto industry uniquely deserving protection? Unlike many
other industries, the automobile industry provides a large
number of high paying jobs and has extensive economic links
with other sectors. As a result, protection of the auto
industry will have greater multiplier effects in preserving
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jobs than other sectors. Such economic links give auto
workers a critical level of bargaining power not available to
workers in many service industries or in other sectors.
Because auto workers may interrupt productive processes and or
services far beyond their immediate job concern, strikes
become political events and have wide-ranging implications
(Peronne, 1984: 1984: 414). In one exercise, sociologist Luca
Perrone linked workers' disruptive potential to their
industries' economic links with other sectors
1 (Ibid.). Alternative macroeconomic strategies, which re-
directed resources away from managers to workers would be
aided by the strategic power of workers in key industries such
as auto. However, the basis for increased State intervention
to facilitate liberal programs may be undercut as workers are
pulled out of highly-linked strategic sectors such as the auto
industry.
The high wages, extensive economic links and strategic
political position assumed by auto workers make the industry
unique as a target of industrial policy. However, workers in
other economic sectors such as the steel industry have
suffered from increased import levels, displacement and
industry restructuring on terms which are not beneficial to
labor (Locker/Abrecht Associates, Inc., 1985). Like auto, the
steel industry is also a strategic industry. Both firms are
well suited to benefit from protection by becoming sheltered
from "trade cycle deflation" discussed earlier. In firms with
increasing returns to scale, as the loss of competitiveness
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leads to a fall in market share, and output contracts, costs
will rise as scale economices are reduced:
...Hence, the competitive position of the firm
worsens further, causing a further drop in output, and a
cycle of falling output and rising costs (Chichilnisky
and Heal, 1983).
While the limits to protectionism are clear, existing
levels of protectionism under the V.R.A. provided workers with
a measure of increased or potential bargaining power. The
costs to removing such import controls are high. By helping
to slow displacement and the erosion in wages, protectionism
increases the bargaining power of workers. By slowing
displacement, trade controls limit the cost of job loss to
auto workers on the job and provide a meausre of support to
workers' bargaining demands. Wage erosion may be slowed as
workers bargaining power is increased, protectionism slows the
"skidding" of workers into lower paid jobs. The wage and
employment secruity provided under protectionism helps to
promote trade union solidarity, as locals would be under less
pressure to make separate deals with companies to secure work.
Retaliation, international divisions among workers, and
corporate opposition place limits on the utlity of increased
protectionism. At the very least, a ceiling on the market
share taken by Japanese and other foreign imports would
provide workers with a measure of political support without
the complications of retaliation and the acceleration of
automation, capital flight, diversification and corporate
opposition.
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1-The extensive corporate restructuring in the auto industry
shows us the other side of the power equation. In reviewing
Perrone's work, Larry Griffin writes that: "The structural
power of capitalists in those industries which are most
'integrated' into the macro-economy may be magnified by the
very fact that their firms are 'central' to the smooth
operation of the entire system. Hence these employers may
have greater power vis-a-vis state policy, other capitalists,
or even workers employed in the 'core' industries" (Griffen,
1984: 425). Nevertheless, while corporate power may mirror
workers' power in strategic industry, workers' power in the
auto industry (in terms of wages and influence) is greater
than that of many other workers. Corporate power does not
diminish this fact.
Appendix One
MARKET SHARES BY CORPORATION, U. S. CAR REGISTRATIONS,
Year
1916 .......... .................
1947 ......... ...................
1948 ............ . ............
1949 ...................................................
1950 ...................................................
1951 ...................................................
1952 ...................................................
1953 ...................................................
1954 ...................................................
1955 ...................................................
1956 ...................................................
1957 ..................................................
1958 .................... .............................
1959 ...................................................
1960 ...................................................
1961 ...................................................
1962 ...................................................
1963 ...................................................
1964 ...................................................
1965 ...................................................
1966 ...................................................
1967 ...................................................
1968 ...................................................
1969 ...................................................
1970 ...................................................
1971 ...................................................
1972 ...................................................
1973 ...................................................
1974 ...................................................
1975 ...................................................
1976 ...................................................
1977 ...................................................
1978 ...................................................
1979 ...................................................
1980 ...................................................
1981 ...................................................
1982 ...................................................
1983 ...................................................
1984 ...................................................
'-And predecessors. Source: AI. L. Polk & Co.
GM
37.78
41.89
40.63-
42.89
45.48
42.83
41.74
45.07
50.70
50.76
50.78
44.85
46.36
42.10
43.64
46.53
51.87
51.04
49.08
50.07
48.13
49.53-
46.73
46.79
39.73
45.16
44.40
44.32
41.89
43.31
47.22
46.37
47.67
46.42
46.41
44.50
44.02
44.01
44.44
Ford
21.97
21.09
18.82
21.31
24.00
22.16
22.78
25.15.
30.83
27.63
28.45
30.39
26.44
28.12
26.60
28.53
26.30
24.87
26.01
25.47
26.08
22.15
23.70
24.25
26.42
23.52
24.39
23.50
24.96
23.06
22.45
22.66
22.91
20.29
16.51
16.32
16.68
17.11
19.26
Chrysler
25.74
21.77
21.45
21.40
17.61
21.80
21.27
20.31
12.90
.16.82
15.48
18.33
13.92
11.30
14.01
10.79
9.61
12.37
13.81
14.67
15.39
16.05
16.25
15.12
16.09
13.71
13.80
13.33
13.56
11.70
12.91
10.97
10.16
9.02
7.14
8.76
8.61
9.19
9.51
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Studebaker-
AMC* Packard
8.68 5.21
5.88 4.73
6.12 6.33
5.65 6.14
4.90
4.68
5.31
3.55
, 2.01
1.81
1.81
1.77
4.01
6.01
6.42
6.33
6.10
5.67
4.71
3.49
2.95
2.85
2.76
2.54
3.03
2.50
2.83
3.45
3.79
3.72
2.53
1.69
1.44
1.52
1.72
1.58
1.09
2.14
1.86
5.40
5.38
5.39
4.05
2.43
2.06
1.76
1.13
1.08
2.21
1.62
1.23
1.12
0.85
0.32
0.13
0.06
SOURCE: Automotive News, Market Data 9Book, Detroit, 1985.
Kalser-Fraser.
Willys
0.42
4.11
5.38
2.12
2.30
2.57
2.71
1.34
0.47
0.10
- Miscellaneouls
Domestic
0.20
0.53
0.81
0.24
0.15
0.17
0.09
0.02
0.07
0.01
~ 0.07
0.07
0.07
0.09
0.13
0.12
0.11
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
- 0.06
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.00
Imports
......... 
0.46
0.25
0.26
0.41
0.71
0.51
0.59
0.81
1.65
3.46
8.12
10.17
7.58
6.47
4.89
.5.10
6.00
6.11
7.31
9.32
10.48
11.24
14.68
15.06
14.53
15.15
15.74
18.17
14.84
18.26
17.78
22.70
28.18
28.80
29.57
27.54
124.93
-o
192
Appendix -Two
Pereentage Change in Real GNP versus Percentage Change in Totai American
Automobile Sales
per cent
30
20
10
0,
-10
-20
-30
r % change in total American automobile sales
- % change in real gross national product
/ I/
'p
I,
1971 72 7'74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
Sources: Wapds Data Bank. Detroit; and National Income and Product Accounts of the United States.
SOURCE: As published in Laffer et. al, 1985.
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Appendix Three
The Cost per Automobile of Federal
Safety and Emissions Regulation, 1966-81
(current $/car)
Equipment Costs Total Costs
(Including Maintenance &
Year Safety Emissions Total Fuel Economy Penalty)
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
40
73
115
129
157
166
171
258
380
358
373
384
393
421
467
494
0
0
14
15
24
25
25
44
49
119
126
123
133
148
222
600
40
73
129
144
181
191
196
302
429
477
499
507
526
569
689
1094
40
73
129
144
181
191
366
790
970
664
696
850
895
980
1373
1894
SOURCE: As published in Crandall, 1984,
S.-
0Li~.
Ca)0-0-
LAOD
.4-S.-
(1)
'4-4-
195
Appendix'Tive
Robot Density
Robots per 100.000 Mfg Workers
Change in Robot Definition
81
+ Germany Japan
SOURCE: U.A.W., 1985b.
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
s0
60
40
20
0
73 79
01 U.S.
82
Sweden
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Appendix Si x
Comparing Japanese and U.S. Car Prices
PERCENT
MODEL 81986 -CHANGE
Subopadt
Honda Civic $ 7,295 $ 7,993 9.6%
Mazda 323 LX 7,395 8,495 14.9
Dodge Omni SE 6,342 6,558 3.4
Ford Escort L 6,127 6,327 3.3
Compact
Honda Accord LX 10,645 12,469 17.1
Mazda 626 LX 10.245 11,045 7.8
Ford Tempo LX 8,302 8,777 5.7
Olds Ciera 9,493 10,153 7.0
Intennediate/Luxury
Toyota Cressida 15,690 17,480 11.4
Pontiac 6000 STE 15,539 15,949 2.6
'*redecesar model
Street Journal), March 29, 1985.SOURCE: Nag (Wall 1
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Average Hourly Wages of Automobile and Manufacturing Workers: U.S.
1950-1982, in 1967 Dollars
'Appendix -Seven
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1.973-
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Automobile hourly
wages as percent
of manufacturing
hourly wages
124
122
125
123
124
124
121
121
121
124
124
123
125
127
127
128
127
126
129
129
126
132
134
133
133
133
136
138
138
135
137
137
131
Real wages
automobile
workers in
1967 dollars
$2.45
2.46
2.58
2.67
2.73
2.86
2.89
2.92
2.94.
3.10
3.17
3.19
3.30
3.38
3.46
3.53
3.54
3.55
3.73
3.73
3.63
3.89
4.09
4.10
3.97
4.00
4.16
4.33
4.36
4.17
4.00
4.06
3.85
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Emoloyment
and Earnings, U.S.: 1909-78, Washington, D.C., 1978; U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Supplement to
Emoloyment and Earnings, Washington, D.C., June 1982; U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earninzs, vol. 30, no. 3, March 1983.
SOURCE: As published in Trachte and Ross, 1983.
Real wages U.S.
manufacuring
workers in
1967 dollars
$1.98
2.01
2.06
2.17
2.21
2.31
2.40
2.42
2.42
2.51
2.55
2.59
2.64
2.67
2.72
2.76
2.79
2.82
2.89
2.91
2.88
2.94
3.05
3.07
2.99
3.00
3.06
3.13
3.16
3.08
2.93
2.97
2.94
Sources:
Appendix Eight
COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME DURING UNEMPLOYMENT: TOTAL SAMPLE
Original Job FLrst Month Layoff Last Month Layoff
lirnPr .nrnm~ IA. I 
-
Spouse Income
16%
Individual Earnings
83%
Other Income 7%
(TAA 4% of Total. Household Income)
Spouse Income
17%E INN
SUB benefits
22%
Unemployment Compensation
54%
Individual Earnings 4%
Other Income 12%
(TAA 6% of Total Household
Income)
SUB benefits
14%
Spouse Income
31%
Unemployment Compensation
39%
I___________________________ I
Total: $404.24 Total: $332.90 Total: $237.05
SOURCE: Gordon et. al., 1984.
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